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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS IN FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
by
Jan Sokolowsky
Chair: Melvin Stephens, Jr.
This dissertation is comprised of three essays in financial economics. Chapter 1
is a critique of a highly influential paper in corporate governance. Chhaochharia and
Grinstein (2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that were not
compliant with the recent NYSE/Nasdaq board independence requirement than in
firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable
to two outliers out of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensa-
tion committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in
the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the
effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the
managerial power hypothesis.
In chapter 2, we investigate whether the earnings overstatements that led to
the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act (SOX) may have been an intended consequence of pay-for-
performance. We find that incentives were higher when current shareholders stood
x
to benefit from overstatements by selling their shares at inflated prices. Incentives
also fell in response to the additional costs imposed by SOX, and the decrease is con-
centrated in firms whose shareholders benefit from overstatements. If overstatements
were a symptom of the agency conflict, incentives should have increased around SOX
to induce more productive effort as managers voluntarily cut back on overstatements.
The empirical evidence thus rejects the view that earnings overstatements prior to
2002 were an unintended consequence of pay-for-performance.
In chapter 3, we explore the relationship between obesity and household credit
risk. Obesity is a known health risk factor and carries a social stigma. Its presence
provides a potentially informative signal about individuals’ choices and preferences.
Using NLSY survey data, we estimate that the loan delinquency rate among the obese
is 20% higher than among the non-obese after controlling for numerous observable,
prohibited, and — to lenders — unobservable credit risk factors. The economic
significance of obesity for delinquencies is comparable to that of job displacements.
Obesity is particularly informative about future delinquencies among those with low
credit risk. In terms of channels, we find that the obesity effect is at least partially
mediated through poor health, but is not attributable to individuals’ time preferences.
xi
CHAPTER 1
CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited
1.1 Introduction
Whether board composition affects executive pay has been the subject of debate
for decades. Proponents of the managerial power hypothesis (e.g., Bebchuk, Fried
and Walker (2002)) argue that managers’ influence over their directors allows them
to extract rents, for example, through excessive pay. An implication of the theory is
that making boards more independent from management is key to improving corpo-
rate governance. The spectacular rise in executive pay over the 1990s has made the
managerial power hypothesis, with all its implications, a popular view among politi-
cians, regulators, academics, and the media. In the wake of the accounting scandals
that led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, NYSE and Nasdaq revised their listing
standards to improve corporate governance. The stock exchanges now require boards
to have a majority of independent directors, as well as fully independent nominating,
compensation, and auditing committees.
If independent directors are indeed better monitors of CEOs, then according to
the managerial power hypothesis CEO pay should decline. To test this prediction,
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) (henceforth CG) use firms’ compliance status
before the rule change to identify the causal effect of board composition on CEO
pay. The independence mandate is an exogenous constraint imposed by the stock
exchanges and provides a quasi-experimental setting. The main advantage to CG’s
difference-in-difference approach is that they circumvent the endogeneity problem
identified by Hermalin and Weisbach ((1998), (2003)) that has plagued the empirical
literature on the effects of board characteristics.
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CG find that CEO pay decreases 17% more in noncompliant firms than in com-
pliant firms, which they interpret as the causal effect of improvements in board inde-
pendence. Their findings are consistent with the managerial power hypothesis, that
is, with the view that non-independent directors allow CEOs to extract rents in the
form of higher pay.
We reexamine the impact of the new independence mandate on CEO pay using
CG’s data and methodology. We document that CG’s main results are mostly at-
tributable to the decrease in pay for just two CEOs, namely, Steve Jobs at Apple
and Kosta Kartsotis at Fossil. We argue that Jobs’ and Kartsotis’ pay are outliers
because they unduly impact the mean estimate of the noncompliance effect and they
do not fit the story of the causal effect of board independence on CEO pay. Dropping
these two firms from the full sample of 865 firms (i.e., 12 out of 5,190 firm-years)
reduces the point estimate of the effect of board independence by 74%, rendering
it economically insignificant and statistically indistinguishable from zero even at the
20% significance level. As such, the mean causal effect of board independence on
CEO pay as identified by CG is not generalizable to large publicly traded firms.1
CG’s results for compensation committees are also sensitive to the outliers. Ex-
cluding the two outliers uncovers an increase in CEO pay in firms whose compensation
committees are not fully independent prior to the new listing requirements relative
to compliant firms. Moreover, the increase in CEO pay is most pronounced in the
presence of stronger shareholder monitoring (i.e., blockholder directors and concen-
trated institutional ownership). These findings are inconsistent with the view that
independent directors prevent managers from extracting rents in the form of excessive
1The IRRC definition of independence is stricter than those of the NYSE/Nasdaq. In an attempt
to adjust for the discrepancies, CG reclassify former employees as independent if three or more
years have passed since termination. While reclassifying former employees, however, CG ignore
other IRRC disqualifications of independence, such as business relationships. Therefore, they end
up treating business relationships inconsistently: former employees with business ties to the firm
are considered independent, while directors with business ties who were not formerly employed are
not considered independent. An anonymous referee finds that in all the cases he/she checked, the
relationships are immaterial under the NYSE/Nasdaq rules. If we treat all such relationships as
immaterial, the number of firms not compliant with the new board independence requirements in
CG’s sample decreases from 142 to 50. Since the misclassification does not alter our conclusions, we
use CG’s definition of noncompliance. We plan to investigate this issue in more detail in separate
research.
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pay.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we replicate
CG’s estimate of the effect of board independence on CEO pay. In Section 1.3, we
show that the magnitude of CG’s estimate is sensitive to the outliers. In Section
1.4, we argue that the change in CEO pay at the outliers was not caused by the
board independence mandate. In Section 1.5, we show that CG’s result is fragile
even if we allow the effect of independence to vary with the strength of shareholder
monitoring prior to the independence requirement. In Section 1.6, we explore the
effect of compensation committee independence on CEO pay. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 The Effect of Board Independence on CEO Pay: Replication of CG’s
Estimates
Column 1 of Table 1.1 reproduces CG’s main result on board independence from
Table II, column 1 of the published paper: the estimated effect of noncompliant board
× after is −0.192 (with an implied p-value of 2.6%). In columns 2 and 3 we present
the results from replicating CG’s main result using their data.3 The estimates do not
match the published results.
Reconciling the differences requires two modifications of the estimates. First,
one would have to combine the estimates from two regressions, namely, the larger
point estimate from the regression that controls for CEO tenure (column 2) and the
smaller standard error from the regression that excludes CEO tenure (column 3). As
some firms have missing data on CEO tenure, controlling for CEO tenure reduces
the sample size from 5,190 to 4,956 observations. Using the full sample by dropping
tenure from the regression lowers the magnitude of the estimate slightly to −0.173
2Our findings are also congruent with Anderson and Bizjak (2003) and Wan (2003) in that
director independence has little effect on executive pay.
3We also construct our own sample following CG’s data requirements (six years of director data
from IRRC, six years of CEO pay data, but allowing for missing observations on tenure). Our final
sample contains 909 firms (including Apple and Fossil). Our findings become qualitatively stronger
when we use our own sample instead of CG’s, which suggests that CG’s results are also sensitive to
sample selection effects. The results are available in Table 1.A.1 in Appendix 1.A to keep the focus
of the paper on the effect of outliers.
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(p-value of 4.6%). Second, one would have to truncate the estimates after the third
decimal place, instead of rounding them to the nearest thousandth.4
To minimize the possibility that sample selection is driving our results below (and
to avoid contention over which sample to use), we use CG’s full sample (i.e., 5,190
observations) as the benchmark for comparison throughout our paper. In doing so, we
complement their data by hand-collecting missing observations on CEO tenure from
various sources such as companies’ websites and proxy statements, Hoover company
records, and news and reports from Forbes and Business Week.5 Column 4 of Table
1.1 contains the replicated results from the full sample, in which missing observations
on CEO tenure have been replaced with hand-collected data. Overall, the magnitude
and statistical significance of the coefficient of CG’s main result remain quantitatively
similar to those in the regression without the tenure variable.6 The coefficient of
−0.179 translates into a decline in CEO pay of 16.4% (p-value of 4.1%). Note that
after the corrections and additions to CEO tenure observations, the coefficient on
tenure becomes statistically significant at conventional levels.
1.3 The Impact of Outliers on CG’s Estimates
Fig. 1.1 presents the histogram of the change in CEO pay for noncompliant firms.
As only 142 sample firms are noncompliant with the new listing requirements, es-
timates of the mean effect of noncompliance are particularly susceptible to outliers
among the noncompliant firms. CG read the proxy statements for some of the non-
complying firms that had the largest drop in compensation. They find that the decline
4To account for serial correlation within firms, CG use clustered standard errors at the firm-
period level. The clusters, however, are not nested within firm-level panels. As such, the degrees of
freedom should be adjusted using the dfadj option in Stata. On average, the adjustment increases
the estimates of the standard errors by about 10%, but we omit the adjustment to make our results
more comparable to those of CG. Using the placebo technique suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and
Mullainathan (2004) yields similar results. Note that we report the within-R2, which is maximized
by the fixed effects estimator, whereas CG reported the overall-R2.
5To allow future replication of our results, Table 1.A.2 in Appendix 1.A presents the year in
which the executive was first appointed as the CEO of the company for observations with either
missing or incorrect data on CEO tenure in the Execucomp database.
6Throughout the paper, our results are robust to using the actual sample that CG used in
their main results (4,956 observations) and to excluding the tenure variable completely from the
regressions.
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in CEO pay at Adobe Systems and Compuware — which rank fourth and fifth in the
distribution — appears to be linked to a reevaluation of incentive pay. However,
there is no mention of the three firms with the largest decrease in CEO pay: Steve
Jobs at Apple, Kosta Kartsotis at Fossil, and Jack Welch at GE. Apple and Fossil
are clearly identifiable outliers among the noncompliant firms.7 We argue that the
decrease in CEO pay at Apple and Fossil makes them outliers for two reasons. First,
the decrease is very large in magnitude, particularly for Apple. As such, these two
firms unduly influence CG’s estimate of the effect of board independence on CEO
pay. Second, CEO pay at Apple and Fossil is idiosyncratic in nature. In a nutshell,
Kartsotis insisted on the decrease himself, and Jobs’ pay is erratic and tied to unusual
circumstances. In other words, neither the magnitude nor determinants of the change
in CEO pay at Fossil and Apple are representative of other firms in CG’s sample or
are driven by the recent board mandate. We devote Section 1.4 to an in-depth look
at the circumstances of Kartsotis’ and Jobs’ pay cuts, but first explore the sensitivity
of CG’s main result to these outliers.
In column 5 of Table 1.1, we account for the outliers’ excessive influence on CG’s
mean estimate by excluding Apple and Fossil from the regression. The magnitude of
the coefficient on noncompliant × after drops from −0.179 to −0.047, or by 74%.8
CG’s main result becomes statistically insignificant even at the 20% level due to the
decrease in its magnitude, and despite the large decrease in its standard error (p-value
of 23%). Interestingly, excluding the outliers also affects the coefficients and standard
errors of all other explanatory variables appreciably, even though the empirical model
constrains the coefficients to be equal for compliant and noncompliant firms. In other
words, removing Apple and Fossil significantly affects the mean estimates derived from
865 firms. This implies that the relationship between CEO pay and the explanatory
7Apple and Fossil constitute outliers based on z-scores exceeding ±3.3, which corresponds to
a probability of less than 0.1% of those values occurring (assuming that the change in ln(pay) is
normally distributed). Oracle is a large positive outlier among the compliant firms. Excluding
Oracle from our analyses further strengthens our results.
8Our results remain quantitatively similar throughout all our analyses in the paper even if we
drop only Apple from the regressions. In this case, the magnitude of the coefficient of CG’s main
result drops from −0.179 to −0.068 (p-value of 9.8%), or by 62%.
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variables at Apple and/or Fossil is fundamentally different from the other sample
firms.
An alternative solution to dealing with outliers is to use the least absolute de-
viations method (i.e., median regression) for estimation, which is less sensitive to
extreme observations. The main benefit to using a median regression is that we need
not explicitly (and perhaps subjectively) identify outliers. In column 6 of Table 1.1,
we present results from the median regression (including Apple and Fossil). Since the
inclusion of a large number of variables exponentially increases the time required to
obtain quantile regression estimates, we account for firm fixed effects by demeaning
all variables and including industry-period dummies instead of industry-year dum-
mies. We estimate bootstrapped standard errors to allow for heteroskedasticity and
clustering at the firm-period level (Petersen (2009)). We find that CG’s main result
is weakened to −0.045 (p-value of 28%). We conclude that the median effect of board
independence on CEO pay is economically and statistically insignificant.
Conceptually, if board independence indeed affects CEO compensation decisions,
its influence should extend to the remuneration of non-CEO top executives. After all,
the same directors who negotiate or approve CEO compensation are also responsible
for the compensation of other top executives. If board independence strengthens di-
rectors’ bargaining position vis-a`-vis top executive officers, then we would also expect
non-CEO executives’ pay to decrease in noncompliant firms. In contrast, if CG’s main
result is driven mainly by outliers in CEO pay, then the board independence require-
ment should have no effect on the remuneration of non-CEO top executives. Column
7 presents the results. We include all non-CEO top executives with non-missing pay
data in Execucomp in our regression, including those of Apple and Fossil. Again, CG’s
main result is weakened substantially to −0.031 and remains statistically insignificant
at conventional levels (p-value of 28%).9
To summarize, we provide strong empirical evidence that CG’s main finding on
9The results are robust to excluding some outliers in non-CEO pay changes (the influence of any
one outlier on the mean estimate is mitigated by the larger number of observations). Our results
also remain quantitatively similar if we use the average pay of these non-CEO top executives or just
the highest-paid non-CEO top executive in our analysis.
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the effect of board independence on CEO pay is fragile. In particular, CG infer the
effect of noncompliance for a broad sample of 865 large and publicly traded firms
primarily from the change in Steve Jobs’ and Kosta Kartsotis’ pay. We conclude that
the mean effect documented by CG is not representative of the sample firms.
1.4 Do the Outliers Fit the Story?
Panels A and B of Table 1.2 present the various components of the total pay to
Kosta Kartsotis and Steve Jobs.10 Kartsotis earned approximately $255,000 annually
in 2000 to 2004, but his pay dropped to nearly zero in 2005. Similarly, Jobs’ total
pay ranged from $75 million to $600 million per year between 2000 and 2003, and
dropped to a symbolic $1 per year in 2004 and 2005.
As the boards of Apple and Fossil did not comprise a majority of independent
directors prior to the passage of the board reform, at first sight the substantial drop
in their CEOs’ pay during the post-reform period is consistent with the claim that
the board independence requirement did indeed affect CEO compensation decisions.
Alternatively, it might be coincidence that CEO pay dropped in these firms, that is,
the drop may be related to factors other than the board independence requirement.
To disentangle these two competing hypotheses, we examine the individual pay to
Kosta Kartsotis and Steve Jobs during our sample period. The plunge in their pay
seems to be driven by CEO/firm-specific factors other than the board independence
requirement.
1.4.1 Kosta Kartsotis
Kosta Kartsotis is the brother of Tom Kartsotis — founder of Fossil, former CEO,
and chairman of the board in 2005. At the beginning of fiscal year 2005, Kosta and
Tom were the firm’s largest shareholders, owning about 30% of the firm’s shares.
Given the Kartsotis’ continuing and pervasive influence on the firm — holding the
10The information on Fossil and Apple comes from their DEF 14A filings with the SEC (available
from 〈http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml〉). We obtain historical stock prices from CRSP and political
contributions from 〈http://www.opensecrets.org〉.
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positions of founder, chief executive officer, chairman of the board, and largest share-
holders between them — it is highly implausible that the pay cut was caused by the
director independence mandate.
In fact, it was Kosta Kartsotis himself, rather than the compensation committee
or the board as a whole, who proposed that his base salary be cut from $255,000 to
$0 in 2005. The voluntary cut was motivated by his concern about Fossil’s recent
stock price performance. In 2005, the stock price of Fossil dropped by about 16%,
compared to a 1% average increase for the industry. The pay cut can be described as
symbolic, as Kosta Kartsotis’ stake in the company exceeded $200 million in 2005.
Further, even prior to becoming majority-independent, the board followed Kart-
sotis’ recommendation on pay. Kosta Kartsotis was appointed as the CEO of Fossil
in October 2000. Between 2001 and 2004, the cumulative return on Fossil’s stock
was 398%, while that for the industry average was 207%. Despite outperforming his
industry peers, and the compensation committee’s explicit recognition in the firm’s
proxy statements for 2002 to 2004 that Kartsotis’ pay was below the market median,
Kartsotis repeatedly requested that his pay not be raised. His refusal to accept pay
increases is contradictory to the claim that the board independence requirement has
been important to compensation decisions at Fossil.
1.4.2 Steve Jobs
Steve Jobs went from earning more than $600 million in 2000 to $1 in 2005. What
happened at Apple for Steve Jobs to experience such a drastic reduction in pay?
Paradoxically, the decline in pay does not reflect a pay cut, but rather temporarily
abnormal pay to Jobs in the early sample period from 2000 to 2003. His base salary
has remained unchanged at $1 per year since he rejoined the company as interim
CEO in September 1997. As Jobs’ annual total pay typically consists only of the base
salary, his total pay was merely $1 per year in 1998 and 1999, and it returned to $1
for 2004 to 2008.
Jobs’ erratic compensation reflects four events. First, in fiscal year 2000, upon
accepting the position of permanent CEO at Apple, Jobs was granted options with
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a Black-Scholes value of $600 million, which was the second largest annual pay ever
awarded to a corporate executive in the U.S. at that time. Later that year, Ap-
ple’s stock price dropped precipitously, rendering the options worthless. Second, in
fiscal year 2001, Jobs received a $90 million bonus for his success as interim CEO
during fiscal years 1997 to 1999. Third, in 2002, the board decided to grant Jobs
additional options valued at $90 million, because the previously granted options no
longer tied Jobs’ pay to firm performance (these new options carried an exercise price
of $18.30). Fourth, in 2003, Jobs voluntarily canceled his outstanding options when
Apple’s shares traded at around $14.50. The board chose to replace those options
with restricted stocks worth $75 million. In 2004 and 2005, Jobs did not receive any
additional stocks or options — his pay went back to the token $1 salary he earned in
1998 and 1999.
The firm fixed-effects model used by CG is inadequate to explain the erratic
timing and magnitude of Jobs’ pay.11 Specifically, the time-series variation in Jobs’
total pay violates the matching principle, i.e., Jobs’ pay is typically not timed to
match his contributions and services rendered during the period. More importantly,
Jobs’ recorded pay does not always reflect the decisions of the board in that year, but
those of prior years. During the entire period from September 10, 1997 to December
1999, Jobs received total pay of merely $2 for serving as the interim CEO of the
company, while the value of Apple’s shares more than quadrupled. To reward him
for his outstanding achievement during that period, the board granted Jobs a special
executive bonus in the form of an aircraft in December 1999. The total cost of the
aircraft (including tax benefits) was approximately $90 million and was eventually
reported as income to Jobs in 2001 and 2002, because the aircraft was not physically
transferred to him until 2001.
11To obtain a reliable estimate from the firm fixed-effects model, one requires a stable relationship
between time-varying economic factors (e.g., firm sales, firm performance, and tenure) and CEO
total pay. In Jobs’ case, the relationship is unstable. As such, the time-series variation in his pay is
poorly captured by the firm fixed-effects model.
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Jobs’ $600 million option grant in 2000 also violates the matching principle, be-
cause it provided him with multiple years’ worth of annual stock options at once.12
As such, this mega grant is equivalent to early payment for services that Jobs had
not yet rendered, but was expected to render in future years.
In addition, Apple’s poor stock performance contributed to Jobs’ high pay in 2000
to 2003. When Apple’s stock price was declining, the board replaced underwater
options to maintain incentives. After 2003, when Apple’s stock price was rising,
no further grants were necessary. This negative relationship between pay and stock
performance at Apple contrasts sharply with the empirical relationship found in Table
1.1 — the positive coefficient on stock returns shows that, on average, CEOs’ pay
increases with prior-year stock returns. Instead, some of Jobs’ pay was contingent
on prior pay becoming worthless (i.e., new grants were made only because previous
grants ended up not costing Apple’s shareholders anything).
Despite earning only a $1 salary in 2004 and 2005, Jobs was well compensated
for his effort. The market value of his stock holdings increased from $75 million in
March 2003 (date of stock grant) to $540 million in September 2005 (end of sample
period). Furthermore, the impact of the fluctuations in the value of the stock and
option grants on CG’s finding is exacerbated by Jobs’ token salary of $1 over the
sample period (small changes in the dollar value of pay lead to large changes in the
log value of pay at low income levels). Overall, the magnitude of CG’s result seems to
reflect a temporary restructuring of incentive pay at Apple rather than a systematic
adjustment to the level of pay in large, publicly traded firms in the U.S.13
12On March 18, 2008, Jobs gave a deposition to the SEC regarding the option backdating case
against two top executives at Apple, in which he described the mega option grant as designed
to provide four years’ worth of equity upfront. The full text of the deposition is available at
〈http://images.forbes.com/media/2009/04/24/jobs-deposition.pdf〉.
13The board room dynamics at Apple also illustrate the shortcomings of formal director indepen-
dence. Jobs personally contributed $50,000 to the Democratic National Committee on November
1, 2000 (a soft money campaign contribution; after his options became worthless), but not to the
Republicans. Then, in September 2002, former Vice President Al Gore joined Apple’s board and
compensation committee as an independent director. Also, from 2003 onward, continuing director
Millard Drexler was deemed an independent director, despite his and Jobs’ prior interlocking rela-
tionship. Until 2002, Jobs was CEO of Apple and served on Gap’s board, while Drexler was CEO of
Gap and served on Apple’s board. Perhaps not coincidentally, Drexler also joined the compensation
committee at Apple starting in 2003. Therefore, it is questionable whether the increase in formal
board independence made Apple’s directors more effective monitors.
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To summarize, we find that including the large drops in pay for Kosta Kartsotis
and Steve Jobs leads to false inferences about the effect of board independence on
CEO pay for most other firms. The changes at Apple and Fossil do not fit the story
of board independence causing a drop in CEO pay.
1.5 CEO Compensation, Board Independence, and Shareholder Moni-
toring
CG contend that effective shareholder monitoring mutes the effect of board inde-
pendence on CEO pay. We follow CG in allowing the noncompliance effect to vary
(i) between firms with and without a non-employee blockholder on the board (as sug-
gested by Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)), and (ii) with institutional ownership
concentration (as suggested by Hartzell and Starks (2003)).
1.5.1 Blockholder Directors
The data set supplied to us by CG does not contain their measure for the presence
of blockholder directors. We follow CG in identifying the presence of director block-
holders based on non-employee directors holding 5% or more of their firms’ shares
in 2002.14 Column 1 in Panel A of Table 1.3 reproduces CG’s main result on block
ownership from Table VII, column 1 of the published paper: the estimated effect of
noncompliant board × after × no blockholder is −0.270 (p-value of less than 0.01%).
Column 2 presents the results from replicating CG’s main result. Again, we fail to
replicate CG’s published results, particularly the standard errors. If we reversed the
standard errors of the point estimates for noncompliant firms with and without block-
holder directors, then we would obtain results reasonably close to CG’s. In column 3
we present the replicated results based on the full sample. The magnitude of the co-
efficient of CG’s main result drops slightly to −0.262 (p-value of 1.3%). CG’s results
14CG offer two conflicting definitions for blockholder directors. On page 254 of the published
article, they define a blockholder director as a nonemployee director who owns 5% or more of the
outstanding shares. However, on page 255, CG write that the ownership cutoff is more than 5%
of the outstanding shares. We identify 35 noncompliant firms with blockholder directors under the
first definition, compared to 34 noncompliant firms with blockholder directors under the second
definition. The results are insensitive to which definition we use.
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indicate that the board independence requirement led to a large decrease in CEO
pay in noncompliant firms, but only in the absence of blockholder directors. Their
findings suggest that blockholder directors are an effective monitoring substitute for
board independence.
As neither Apple nor Fossil have non-employee blockholder directors on their
boards in 2002, we investigate the sensitivity of CG’s estimates to the outliers in
columns 4 to 6. In column 4, we account for the outliers’ excessive influence on CG’s
mean estimate by excluding them from the regression. The magnitude of the coef-
ficient drops to −0.100, or by 62%, but it maintains its statistical significance with
a p-value of 2.5%. Contrary to CG’s findings, however, we also find a significant
increase in CEO pay in noncompliant firms with non-employee blockholder directors
(coefficient of 0.111; p-value of 7.7%). This result suggests that the board indepen-
dence requirement has had the unintended consequence of increasing CEO pay in
firms with blockholder directors.15,16
We present results from the median regression and from non-CEO top executive
pay in columns 5 and 6 as alternative ways to examine the robustness of CG’s main
result to outliers. Our estimate from the median regression is −0.074.17 The pay
of non-CEO top executives responds even less to the board independence mandate
(coefficient of −0.039). Neither estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at
conventional significance levels, indicating that outliers drive CG’s published result.
15In additional robustness tests, we also control for changes in blockholder presence and insti-
tutional concentration, as well as interactions between the substitute monitor classifications prior
to the rule change with a dummy identifying the period after the rule change. The results remain
similar.
16Using our own data set (as opposed to CG’s), the noncompliance effect is also positive and
highly significant in firms with blockholder directors (coefficient of 0.160). However, the coefficient
for noncompliant firms without blockholder directors is of very small magnitude (−0.005) and not
distinguishable from zero. The estimation results are available in Table 1.A.1.
17The absence of blockholder directors is the only instance in which using industry-year dummies
rather than industry-period dummies in a median regression with demeaned data yields an estimate
of the effect of noncompliance that is statistically significant at the 10% level (coefficient of −0.079,
p-value of 7.2%).
12
1.5.2 Institutional Ownership Concentration
We follow CG in defining institutional ownership concentration as the sum of
shares held by the five largest institutional investors relative to total institutional
shareholdings in the firm. Note that CG deviate from Hartzell and Starks (2003) in
classifying high and low ownership concentration as belonging to the top and bottom
quartile of the distribution in their sample, whereas Hartzell and Starks use concen-
tration as a continuous measure. For the sake of comparability to CG’s results, we
follow CG’s classification into quartiles based on all sample firms’ 2002 observations.18
Column 1 in Panel B of Table 1.3 reproduces CG’s results on institutional owner-
ship concentration from Table VII, column 2 of the published paper. They find that
noncompliant firms with low concentration of institutional holdings decrease CEO
pay by 21.2% more than compliant firms (coefficient of −0.238; implied p-value of
2.6%). However, CG acknowledge that the decrease in CEO pay in noncompliant
firms with low concentration of institutional ownership is not statistically different
from the decrease for firms with high concentration, for which they report a statisti-
cally insignificant point estimate of −0.176.
Column 2 in Panel B of Table 1.3 displays our replication estimates. The esti-
mates differ greatly from CG’s published results, as we find that neither noncompliant
firms with high institutional concentration nor noncompliant firms with low institu-
tional concentration decrease CEO pay relative to compliant firms (neither estimate
is distinguishable from zero at conventional significance levels).
Why are our estimates so different from CG’s published results?19 We suspect
that the difference stems from a discrepancy in CG’s research design and their imple-
18The data set supplied by CG contains measures of institutional ownership by the top 5 in-
stitutions and total institutional ownership, but some observations are missing. We were able to
match every firm in CG’s data set with institutional ownership data from TFN. To keep the sample
consistent throughout the paper, we proceed using our measure of institutional ownership concen-
tration. For each firm, we calculate the average value of institutional concentration over the four
quarters in calendar year 2002. The results based on CG’s measures are similar. Our findings remain
qualitatively identical when we use the continuous measure of institutional ownership concentration.
19Without access to CG’s coding or clarifications on the implementation, we are unable to replicate
their published results (even using CG’s data on institutional ownership). Our replication attempts
rely on trial and error. The following section is based on the replication that yields estimates closest
to the published results.
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mentation of it. The research design for institutional ownership concentration, as laid
out in their published paper, is problematic. CG allow the effect of noncompliance
to differ between firms with high and low institutional ownership concentration (i.e.,
firms in the top and bottom quartiles), but implicitly constrain the noncompliance
effect of firms with institutional concentration in the interquartile range to be zero
(i.e., those firms are treated like compliant firms). However, in the implementation
CG appear to treat all firms in the bottom three quartiles as having low institutional
ownership concentration.
The next two columns present results based on modifications of CG’s original
methodology. For column 3, we allow the effect of noncompliance to differ across all
four quartiles of institutional concentration. As before, we find that noncompliant
firms in the top and bottom quartiles of institutional concentration do not decrease
CEO pay by more than compliant firms. Since both outliers — Apple and Fossil
— belong to the third quartile, it is not surprising that the decrease in CEO pay
is concentrated there. The point estimate of −0.804 is unrealistic, as it suggests
that board independence in the presence of medium-to-high ownership concentration
causes CEO pay to drop by over 55%. For column 4, we redefine low institutional
concentration to encompass all noncompliant firms in the bottom three quartiles of
the distribution. These results are closest to CG’s published results. Note that the
low institutional concentration group now includes Apple and Fossil, which drive both
the magnitude and significance of CG’s result.
As before, we account for the outliers’ influence on CG’s mean estimate by ex-
cluding them from the regression (column 5), using a median regression (column 6),
and evaluating the effect of board independence on non-CEO executive pay (column
7). We continue to group the bottom three quartiles into the low concentration cat-
egory. In all cases, the estimates of the effect of noncompliance on executive pay are
economically negligible and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
To summarize, our results indicate that CG’s main findings on substitute monitors
are not robust and are driven by the decrease in CEO pay at Apple and Fossil. We
find no support for the hypothesis that the board independence requirement led to a
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decrease in CEO pay in noncompliant firms with low (or high) institutional ownership
concentration.
1.6 Compensation Committees
Once we account for the effect of outliers, we find that the requirement for a fully
independent compensation committee, rather than that for a majority of independent
directors on the board, affects the level of CEO pay.
Column 1 of Table 1.4 reproduces CG’s main result from Table II, column 2 of
the published paper: the estimated effect of compensation committee noncompliant
× after (hereafter referred to as CC-noncompliance) is −0.014 (p-value of 83%).
Column 2 of Table 1.4 contains the estimates from the full sample. The magnitude
and statistical significance of the coefficient on CC-noncompliance are nearly zero,
which if true suggests that the requirement for independent compensation committees
has no influence on CEO compensation.
In column 3, we remove Apple and Fossil from the regression.20 Without the
downward influence of Jobs’ huge pay decrease on the estimate, the magnitude of
the coefficient increases and turns positive. Specifically, the logarithm of CEO pay
increases by an additional 0.069 in firms not compliant with the compensation com-
mittee independence rule relative to compliant firms, and the result is statistically
significant at the 5% level (p-value of 2.3%). This result indicates that the requirement
for compensation committee independence has not only been ineffective at reducing
CEO pay, but has had the presumably unintended consequence of raising CEO pay.
We obtain a similar estimate, albeit smaller in magnitude (0.046, p-value of 4.3%),
from the pay of non-CEO executives (column 4). While using committees instead
of boards impacts the noncompliance coefficients dramatically, the standard errors
remain similar (compared to columns 5 and 7 of Table 1.1).21
20Apple’s compensation committee did not comply with the new requirements in 2002, but Fossil’s
did. We continue to remove both firms from the regression for consistency in the presentation of
our results. The results are virtually unchanged if we keep Fossil in the sample, as its impact on the
estimate for compliant firms is negligible.
21Using median regressions, we find no significant effect of compensation committee independence
on executive compensation levels throughout this section.
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To examine how CEO pay changes in the presence or absence of monitoring substi-
tutes, we follow CG in allowing the CC-noncompliance effect to vary with the presence
of blockholder directors and the concentration of institutional investor ownership. In
column 5 of Table 1.4, we find that the increase in CEO pay is concentrated in CC-
noncompliant firms with blockholder directors. Numerically, CEO pay in those firms
increases by an additional 15% (coefficient of 0.136, p-value of 0.4%) when compared
to the CC-compliant firms. The effect is economically meaningful and statistically
significant at well below the 5% level. We find a similar but again smaller effect for
non-CEO executives. Our results in column 6 show that non-CEO pay rises by an
additional 8% (p-value of 4.3%) in those firms relative to CC-compliant firms. How-
ever, the effect of CC-noncompliance differs only marginally between firms with high
and low institutional concentration (columns 7 and 8), but it remains positive. Based
on CG’s sample, we conclude that CC-noncompliance leads to an increase in CEO
pay, regardless of institutional shareholder concentration.22
Taken together, our findings indicate that the requirement for compensation com-
mittee independence produces a perverse effect on executive remuneration in non-
compliant firms, particularly in the presence of blockholder directors.
1.7 Discussion
Here we discuss two plausible explanations of our findings that compensation
committee independence leads to an increase in executive pay, and that the increase
is concentrated in firms with powerful monitors: (i) the independence mandate forces
noncompliant firms to move away from their optimum governance structures; and (ii)
in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, director priorities shift from reigning
in CEO pay toward other tasks, especially in noncompliant firms.
22We obtain economically and statistically highly significant estimates for compensation committee
noncompliance when we use our own data set. The CC-noncompliance effect is concentrated in firms
with blockholder directors (coefficient of 0.137) and with high institutional concentration (coefficient
of 0.167). On the other hand, the coefficients for firms without blockholder directors and low
institutional concentration are of very small magnitude (0.037 and 0.026) and not distinguishable
from zero. These results imply that the compensation committee independence requirement has had
the unintended consequence of increasing CEO pay, especially in firms with effective shareholder
monitoring. The estimation results are available in Table 1.A.1.
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1.7.1 Endogenous Board and Committee Composition
The perverse effect of the director independence mandate on CEO pay is consistent
with the view that the composition of boards and compensation committees is de-
termined endogenously to fit the needs and circumstances of shareholders, managers,
and firms (e.g., Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that boards are an effective solution
to agency problems; and Hermalin and Weisbach ((1998), (2003)) emphasize the en-
dogenous nature of boards). To the extent that non-independent directors are better
monitors than independent directors, they play an integral part in the makeup of the
compensation committee or board. The independence mandate, however, forces non-
compliant firms to alter their board and committee structures to suboptimal ones.
In other words, the new listing requirements force firms to reduce the influence of
potentially more competent and/or powerful monitors (non-independent directors)
by replacing them with or adding less competent/powerful monitors (independent
directors). The regulation thus tilts the bargaining power towards management and
away from the compensation committee in negotiating pay, especially in the presence
of substitute monitors such as blockholder directors or institutional ownership con-
centration (consistent with empirical evidence of endogenously determined ownership
structure in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001).23
While most of the recent corporate governance literature views boards as endoge-
nously determined institutions, independent directors are typically assigned the role
of monitors and non-independent directors are cast as advisors (e.g., Boone, Field,
Karpoff and Raheja (2007), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), and Linck, Netter and
Yang (2008)). Yet, if the increase in CEO pay in noncompliant firm is any indication
of director monitoring, then independent directors appear to be worse monitors than
non-independent directors.
One reason non-independent directors may be better monitors is that they typi-
cally own more of their companies’ shares than independent directors. Their equity
23It also applies to firms that warrant control rights, e.g., family firms and founder-managed firms.
The director regulation reduces the ability of these owners to exert effective control over their firms’
directions.
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stakes provide more powerful incentives, and perhaps more power, to monitor man-
agement and to prevent excessive managerial compensation. In the 2002 IRRC data,
for example, only 3.2% of independent directors, but 35.6% of non-independent di-
rectors have voting rights of 1% or more in their firms (with means of 0.2% vs. 2.8%).
A second reason for non-independent directors to be better monitors is that they are
more familiar with the firm, its market, and even the management team due to their
business relationships with the firms (e.g., as suppliers, bankers, and attorneys).24
The additional information can be leveraged into more accurate performance evalua-
tions, as well as better compensation and retention decisions. Third, as emphasized
by Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2008), junior managers with career concerns and the
promise of future rents can effectively discipline CEOs, because they can threaten to
withhold their productive effort. Thus, non-independent directors may well be more
effective monitors and pay negotiators than independent directors.
Our findings and rationalization are very similar to those of Anderson and Bizjak
(2003). They argue that CEOs with substantial equity stakes or founders may want
to serve on the compensation committee to help design optimal contracts for other
key managers. More generally, insiders serving on compensation committees may
provide insights into the special social and political aspects of their company that
help improve executive compensation decisions. Indeed, Anderson and Bizjak do not
find that CEO pay is higher when CEOs or insiders serve on their own compensation
committees. To the contrary, the insiders typically own more of their firms’ equity
and thus have stronger incentives, but tend to earn less. Interestingly, they also find
that when founders or their family members leave a compensation committee, CEO
pay increases subsequently. Similarly, Core et al. (1999) and Wan (2004) find that
CEOs also earn significantly less total pay in firms with a greater representation of
current officers sitting on the board of directors.
24IRRC considers directors with business relationships as non-independent. The NYSE/Nasdaq
independence definition is more lenient, as it disqualifies only directors with material business re-
lationships. Since the materiality of those relationships is not available in IRRC, CG opt not to
reclassify non-independent directors as independent.
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1.7.2 Shifting Priorities
Our second explanation for the observed increase in CEO pay in noncompliant
firms is based on the increase in director responsibilities imposed by the contempo-
raneous Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. SOX was enacted in response to a string of
major corporate accounting scandals with the goal to restore public confidence in
financial markets. The provisions of SOX aim to improve the accuracy and integrity
of financial reporting, for example by strengthening disclosure and internal controls,
enhancing oversight and accountability, and increasing the penalties for misreport-
ing. In addition, the structure of pay as opposed to its level has come under intense
scrutiny in an attempt to reduce managerial incentives for misreporting and excessive
risk-taking.25 Since most of the workload post-SOX is expected to be carried out by
independent directors, the dramatic increase in director responsibilities forces board
members to reprioritize their tasks.
Even after satisfying the new listing standards, previously noncompliant firms
have a lower representation of independent directors on their boards. In CG’s data,
the average fraction of independent directors on compliant boards increases from 72%
to 77% from the pre- to post-independence mandate, and from 43% to 58% on non-
compliant boards. In addition, noncompliant boards also experience higher director
turnover, which means that more of their directors are busy getting to know the firm,
its stakeholders, and economic environment. Those boards must also spend more time
on recruiting qualified directors, a task that was deemed difficult even before SOX
increased the demand for independent directors.26 As a consequence, the boards and
committees in noncompliant firms are likely to be more time-constrained in fulfilling
their post-SOX responsibilities than their counterparts in compliant firms.27
25A number of recent empirical studies document a differential shift in the composition of pay for
compliers and noncompliers around the new listing requirements. For example, see Chung (2008),
Cohen, Dey and Lys (2007), and Guthrie, Kwon and Sokolowsky (2008).
26World at Work and Towers Perrin conducted a survey on outside director pay and practices in
2004 (available from 〈http://www.worldatwork.org/pub/outside-director-0104.pdf〉). Of the respon-
dents who indicated that they recruited new directors for 2004, 33% found recruiting more difficult
than usual and less than 4% found it easier than usual.
27This explanation is consistent with the findings of Fich and Shivdasani (2006), who document
that busy outside directors are associated with weak governance.
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Linck, Netter and Yang (2009) provide empirical evidence that directors indeed
reevaluate their priorities post-SOX. They document that the meeting frequencies
of audit and nominating committees rise almost two- and four-fold from 2001 to
2004. The meeting frequency of compensation committees, on the other hand, is
almost unchanged. They also show that the percentage of independent directors who
serve on all committees — auditing, compensation, and nominating — more than
quadruples between 2001 and 2004, from 2.14% to 9.03%. The increased demand on
and for directors is reflected in rapidly rising insurance premiums (with the average
rising nearly five-fold between 2001 and 2004) and director pay (an increase of 50%).28
To substantiate our hypothesis that independent directors in compliant and non-
compliant firms experience a differential increase in their responsibilities and work-
load, we calculate the change in committee membership of independent directors for
compliant and noncompliant firms separately. Specifically, in our replicated sample
we find that in firms with compliant compensation committees the fraction of indepen-
dent directors who simultaneously serve on the audit, compensation, and nomination
committees increases by 2.68 percentage points on average (or a 42% increase over
the 2000 to 2002 mean). In contrast, the increase in noncompliant firms amounts to
6.02 percentage points (an 84% increase). Using the average change in the number
of committee memberships per independent director yields similar conclusions.
To put the value of reigning in CEO pay into perspective, we make some back-
of-the-envelope comparisons of the costs and benefits of lowering CEO pay relative
to other director responsibilities within the monitoring realm. CG estimate that the
independence mandate reduces CEO pay by 17.5%, which translates into $362,000
for the typical noncompliant firm in CG’s sample. The value drops to $95,000 if we
base the calculation on the estimate excluding Apple and Fossil. For our first point
of comparison, Taylor (2008) estimates that boards act as if firing a CEO costs them
the equivalent of 5.9% of firms’ assets ($111 million at the median). To the extent
28The caveat to the findings by Linck et al. is that some of these findings are based on small
samples or on non-IRRC data. As such, we cannot be sure about the exact magnitudes of the
changes in director responsibilities for the firms in the CG sample, but we have no reason to expect
that the general trend would be any different for our sample firms.
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that boards dislike cutting CEOs’ pay as much as firing them it is entirely implausible
that boards would — immediately upon becoming formally independent — set out to
reduce executives’ pay. Second, Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008b) find that the cost to
firms of being caught cooking the books carries a reputational loss worth $20 million
at the median ($264 million at the mean), in addition to fines and litigation costs.
SOX further increases the penalties for corporate wrongdoing and the likelihood that
directors are personally implicated. Third, as emphasized by Gabaix and Landier
(2008), even small differences in CEO talent are magnified by firm size to impact
shareholder wealth significantly. If the selection of a more talented CEO improves a
firm’s market value by 1%, firm value would increase by $20 million at the median
($72 million at the mean).
Given the relatively low importance of reigning in the level of CEO pay, it is plau-
sible that newly independent boards and compensation committees spend relatively
less time on negotiating the level of CEO pay. As a result, CEO pay increases in
noncompliant firms relative to compliant firms.
1.8 Conclusion
Using corporate governance listing requirements imposed by the U.S. stock ex-
changes as a quasi-natural experiment to examine whether board structure influences
CEO remuneration, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find that CEO pay decreases
by about 17% in firms with noncompliant boards relative to firms with a majority of
independent directors.
We reexamine CG’s evidence using their data and methodology and find that the
results are fragile. Their results are driven by two outlier firms in CEO pay, namely,
Apple and Fossil. After excluding these two outlier firms (12 firm-year observations)
from the full sample of 865 firms (5,190 firm-year observations), our results indicate
that (i) board independence does not affect the level of CEO pay; (ii) compensation
committee independence causes CEO pay to increase; and (iii) the increase in CEO
pay occurs only in the presence of blockholder directors or high institutional ownership
concentration, both of which are considered to be monitoring substitutes. We draw
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similar conclusions based on median regressions and the change in pay for non-CEO
executives. These results are based on CG’s sample selection criteria, definitions, and
methodology and may not be generalizable.
Taken together, there is little evidence that the board reforms have had any mean-
ingful effect on the level of CEO pay. While it is tempting to reject the managerial
power hypothesis, the evidence alternatively calls into question the effectiveness of
director independence in corporate governance or the importance of reducing CEO
pay.
One plausible explanation for the increase in pay in firms with noncompliant
compensation committees is that non-independent directors — perhaps due to more
powerful incentives or superior information — have more bargaining power than inde-
pendent directors, and thus monitor more effectively. It is also consistent with direc-
tors shifting their attention away from reigning in CEO pay levels and toward other
board responsibilities, especially in previously noncompliant firms. Alternatively, the
managerial power hypothesis (e.g., Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002)) may not be
a valid representation of the determination of executive pay. Distinguishing between
these interpretations remains an open and pertinent research question.
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Figure 1.1: Histogram of Changes in CEO Pay for Noncompliant Firms
This figure plots the histogram of the changes in CEO pay around the new stock exchange listing
requirements for noncompliant firms.
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Table 1.1: The Effect of Board Independence on CEO Pay
The results in this table are based on the data used and supplied by CG. The empirical model also follows CG:
ln(CEO pay) = a0 +a1×D(noncompliant board ’02)i×D(’03–’05)t + [controlsit] + [FEi] + [FEjt] + eit, where CEO
pay is total CEO compensation (variable tdc1 in Execucomp), and Noncompliant Board is a binary variable that
takes the value of one if the firm did not have a majority of independent directors on the board in 2002 and zero
otherwise. A director is defined as an independent director if the director was not an employee of the firm during
the previous three years, did not have any family affiliation of the officers of the firm, and did not have any material
business transactions with the firm. before and after are period indicators, taking the value of one if the observation
is in the pre-mandate period (2000 to 2002) or post-mandate period (2003 to 2005), and zero otherwise. Controls
include: Sales, the natural log of company sales (Compustat data item 12); ROA, the natural log of one plus net
income before extraordinary items (data item 18) scaled by the book value of assets (data item 6) — all measured
in (t − 1); RET, the natural log of one plus the annual stock return (with dividends reinvested), measured in year
(t− 1); Tenure, the natural log of one plus the number of years the CEO served in the firm; and Tenure (adj), CEO
tenure, with hand-collected corrections and additions to replace missing Tenure observations. Sales, ROA, and RET
are interacted with the period indicators before and after. We include firm fixed-effects (FEi) and industry-year
dummies (FEjt) in the regressions. Industry-year dummies are based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry
classification interacted with year dummies. All nominal variables are adjusted for inflation using 2002 as the base
year. The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-period level.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Published and Replicated Results Effect of Outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Published Replicated Replicated Replicated Excluding Median Non-CEO
Results Results Results Results w/ Apple & Regression Top-
w/o Tenure Tenure adj. Fossil Executives
Noncompliance -0.192** -0.193** -0.173** -0.179** -0.047 -0.045 -0.031
× after (0.086) (0.094) (0.086) (0.087) (0.039) (0.042) (0.028)
Sales 0.305*** 0.306*** 0.319*** 0.326*** 0.379*** 0.356*** 0.292***
× before (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.063) (0.048) (0.083) (0.035)
Sales 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.280*** 0.287*** 0.355*** 0.416*** 0.272***
× after (0.072) (0.073) (0.069) (0.069) (0.048) (0.048) (0.035)
ROA 0.321 0.322 0.290 0.311 0.164 0.620* 0.209
× before (0.399) (0.399) (0.389) (0.390) (0.375) (0.335) (0.182)
ROA 0.260* 0.260* 0.268* 0.278* 0.209* 0.172 0.016
× after (0.150) (0.150) (0.149) (0.152) (0.120) (0.155) (0.088)
RET 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.183*** 0.094***
× before (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.029) (0.026)
RET 0.269*** 0.270*** 0.273*** 0.276*** 0.302*** 0.228*** 0.189***
× after (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.042) (0.030) (0.029)
Tenure -0.034 -0.034
(0.022) (0.023)
Tenure (adj.) -0.046** -0.034* 0.024
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
# firm-years 5,190 4,956 5,190 5,190 5,178 5,190 22,736
# firms 865 841 865 865 863 865 865
Adj. R2 0.260 0.103 0.104 0.105 0.124 0.062
24
Table 1.2: CEO Pay at Fossil and Apple from 2000 to 2005
Notes: (i) All other compensation to Kosta Kartsotis refers to the premiums paid by the company on his term life
insurance policies. (ii) In December 1999, Jobs was awarded a special executive bonus in the form of an aircraft for
serving as the company’s interim CEO between September 1997 and December 1999. The total cost of the aircraft was
about $90 million. The entire cost of the aircraft was initially reported as a bonus to Jobs in 2000. Later, however,
the bonus was reclassified into four different income components to Jobs in 2001 and 2002, because the aircraft was
not physically transferred to him until 2001. The reclassification reflects that the purchase of the aircraft involved
two payments: approximately $40.5 million in 2001 and approximately $2.7 million in 2002. The company also made
two corresponding payments to settle related tax obligations, reported as All other compensation of $40.5 million in
2001 and $1.3 million in 2002.
Panel A: Compensation to Kosta Kartsotis at Fossil
Year Salary Bonus Restricted Option Grants All Other Total Pay
Stock Grants (Black-Scholes) Compensation
2000 $255,000 $0 $0 $0 $35 $255,035
2001 $255,000 $0 $0 $0 $21 $255,021
2002 $255,000 $0 $0 $0 $17 $255,017
2003 $255,000 $0 $0 $0 $324 $255,324
2004 $255,000 $0 $0 $0 $220 $255,220
2005 $0 $0 $0 $0 $180 $180
Panel B: Compensation to Steve Jobs at Apple
Year Salary Bonus Restricted Option Grants All Other Total Pay
Stock Grants (Black-Scholes) Compensation
2000 $1 $0 $0 $600,347,400 $0 $600,347,351
2001 $1 $43,511,534 $0 $0 $40,484,594 $83,996,129
2002 $1 $2,268,698 $0 $89,444,690 $1,302,795 $93,016,179
2003 $1 $0 $74,750,000 $0 $0 $74,750,001
2004 $1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $1
2005 $1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $1
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Table 1.3: The Impact of Shareholder Monitoring
To the extent that the presence of monitoring substitutes mutes the effect of board independence, one would expect
the decrease in pay to be concentrated in noncomplying firms without monitors. Here we modify the empirical model
of Table 1.1 to allow the effect of noncompliance to differ between the presence and absence of substitute monitors.
Blockholder is a binary variable that equals one if a firm has any non-employee directors who own more than 5% of
the company’s shares and zero otherwise. High concentration is a binary variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s
institutional ownership concentration falls into the top quartile. The other concentration variables — upper middle,
lower middle, and low concentration — are also binary variables indicating the lower three quartiles of institutional
concentration. Note that low concentration encompasses the bottom quartile in columns 1 to 3, and the bottom
three quartiles in columns 4 to 7. Concentration of institutional ownership is the proportion of institutional investor
ownership accounted for by the five largest institutional investors in the firm. See Section 1.5.2 for more details. All
other variables are defined in Table 1.1. The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors,
clustered at the firm-period level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: Blockholder Directors
Published and Replicated Results Effect of Outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Published Replicated Replicated Excluding Median Non-CEO
Results Results Results w/ Apple & Regression Top-
Tenure (adj) Fossil Executives
Noncompliance
× after
× blockholder 0.054 0.053 0.075 0.111* 0.044 -0.006
(0.106) (0.073) (0.067) (0.063) (0.064) (0.046)
× no blockholder -0.270*** -0.273** -0.262** -0.100** -0.074 -0.039
(0.063) (0.114) (0.106) (0.044) (0.048) (0.033)
Sales 0.333*** 0.314*** 0.334*** 0.384*** 0.357*** 0.293***
× before (0.055) (0.066) (0.062) (0.048) (0.085) (0.036)
Sales 0.298*** 0.278*** 0.296*** 0.361*** 0.425*** 0.273***
× after (0.056) (0.072) (0.067) (0.048) (0.048) (0.035)
ROA 0.285 0.339 0.331 0.178 0.614 0.211
× before (0.256) (0.399) (0.390) (0.375) (0.334) (0.182)
ROA 0.249 0.253* 0.271* 0.204* 0.170 0.015
× after (0.161) (0.149) (0.150) (0.119) (0.161) (0.088)
RET 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.181*** 0.093***
× before (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.029) (0.026)
RET 0.265*** 0.273*** 0.279*** 0.304*** 0.229*** 0.190***
× after (0.051) (0.048) (0.046) (0.042) (0.030) (0.029)
Tenure -0.034 -0.036
(0.022) (0.023)
Tenure (adj.) -0.048** -0.035* 0.021
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
# firm-years 5,190 4,956 5,190 5,178 5,190 22,736
# firms 865 841 865 863 865 865
Adj. R2 0.280 0.105 0.107 0.125 0.062
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Panel B: Institutional Ownership Concentration
Published and Replicated Results Effect of Outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Published Top vs. All Top vs. Excluding Median Non-CEO
Results Bottom Quartiles Bottom 3 Apple & Regression Top-
Quartiles Quartiles Fossil Executives
Noncompliance
× after
× high conc -0.176 -0.062 -0.092 -0.096 -0.083 -0.046 -0.046
(0.112) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.056) (0.061) (0.045)
× upp-mid conc -0.804**
(0.350)
× low-mid conc 0.133*
(0.073)
× low conc -0.238** -0.038 -0.072 -0.224* -0.027 -0.042 -0.023
(0.107) (0.075) (0.077) (0.124) (0.047) (0.049) (0.034)
Sales 0.304*** 0.312*** 0.310*** 0.327*** 0.379*** 0.356*** 0.292***
× before (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.062) (0.048) (0.082) (0.035)
Sales 0.266*** 0.278*** 0.270*** 0.289*** 0.354*** 0.416*** 0.272***
× after (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.068) (0.048) (0.048) (0.035)
ROA 0.326 0.327 0.325 0.309 0.164 0.620* 0.210
× before (0.398) (0.396) (0.381) (0.389) (0.376) (0.338) (0.182)
ROA 0.258 0.268* 0.279* 0.280* 0.208* 0.172 0.016
× after (0.150) (0.149) (0.153) (0.153) (0.120) (0.157) (0.088)
RET 0.123*** 0.117*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.183*** 0.094***
× before (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.026)
RET 0.270*** 0.276*** 0.274*** 0.276*** 0.303*** 0.227*** 0.189***
× after (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.042) (0.030) (0.029)
Tenure -0.033
(0.003)
Tenure (adj.) -0.043** -0.038* -0.045** -0.034* 0.024
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
# firm-years 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,178 5,190 22,736
# firms 865 865 865 865 863 865 865
Adj. R2 0.280 0.103 0.115 0.106 0.124 0.062
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Table 1.4: The Effect of Compensation Committee Independence on CEO Pay
This table repeats the regressions displayed in Tables 1.1 and 1.3, except that we determine firms’ noncompliance
status from their compensation committee independence. Noncompliant now takes the value of one if the firm did
not have a fully independent compensation committee in 2002 and zero otherwise. Blockholder and High institutional
concentration are dummies indicating the presence of substitute monitors prior to the independence mandate (see
Table 1.3 for more details). Low institutional concentration encompasses firms in the bottom three quartiles. All
other variables are defined in Table 1.1. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered at the
firm-period level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Published and Effect of Outliers Block Ownership Instit. Ownership
Replicated Results Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Published Replicated Exclude Non-CEO Exclude Non-CEO Exclude Non-CEO
Results Results w/ Apple & Top- Apple & Top- Apple & Top-
Tenure adj. Fossil Execs Fossil Execs Fossil Execs
Noncompliance -0.014 -0.000 0.069** 0.046**
× after (0.064) (0.061) (0.031) (0.023)
× blockholder 0.136*** 0.080**
(0.047) (0.039)
× no block 0.049 0.036
(0.035) (0.026)
× high inst conc 0.073 0.037
(0.047) (0.037)
× low inst conc 0.067* 0.049*
(0.037) (0.026)
Sales 0.290*** 0.310*** 0.370*** 0.286*** 0.372*** 0.287*** 0.370*** 0.287***
× before (0.068) (0.064) (0.048) (0.035) (0.048) (0.035) (0.048) (0.035)
Sales 0.259*** 0.277*** 0.350*** 0.269*** 0.352*** 0.270*** 0.350*** 0.269***
× after (0.073) (0.070) (0.048) (0.035) (0.048) (0.035) (0.048) (0.035)
ROA 0.346 0.331 0.183 0.223 0.178 0.221 0.182 0.224
× before (0.404) (0.394) (0.377) (0.183) (0.377) (0.183) (0.377) (0.183)
ROA 0.248* 0.267* 0.199* 0.011 0.198* 0.010 0.199* 0.011
× after (0.148) (0.150) (0.119) (0.087) (0.118) (0.087) (0.119) (0.087)
RET 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.094*** 0.118*** 0.094*** 0.119*** 0.094***
× before (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.026) (0.033) (0.026) (0.033) (0.026)
RET 0.269*** 0.276*** 0.303*** 0.190*** 0.303*** 0.190*** 0.303*** 0.190***
× after (0.048) (0.047) (0.042) (0.029) (0.042) (0.029) (0.042) (0.029)
Tenure -0.029
(0.024)
Tenure (adj.) -0.042** -0.032 -0.032 -0.032
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
# firm-years 5180 5190 5178 22,736 5178 22,736 5178 22,736
# firms 865 865 863 865 863 865 863 865
Adj. R2 0.260 0.103 0.124 0.062 0.125 0.062 0.124 0.062
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1.A Appendix
Table 1.A.1: Replication of the Results from Tables 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4 Using Our Data
The results in this table are based on our own sample. In constructing this sample, we follow all of CG’s data
requirements (six years of director data from IRRC, six years of CEO pay data from Execucomp, but allowing for
missing observations on tenure) and definitions. Our final sample contains 909 firms (including Apple and Fossil). All
variables are as defined in Tables 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4. Columns 1 to 4 are based on firms’ compliance status with the board
majority independence requirement in 2002, and columns 5 to 7 are based on compensation committee independence.
We differentiate the effect of noncompliance (columns 1, 2, and 5) by the presence of substitute monitors in columns
3, 4, 6, and 7. The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-period
level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Board Compensation Committee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Baseline Block Dir Inst Conc Baseline Block Dir Inst Conc
All firms Excl. A&F Excl. A&F Excl. A&F Excl. A&F Excl. A&F Excl. A&F
Noncompliance -0.098 0.037 0.060*
× after (0.091) (0.043) (0.034)
× blockholder 0.160*** 0.137**
(0.062) (0.057)
× no blockholder -0.005 0.037
(0.051) (0.038)
× high inst conc 0.004 0.167***
(0.060) (0.056)
× low inst conc 0.047 0.026
(0.051) (0.038)
Sales 0.320*** 0.354*** 0.357*** 0.353*** 0.354*** 0.355*** 0.356***
× before (0.059) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Sales 0.293*** 0.342*** 0.346*** 0.341*** 0.342*** 0.344*** 0.346***
× after (0.063) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
ROA 0.464 0.374 0.383 0.375 0.378 0.379 0.367
× before (0.334) (0.336) (0.335) (0.336) (0.334) (0.335) (0.333)
ROA 0.202 0.124 0.122 0.124 0.120 0.119 0.121
× after (0.135) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
RET 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087***
× before (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
RET 0.285*** 0.318*** 0.320*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.319***
× after (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Tenure -0.016 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
# firm-years 5,318 5,306 5,306 5,306 5,306 5,306 5,306
# firms 909 907 907 907 907 907 907
Adj. R2 0.096 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121
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Table 1.A.2: Data on CEOs’ First Year in Office
Company Name GVKEY CEO Name Year
AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP INC 8431 Carl Henry Lindner 1959
AMERICREDIT CORP 17197 Clifton H. Morris, Jr. 1988
ANALOGIC CORP 1633 Bernard M. Gordon 1995
ANALOGIC CORP 1633 John W. Wood, Jr. 2003
BEST BUY CO INC 2184 Richard M. Schulze 1983
BIG LOTS INC 12123 Steven S. Fishman 2005
BJ SERVICES CO 22794 J. W. Stewart 1990
BJ’S WHOLESALE CLUB INC 65105 John J. Nugent 1997
CAMBREX CORP 13839 James A. Mack 1995
CASCADE NATURAL GAS CORP 2803 W. Brian Matsuyama 1995
CDW CORP 28320 Michael P. Krasny 1984
CENTRAL PARKING CORP 61404 Monroe J. Carell, Jr. 1980
COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES INC 12756 Lowry F. Kline 2001
COMMERCE BANCORP INC/NJ 16784 Vernon W. Hill, II 1982
COMMERCIAL METALS 3246 Stanley A. Rabin 1979
COMPASS BANCSHARES INC 2849 D. Paul Jones Jr. 1991
CTS CORP 2577 Joseph P. Walker 1988
DATASCOPE CORP 3786 Lawrence Saper 1964
DELL INC 14489 Michael S. Dell 1984
DILLARDS INC 3964 William Dillard II 1998
DOW CHEMICAL 4060 William S. Stavropoulos 1995
DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP 4065 Daniel D. Rosenthal 1998
DRIL-QUIP INC 65671 Gary D. Smith 1981
DYNEGY INC 25495 Charles L. Watson 1985
EDWARDS (A G) INC 4230 Benjamin F. Edwards III 1983
FIRST AMERICAN CORP/CA 12796 Parker S. Kennedy 1993
FIRST DATA CORP 25157 Henry C. Duques 1989
GTECH HOLDINGS CORP 25807 W. Bruce Turner 2000
HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDS 12788 Bernard A. Girod 1998
INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GP INC 30146 Raymond L. Killian Jr. 1994
JLG INDUSTRIES INC 6207 L. David Black 1991
KELLY SERVICES INC 6379 Terence E. Adderley 1987
LINDSAY CORP 14954 Gary D. Parker 1984
MAF BANCORP INC 20075 Allen H. Koranda 1989
MBIA INC 13561 Joseph W. Brown, Jr. 1999
MDC HOLDINGS INC 6865 Larry A. Mizel 1988
MOLEX INC 7506 Frederick A. Krehbiel 1988
NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CORP 31607 James J. Truchard 1976
NBTY INC 7798 Scott Rudolph 1994
NORTH FORK BANCORPORATION 15202 John Adam Kanas 1976
OFFICEMAX INC 2290 George J. Harad 1994
O’REILLY AUTOMOTIVE INC 28180 Greg Henslee 2005
PAXAR CORP 8293 Arthur Hershaft 1980
PAYCHEX INC 8402 B. Thomas Golisano 1971
PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP INC 61325 Roger J. Medel 1979
PHOTRONICS INC 13200 Constantine S. Macricostas 1974
PLEXUS CORP 12945 Peter Strandwitz 1979
RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL CORP 8898 Thomas A. James 1983
SLM CORP 10121 Albert L. Lord 1997
SPX CORP 5087 John B. Blystone 1995
STARBUCKS CORP 25434 Howard D. Schultz 1985
STURM RUGER & CO INC 10124 William B. Ruger 1949
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 17233 Robert S. Bolinger 1982
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 13041 James H. Blanchard 1971
TECHNITROL INC 10374 James M. Papada III 1999
TELLABS INC 10420 Michael J. Birck 1975
TEXAS INDUSTRIES INC 10498 Robert D. Rogers 1970
TOLL BROTHERS INC 12395 Robert I. Toll 1967
UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 17248 Richard M. Adams 1984
UNITED NATURAL FOODS INC 63927 Michael S. Funk 1999
VITAL SIGNS INC 23088 Terry D. Wall 1972
WATSCO INC 11313 Albert H. Nahmad 1973
WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 14253 David L. Payne 1989
ZENITH NATIONAL INSURANCE CP 13597 Stanley R. Zax 1978
ZIONS BANCORPORATION 11687 Harris H. Simmons 1990
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CHAPTER 2
Earnings Overstatements: An Intended or Unintended Consequence of
Pay-for-Performance?
2.1 Introduction
CEO incentives have been linked to income-increasing accrual choices, earnings
reports that systematically exceed analysts’ forecasts, earnings restatements, consecu-
tive strings of earnings increases, and securities class action law suits for financial mis-
representation.1 The purpose of our paper is to shed light on whether such earnings
overstatements are an intended or unintended consequence of pay-for-performance.
The theoretical literature on incentive design has long recognized the potential
tradeoff between inducing long-term value creation and short-term overstatements.
While incentive pay is used to align the interests of managers with those of owners,
managers also inflate the stock price to improve their performance evaluation and
increase compensation.2 This tradeoff is based on the premise that managers benefit
from increasing firm value in the short term, whereas shareholders care about firm
value in the long run.
In reality, however, current shareholders could benefit from short-run overstate-
ments for several reasons. For example, Bushee (2001) emphasizes the short-term
value preferences of transient institutional investors, and Shleifer (2004) argues that
1For example, see Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and Kedia (2006), Cheng and
Warfield (2005), Denis, Hanouna and Sarin (2006), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007), Kadan
and Yang (2004), Ke (2004), and Peng and Ro¨ell (2008). Two notable exceptions are Armstrong,
Jagolinzer and Larcker (2010) and Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2006). However, the sample
period of Armstrong et al. spans pre- and post-SOX years and their results are not robust when re-
stricted to the pre-SOX period; and Erickson et al. base their study on a small number of accounting
frauds that likely reflect idiosyncratic managerial expropriation.
2The tradeoff between incentives for productive effort and overstatement has been formalized by
Crocker and Slemrod (2005), Dye (1988), Goldman and Slezak (2006), Guttman, Kadan and Kandel
(2006), and Kwon and Yeo (2009).
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shareholders benefit from attracting external finance at lower cost. Some of the the-
oretical studies on incentive design explicitly recognize the potential for shareholders
to use pay-for-performance to induce overstatement by managers. Dye (1988), for ex-
ample, calls the possibility of shareholders using pay-for-performance to reward man-
agers for overstatements the external demand for earnings management, and Bolton,
Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) refer to it as the strong form of their theory. To the
best of our knowledge, however, there exists no empirical evidence to distinguish be-
tween the views that overstatements are an intended or unintended consequence of
incentive pay. To this end, we investigate empirically whether CEO incentives reflect
shareholder costs and benefits of overstatements.
To differentiate between these two opposing views on shareholders’ underlying
preference for earnings overstatements, we develop a novel test based on predictions
derived from a principal-agent model linking pay to the costs and benefits of over-
statements. We show that when the cost of overstatement increases, the change in the
optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) for a CEO depends on shareholders’
preference for overstatements. Specifically, if shareholders do not value overstate-
ments, optimal incentives strike a balance between inducing productive effort and
avoiding overstatements. Since managers overstate less following an increase in the
cost of overstatement, shareholders can raise incentives to induce more productive
effort. On the other hand, if shareholders value overstatements, optimal incentives
fall in response to an increase in the cost of overstatement (like other ordinary goods,
the quantity of overstatements demanded is inversely related to its price). Through-
out the paper, we refer to such shareholders as myopic to describe their preference
for maximizing a firm’s market value in the short run as opposed to its fundamental
value in the long run.
We provide three pieces of empirical evidence that are consistent with the view
that earnings overstatements were an intended consequence of pay-for-performance,
at least prior to 2002. Our first approach exploits the increase in CEOs’ expected cost
of overstatement with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) to infer
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shareholder objectives from observed changes in pay-for-performance sensitivities.3
Using SOX as an exogenous shock to firms’ optimal incentive contracts offers a quasi-
experimental setting which allows us to circumvent the typical endogeneity issues
plaguing much of empirical research on corporate governance (e.g., see Hermalin
and Weisbach (2003) for a literature survey on corporate boards as endogenously
determined institutions). In addition, Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008a) show that
managers suffer severe consequences for financial misrepresentation. Consequently, it
is reasonable to expect that changes in the cost of overstatements impact managerial
incentives. We find that pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases significantly in
the fiscal year of and after SOX, but not in other years. In particular, we estimate
that incentives fall by about 8% (or about $23,000 per 1% change in firm value
at the median and $85,000 at the mean) from before to after SOX. The empirical
evidence is consistent with the view that SOX decreased the shareholder demand for
overstatements.4
Our second approach relies on empirical proxies for shareholder benefits from over-
statements (SBO) to substantiate our finding that shareholder objectives are reflected
in CEO incentives. Our model makes two predictions in this regard. First, greater
benefits from overstatements should lead to higher CEO incentives. Second, CEO
incentives should fall by more around SOX in firms whose shareholders benefit more
from overstatements. To test these predictions, we use two proxies for shareholder
benefits from overstatements: (i) the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) measure of capital con-
straint (overstatements temporarily reduce the cost of capital)5; and (ii) the portfolio
3SOX increased the cost to CEOs for overstating earnings by (i) increasing the limits on financial
penalties and prison terms for financial misrepresentation; (ii) requiring CEOs to reimburse any
incentive based compensation or profit from the sale of stock received within 12 months after the
misreporting if there is an accounting restatement as a result of misconduct; (iii) providing an
additional $776 million in funding to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to step up its
monitoring and enforcement efforts; and numerous other provisions.
4We acknowledge that this first piece of evidence — the decrease in incentive pay after SOX —
has been documented previously (e.g., Cohen et al. (2007) and Indjejikian and Mateˇjka (2009)).
However, several authors present evidence to the contrary (e.g., Carter, Lynch and Zechman (2009),
Jayaraman and Milbourn (2010), and Paligorova (2007)). As such, we contribute an independent
assessment of these claims, and more importantly, we offer a novel interpretation of the empirical
evidence. See Section 3.2 for further discussion.
5Our results are qualitatively robust to the alternative measures of financial constraints proposed
by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and Whited and Wu (2005). See Section 2.4.2.2 for further details.
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turnover rate of firms’ institutional owners (overstatements increase the return to
influential short-term investors). Our choice of proxies for shareholder benefits from
overstatements reflects the motivations used in the theoretical literature cited above
(i.e., Bolton et al. (2006) and Shleifer (2004)), as well as empirical evidence linking
these firm attributes to earnings management (e.g., Bushee (1998) and Linck, Netter
and Shu (2010)).
Higher capital constraints and higher portfolio turnover rates are indicative of
higher CEO incentives cross-sectionally. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile
of each measure corresponds to differences in CEO incentives of 36% and 21%. We
also find that the decrease in CEO incentives is concentrated in firms whose share-
holders are most likely to benefit from overstatements. This difference-in-difference
approach implicitly controls for confounding events or changes in market conditions
that affect firms with high and low shareholder benefits from overstatements equally.
For example, one alternative explanation for the observed decrease in incentives is that
shareholders learned from the numerous scandals about the extent of overstatements,
which in turn could have lead to the decrease in incentives. However, this alternative
story fails to explain why the decrease in incentives would be concentrated in firms
whose shareholders stood to gain from overstatements.
Our research complements prior work linking earnings management to firm ob-
jectives. Our revealed-preference-approach to uncovering shareholder objectives from
changes in optimal incentive pay circumvents the problem of how to identify earn-
ings overstatements. Researchers disagree whether accruals (or which accruals) are
good proxies for earnings management and whether discontinuity in the distribution
of forecast errors around various earnings benchmarks constitutes evidence of earn-
ings management. Other measures of overstatements, such as shareholder litigation,
earnings restatements, and enforcement actions by the SEC suffer from the drawback
that only a fraction of overstatements is detected.6 It is also unclear where to draw
6For example, see Ball and Shivakumar (2006), Beneish (2001), Dechow and Dichev (2002),
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), and Schipper (1989) on the accruals debate, Durtschi and Easton
(2005) on forecast errors, and Burns and Kedia (2006), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996), Hennes,
Leone and Miller (2008), Peng and Ro¨ell (2008), and Wang (2006) on restatements, enforcement
actions, and litigation.
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the line between desired and undesired earnings management, because the cost of
overstatement increases with its magnitude. Our research design has the advantage
that, unlike the aforementioned studies, we infer shareholders’ underlying objectives
from observed CEO contracts without relying on a proxy for earnings management.
Despite the different approaches, our findings are consistent with recent account-
ing studies documenting a decrease in accruals-based earnings management and the
frequency of meeting or beating analysts’ consensus forecasts, as well as an increase
in accounting conservatism around SOX (e.g., Bartov and Cohen (2009), Cohen, Dey
and Lys (2008), and Lobo and Zhou (2009)). The extant literature strongly supports
our interpretation that the reduction in CEOs’ pay-for-performance around SOX re-
duces their incentives to overstate earnings.7
To summarize, our findings and interpretation primarily contribute to our un-
derstanding of the tradeoffs inherent in the design of managerial incentives. Given
the importance of this topic to managers, investors, and regulators, our goal is to
engage these parties in continuing the discussion on incentive pay and the integrity
of capital markets.8 To this end, we provide a novel test of shareholder objectives
with implications for corporate governance and public policy. We find that both
costs and benefits of overstatements are reflected in CEO contracts through pay for
performance. Our results challenge the majority view that overstatements are an
undesired side-effect of inducing productive effort. The important implication for
corporate governance is that overstatements are not necessarily a symptom of poor
oversight. In an effort to improve the quality of financial reporting, recent corporate
governance reforms have put great emphasis on board and committee independence
to improve directors’ ability to act independently from management, and possibly
to the detriment of directors’ access to information. We emphasize that directors
must also want to act as monitors. If the shareholders they represent benefit from
7In addition, Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2010) and Cohen et al. (2007) show that firms reduce
their capital and research and development expenditures. These findings are consistent with our
model’s prediction that the decrease in CEO incentives also curtails productive effort and/or risk-
taking. The extent to which the documented decrease in firm values around SOX is attributable to
a change in CEO incentives is beyond the scope of the present paper.
8Similar concerns are present in many other fields, such as education and health care.
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overstatements, then one cannot expect the directors to be effective at preventing
overstatements. We conjecture that the provisions of SOX that increase the expected
cost of overstatements have done more to improve the quality of financial reporting
than the board composition mandates.
2.2 Other Related Literature
Although our paper primarily focuses on the shareholder costs and benefits of
overstatements, using SOX as a quasi-experimental shock to optimal incentives also
places it in the ongoing debate on the effects of SOX on the performance sensitiv-
ity of managerial compensation. Here we provide a brief sketch of the conflicting
empirical evidence on incentive changes around SOX and competing interpretations.
Carter et al. (2009), on the one hand, find an increase in the earnings-sensitivity of
bonuses following SOX. They argue that the increase reflects firms’ willingness to offer
greater incentives for productive effort, because SOX constrains managers’ flexibility
in managing earnings.
In contrast, Indjejikian and Mateˇjka (2009) find that bonuses become less sensitive
to financial performance measures in the post-SOX period. The strength of their
empirical analysis derives from their survey data: the availability of bonus data for
both public and private firms allows them to differentiate between the effects of SOX
and a general time trend or contemporaneous events. As such, theirs is one of the
most convincing pieces of evidence on the change in incentives around SOX. To guide
the interpretation, Indjejikian and Mateˇjka model the optimal contract as balancing
benefits from productive effort and costs from misreporting. Based on this tradeoff,
they interpret the decrease in incentives to reveal that firms must have experienced
an increase in the cost of misreporting that warrants a cutback in misreporting above
and beyond the response of CFOs to SOX.
However, it is difficult to reconcile the empirical evidence with some of the ex-
planations for why firms would cut back on incentives when managers already cut
back on misreporting themselves. If firms revised their assessment of the power of
incentives or investors became more sensitive to misreporting, then one would expect
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similar responses in both public and private firms.9 In addition, SOX imposes not
only greater risk of detection, but also greater penalties and personal liability on
CEOs and CFOs. In the absence of additional evidence for these types of explana-
tions for a decrease in incentive pay, the evidence contradicts the predictions from
standard theories on the tradeoff between productive effort and misreporting.
For this reason, we consider the possibility that shareholders benefit from over-
statements and use incentive pay to reward managers for overstatements. Implicitly,
we also assume that firms and managers experience a proportional increase in their
costs of misreporting. In light of the emphasis of SOX on personal responsibility and
liability for managers, we believe this to be a reasonable, even conservative assump-
tion. Taken together, these two differences lead us to infer that shareholder used
pay-for-performance to reward managers for overstating earnings prior to SOX. Our
cross-sectional results on shareholder benefits from overstatements corroborate our
view. In addition, our study differs from Carter et al. and Indjejikian and Mateˇjka in
a number of other dimensions, e.g., sample period, coverage of executives, and most
importantly the measure of incentives. We do not only study the performance sen-
sitivity of bonus pay, but also include the incentive effects from stocks and options.
Our more comprehensive incentive measure is better suited for drawing inferences
about the nature of incentive pay.
Several other contemporaneous working papers also address this topic using broader
measures of incentive pay. For example, Cohen et al. (2007) find that incentives drop
around SOX.10 In contrast to us, they attribute the decrease in incentives to public
pressure to rein in executive compensation. While we cannot completely refute this
argument, we are skeptical that public pressure or the realization that perhaps in-
centives had grown out of control adequately explain the data. For one, Core, Guay
9On the other hand, private firms might have different governance structures that allow them
respond differently. In this case, however, private firms would not make a good control group for
studying the effect of SOX on incentive pay at public firms.
10Mirroring the disagreement about the direction of the change in the performance sensitivity of
bonus pay, there exists contradictory evidence on the effect of SOX on incentive pay. Jayaraman and
Milbourn (2010), for example, argue that SOX led to increase in incentives, which they interpret
analogously to Carter et al.. However, the result appears to be driven by their research design (they
estimate the SOX effect after controlling for year effects, but not for firm-fixed effects).
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and Larcker (2008) find no consistent evidence that CEO compensation responds to
negative media attention. Second, we find that the drop in incentives occurs in fiscal
years 2002 and 2003, and does not correspond to the growing number of accounting
restatements that ultimately led to the passage of SOX (see Section 2.4.2.1 for further
details). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the alternative explanations cannot
account for the fact that the decrease in incentives is concentrated among firms whose
shareholders stood to gain from overstatements prior to SOX.
2.3 Theory and Hypothesis Development
In this section, we develop a principal-agent model of optimal contracts. It formal-
izes how optimal incentive contracts respond to an exogenous increase in the cost of
overstatements.11 The theory provides a framework that allows us to infer shareholder
objectives from the observed changes in CEO pay around SOX, which we investigate
empirically in Section 2.4.2.1. The model’s additional testable predictions provide
the basis for our empirical work in Sections 2.4.2.2–2.4.2.4.
The key point in the theoretical model is the potential tradeoff — depending on
shareholders’ preference for overstatements — between inducing overstatement and
inducing productive effort through pay for performance. Few models have captured
this trade-off because most of them look at either overstatements or productive effort,
but not both. For example, Fischer and Verrecchia (2004) and Stein (1989) do not
consider the agent’s productive effort or the optimal contract. Gibbons and Murphy
(1992) and Holmstro¨m (1999) do not consider the agent’s overstatement. And several
models that capture this tradeoff do not consider different objectives of the principal.
While Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Kwon and Yeo (2009) do not model share-
holder benefits from overstatements, Bolton et al. (2006), Dye (1988), and Goldman
and Slezak (2006) do not offer empirically testable implications to distinguish between
principals that discourage and principals that encourage overstatements.
11Our model is one formalization of the hypotheses and we acknowledge that there could be
alternative, more complex ways of modeling these effects. An informal summary of the empirical
hypotheses with a brief explanation of the intuition behind them is provided in Section 2.3.4.
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2.3.1 Set-up
We consider a firm with one principal (e.g., shareholders represented by a board)
and one agent (e.g., a CEO).12 The agent exerts productive effort (a) to increase a
firm’s underlying fundamental value, y = a+a, where a follows a normal distribution
N(0, σ2a). As in Kwon and Yeo (2009), we allow the agent to overstate the fundamental
value by m. Neither the principal nor the market observes the fundamental value (y)
or overstatement (m). However, the market can discount the reported value by its
expectation on overstatement (me). Then, a firm’s market performance (e.g., stock
price), denoted by y˜, is determined by y˜ = y + m + m − me, where m is random
noise following a normal distribution N(0, 2m).
13
As in Bolton et al. (2006), we assume that investors have heterogenous beliefs on
the agent’s overstatement, and that the firm’s market value is determined by the most
optimistic investor (or the smallest expected overstatement). In other words, investors
who value the firm’s shares most highly hold the long positions. More specifically, let
us denote an investor i’s expectation on the agent’s overstatement by mei , where mi
is distributed over [m,m], and m > m > 0. We assume that E[mei ] = m
∗, where m∗
is the agent’s equilibrium overstatement level. Therefore, investors’ expectations are
rational on average. However, Bolton et al. (2006) show that if short selling is costly,
the market price is determined by the most optimistic belief, mei = m. In this case,
the market’s expectation is me = m.14
Let us define θ such that me = m = θm∗. Note that 0 < θ < 1, since E[mei ] =
m∗ > m > 0, and the market underestimates the extent of overstatement. If market
uncertainty increases and investors’ beliefs are more dispersed (holding the mean
constant), then m (θ) becomes smaller and the market will underestimate the extent
12Throughout the paper, we ignore the possible agency problem between the shareholders and
the board. Allowing such agency problem in this model would be an interesting topic for future
research.
13In this paper, we do not consider the agent’s incentive to understate performance to smooth
income, for example. If there is such an incentive, we can regard m as the overstatement above and
beyond the understated performance.
14For example, D’Avolio (2002), Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), and Jones and Lamont (2002)
provide empirical evidence that it is costly to short sell stocks.
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of overstatement by more. Thus, we can interpret θ as a measure of mispricing in the
market.
The agent’s wage (w) is contingent on the firm’s market value.15 In the spirit of
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1992), we assume a linear contract, where w = s+ βy˜.16
The principal is risk-neutral, and the agent is risk-averse. The agent’s utility func-
tion is given by U(w, a,m) = − exp−r(w− 12a2− k2m2), where 1
2
a2 is the cost of productive
effort and k
2
m2 captures the cost of overstatement. More specifically, we assume that
the probability of getting caught overstating (q) is proportional to the size of over-
statement, i.e., q = ρ1m. Once caught, the punishment for overstatement (P ) is also
proportional to the size of overstatement, i.e., P = ρ2m. Let ρ = ρ1ρ2, and the
expected punishment amounts to qP = ρm2. The punishment is shared between the
agent (η) and the principal (1− η). Then, the expected punishment of overstatement
to the agent is ηqP = ηρm2 = k
2
m2, where k = 2ηρ. Note that the marginal cost of
overstatement to the CEO (= km) is increasing in m. Similarly, the expected cost of
overstatement to the principal is (1−η)qP = (1−η)ρm2 = c
2
m2, where c = 2(1−η)ρ.
Recall that SOX has increased both funding to the SEC to increase enforcement, as
well as penalties for CEOs (e.g., through required reimbursement of incentive pay-
ments from overstatement). Thus, SOX has increased both ρ1 and ρ2, or k and c. We
normalize the agent’s reservation utility to −1, and assume that the principal has all
the bargaining power.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal and the agent sign
a binding wage contract. Then, the agent chooses productive effort (a). After the
fundamental value (y) is realized, the agent chooses his overstatement level (m). The
market discounts the reported value and determines the market value of the firm (y˜).
15This assumption reflects the usual stock- and option-based compensation packages for CEOs.
Technically, we assume that the agent’s reported performance is not verifiable. For example, the
agent may only know the probability distribution of the true performance, and can only report the
mean of the distribution. Then, the agent is unlikely to become liable for the report. Technically, this
assumption allows us to avoid the revelation mechanism, as discussed in Crocker and Slemrod (2005)
and Dye (1988). Under a revelation mechanism, there is no tradeoff between inducing overstatements
and productive effort.
16For recent attempts to characterize general non-linear contracts, see Crocker and Slemrod (2005)
and Hemmer, Kim and Verrecchia (2000).
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The agent then gets paid based on the initial contract.
2.3.2 Overstatement and Effort
We solve the model by backward induction. Given the contract and the market’s
expectation, we first characterize the agent’s incentive constraints for overstatement
(m) and productive effort (a).
Overstatement Given fundamental value (y = a+ a), the agent solves the follow-
ing maximization problem to determine the optimal level of overstatement:
max
m
E
[
− exp
(
−r(s+ βy˜ − 1
2
a2 − k
2
m2)
)]
⇐⇒ max
m
s+ β(y +m−me)− 1
2
a2 − k
2
m2 − r
2
β2σ2m.
From the first order condition, we obtain the optimal level of overstatement
m∗(y) =
β
k
. (2.1)
Since the agent’s overstatement level does not depend on the reported value, it is
rational for the market to discount the reported value by a constant. Therefore, in
this simple equilibrium, the agent can take the market expectation (me) as given.17
Effort Given the agent’s optimal overstatement rule in (1), the agent’s optimal
choice of effort solves the following optimization problem:
max
a
s+ βE
[
a+ a +m
∗(y) + m −me
]
− 1
2
a2 − k
2
m∗(y)2 − r
2
β2(σ2a + σ
2
m)
= max
a
s+ β
(
a+ (1− θ)β
k
)
− 1
2
a2 − β
2
2k
− r
2
β2(σ2a + σ
2
m).
17Kwon and Yeo (2009) show that there is another, more complex equilibrium where market
expectation is a strictly increasing function of reported performance. Such an equilibrium becomes
quickly untractable in this paper, but the qualitative results of this paper should hold in that
equilibrium too.
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When the agent decides on his effort level, both  and m are still random variables.
The first order condition yields
a∗ = β. (2.2)
Not surprisingly, if β increases, the agent exerts more productive effort. But from
Eq. (1), the agent will also overstate the fundamental value by more, which presents
a potential trade-off to the principal.
The agent’s participation constraint must also be binding. That is,
E
[
− exp−r(w− 12a2− k2m2)
]
= −1
m
s+ β
(
a+ (1− θ)β
k
)
− 1
2
a2 − β
2
2k
− r
2
β2(σ2a + σ
2
m) = 0. (2.3)
2.3.3 The Optimal Contract
We model two opposing views on shareholder objectives: maximization of either
the market value or fundamental value of the firm. To encompass both views, we
assume that the principal maximizes the weighted average of market performance
and fundamental performance of the firm. We introduce λ to capture the weight the
principal places on her firm’s market value instead of its fundamental value. The
principal’s optimization problem is thus given by
max
s,β
E
[
λy˜ + (1− λ)y −w− c
2
m2
]
= a+ λ(m−me)−
(
s+ β(a+m−me)
)
− c
2
m2,
subject to the incentive constraints (1) and (2), and the participation constraint (3).
Substituting (1), (2), and (3) into the principal’s objective function yields
max
β
β + λ(1− θ)β
k
−
[
−
(
β
(
β + (1− θ)β
k
)
− β
2
2
− β
2
2k
− r
2
β2(σ2a + σ
2
m)
)
+ β
(
β + (1− θ)β
k
)]
− c
2
(β
k
)2
.
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The first order condition is
1 + λ
(
1− θ
k
)
−
(
1 +
1
k
+ r(σ2a + σ
2
m)
)
β − c
k2
β = 0. (2.4)
This first order condition reveals the trade-off in choosing the optimal pay-for-performance
sensitivity (PPS), β. The marginal benefits of raising β include the increased pro-
ductive effort and the returns from the agent’s overstatement, λ
(
1−θ
k
)
. The marginal
costs of raising β include the increased cost of productive effort, overstatement, and
risk-premium, as well as the increased cost from overstatement to the principal.
The optimal PPS, β∗, is given by
β∗ =
1 + λ
(
1−θ
k
)
1 + c+k
k2
+ r(σ2a + σ
2
m)
=
1 + λ
(
1−θ
2ηρ
)
1 + 1
2η2ρ
+ r(σ2a + σ
2
m)
. (2.5)
We are interested in how optimal PPS changes in response to an exogenous in-
crease in the cost of overstatement, ρ. The following proposition states that optimal
PPS can either increase or decrease depending on the principal’s degree of myopia
(λ) and market uncertainty (θ).
Proposition 2.1.
∂β∗
∂ρ
< 0 if and only if λ > 1
η(1−θ)(1+r(σ2a+σ2m)) .
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.1.
Proposition (2.1) states that an increase in the cost of overstatement (ρ) will de-
crease optimal PPS only if the principal is sufficiently myopic (i.e., λ is sufficiently
large). However, if the principal cares about the fundamental value of the firm, opti-
mal PPS will increase. Note that, because λ < 1, if market uncertainty is sufficiently
small (i.e., θ is sufficiently large and overstatements are ineffective) or if the agent
bears insufficient costs of overstatement (i.e., η is sufficiently small), then optimal PPS
will increase in response to a rising cost of overstatement, regardless of the degree of
shareholder myopia.
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Intuitively, suppose that the principal does not want the agent to overstate per-
formance, because there is no payoff from overstating (high θ), the principal bears
excessive costs (low η), or the principal does not care about market value (low λ). To
induce the agent’s productive effort, the principal still has to provide positive PPS
and induce overstatements. In this case, if the agent’s cost of overstatement increases,
the agent will reduce overstatements voluntarily, and the principal can raise PPS to
induce more productive effort with less overstatement.
However, if the principal wants the agent to overstate, because overstating yields
high returns (low θ) and because the principal cares about the market value of the firm
(high λ), the principal will provide high PPS to induce large overstatements. In this
case, as the cost of overstatement increases, it becomes more costly for the principal
to induce the agent to inflate the market value of the firm. Thus, the principal would
have to reduce PPS.
These results are significant, as they show that we can potentially distinguish
between shareholder objectives of maximizing firms’ market values and fundamental
values. More specifically, when there is an exogenous increase in the cost of overstate-
ment, if the firm increases PPS, it implies either that the firm cares more about the
fundamental value or that the returns from overstatement are negligible. However,
if the firm decreases PPS, it would be an indication that the firm focuses relatively
more on the market value, and not the fundamental value of the firm.
To the extent that we can find empirical measures of λ, we can test the model’s
predictions directly (i.e., without inferring shareholder objectives). In particular, the
model predicts:
Proposition 2.2.
(i) ∂β
∗
∂λ
> 0.
(ii) ∂
2β∗
∂ρ∂λ
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.1.
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When the principal focuses more on the market value, instead of the fundamen-
tal value, the principal wishes to encourage more overstatement by providing larger
incentives. Thus, as λ increases, optimal incentives increase too.
However, exactly when the principal cares more about the market value (i.e., λ
is large), the effect of the increased cost of overstatement (ρ) becomes even bigger.
In other words, when the cost of overstatement increases, optimal incentives in firms
that focus relatively more on market value will decrease by more (or increase by less)
compared to firms that focus relatively more on fundamental value.
2.3.4 Empirical Hypotheses and Strategy
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, we utilize Proposition (2.1)
to infer shareholder objectives from observed changes in CEO incentives around SOX:
Hypothesis 2.1. According to Proposition (2.1), an observed decrease in CEOs’
pay-for-performance sensitivity in response to SOX is consistent with market value
maximization, but inconsistent with maximization of fundamental value (i.e., share-
holders must benefit from overstatements). On the other hand, if CEO incentives in-
crease in response to SOX, overstatements are either ineffective or too costly, and/or
shareholders do not value gains from overstatements.
Intuitively, shareholders who do not value overstatements are constrained in of-
fering their CEO higher incentives, because higher incentives lead to costly overstate-
ments. An increase in the cost of overstatement induces the CEO to reduce overstate-
ments for any given level of incentives, and the shareholders’ constraint loosens —
they can now raise incentives to induce more productive effort. On the other hand,
if shareholders value overstatements, an increase in the cost of overstatements leads
to fewer/smaller overstatements desired by them (the quantity demanded decreases
as the price rises, reflecting a downward sloping demand curve for overstatements),
which in turn lowers CEO incentives to overstate (and, by extension, to exert pro-
ductive effort).
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides a quasi-experimental increase in the
cost of overstatements that allows us to assess the model’s predictions. We argue that
SOX increased the cost to the agent for overstating earnings directly by increasing
CEOs’ personal exposure to liability (e.g., through higher expected penalties) and
indirectly by making financial misrepresentation more difficult (e.g., through more
auditor oversight and independence).
Specifically, SOX requires CEOs to reimburse any incentive based compensation
or profit from the sale of stock received within 12 months after the misreporting if
there is an accounting restatement as a result of misconduct (section 304). SOX
also grants the SEC power to permanently bar fraudulent executives from serving
as officers or directors in the future (1105). Maximum criminal penalties for fraud
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are increased to $5 million and 20
years of prison (1106), and maximum prison terms increase to 25 years for securities
fraud and up to 20 years for mail and wire fraud (807 and 903). In addition, SOX
requires CEOs to personally certify the correctness and completeness of the financial
statement (302), as well as to disclose any significant deficiencies and changes in
internal controls over financial misrepresentation (404). According to Bainbridge
(2007), the purpose of these certifications is to prevent CEOs from hiding behind
the veil of ignorance. SOX also institutes stiff penalties for noncompliance with the
certification requirements; they are punishable with up to $5 million in fines and 20
years in prison (906).
Furthermore, the SEC is apportioned an additional $776 million of funding for
fiscal year 2003, of which $201 million are intended for higher staff compensation
and at least 200 new hires (601). To better protect investors, SOX mandates the
SEC to review each firm’s disclosures at least once every three years (408). SOX
also makes it more difficult to misrepresent a firm’s financial situation by creating the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (title I); requiring auditor independence
(title II); improving the quality of audit committees through independence (301) and
financial expertise (407); and providing explicit protection of whistleblowers (806 and
1107).
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The second and third parts of our empirical analysis are tests of Proposition (2.2).
These tests are independent from inferred shareholder objectives based on Proposi-
tion (2.1). The model parameter λ captures the weight shareholders assign to the
market value as opposed to the fundamental value of the firm. While λ is not directly
observable, we can proxy for λ using measures of shareholder benefits from overstate-
ments. Our two measures are (i) the Kaplan-Zingales measure of capital constraint
(KZ-score) and (ii) the turnover rate in the portfolios of institutional shareholders
(IT-score). Our choice of these measures is motivated by recent theoretical con-
tributions on overstatements in contract design and empirical evidence on earnings
overstatements. We discuss these measures in more detail in Section 2.4.2.2.
The model makes the following testable predictions about the relationship between
CEO incentives and shareholder benefits:
Hypothesis 2.2. According to Proposition (2.2) (i), higher shareholder benefits from
overstatements are reflected in higher CEO incentives.
Hypothesis 2.3. According to Proposition (2.2) (ii), higher shareholder benefits
from overstatement are reflected in a larger decrease in CEO incentives around SOX.
The intuition for Hypothesis (2.2) is straightforward: The more shareholders ben-
efit from overstatements, the more they are willing to pay their CEO to achieve them.
Hypothesis (2.3) is a combination of Hypotheses (2.1) and (2.2). The effect of the in-
crease in the cost of overstatements is more pronounced the more shareholders benefit
from overstatements.
To test Hypothesis (2.2), we link cross-sectional variation in the proxies for share-
holder benefits to CEO incentives. In addition, using a difference-in-difference ap-
proach around SOX, we test if incentives fall by more in firms exposed to high pre-SOX
shareholder benefits. This approach allows us to rule out alternative explanations of
the decrease in CEO incentives that affect shareholders with high and low benefits
from overstatements equally.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Sample Description
Our sample covers over 850 large publicly traded firms with fiscal years 1999–2005.
We require annual data on CEO incentives (from Execucomp) and firm characteristics
(from Compustat). To avoid entry and exit effects, we only keep firms with CEO
incentive data for all seven years of the sample. However, our results are qualitatively
unchanged if we relax this restriction. Our findings are also robust to excluding
firms with missing control variables and to excluding financial firms and utilities.
Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 2.1 (Appendix 2.A.2 describes the
calculation of PPS in more detail). To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize
all variables at the top and bottom percentile (the results are qualitatively similar
if we do not winsorize, but the mean estimates tend to increase). Table 2.2, Panel
A, displays the means of all variables for each fiscal year. Panel B provides further
summary statistics for the pooled cross-section. All nominal values are expressed in
December 2006 dollars (using the BLS CPI for all urban consumers – current series).
2.4.2 Results
2.4.2.1 Timing of SOX and Changes in CEO Incentives
To infer shareholder objectives from Hypothesis (2.1), we need to determine how
CEO incentives change with the passage of SOX in 2002. Whether firms had sufficient
time to react to SOX in the fiscal year of its passage is a priori uncertain. Therefore,
we treat fiscal year 2002 as the transition year (event year t = 0). Initially, we
consider fiscal years 1999-2001 as the pre-SOX period (−3 ≤ t ≤ −1) and fiscal years
2003-2005 as the post-SOX period (1 ≤ t ≤ 3).18 To study changes in CEO incentives
18SOX was passed in July 2002 in response to the large corporate scandals in the preceding year
(e.g., Enron, Tyco, Worldcom). We assume that fiscal year 2003 falls into the post-SOX period,
as its begin date falls between June 2002 and May 2003. To the extent that the expected cost of
overstatements increased prior to the adoption of SOX (e.g., through anticipated regulatory changes
or higher scrutiny by investors and enforcement agencies), incentive effects can already be visible in
earlier years.
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around SOX, we estimate the regression
incentivesit =
+3∑
t=−2
δtDt + α0 +
k∑
j=1
αjXjit + υi + it , (2.4)
where t denotes the number of years before or after SOX, i denotes firms, and j de-
notes control variables. δ−2–δ+3 are the coefficients of interest. Dt are year dummies,
Xjit includes standard control variables used in the literature on executive compen-
sation, namely market value of equity, stock price volatility, market-to-book ratio,
and leverage as measures of firm characteristics; return on assets, firms’ total share-
holder returns, and market returns as performance controls; as well as CEO tenure,
CEO turnover, and CEO option exercises.19 υi are firm fixed effects. We estimate
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level to address serial
correlation concerns.
We set Dt = 1 for all fiscal years in or after event year t, and equal to zero
otherwise. That is, Dt is not the usual year dummy which captures the cumulative
change from the base year (in our case 1999). Instead, we define it to capture the
marginal change from the prior year. This definition allows us to use the t-test for
significant difference from zero to determine if incentives fall or rise from their level
in the previous year. To the extent that incentives adjust slowly (i.e., over several
years), one has to add the coefficients for t ≥ 0 to obtain the full impact of SOX on
the level of incentives.
Column 1 in Table 2.3 shows the results for CEOs’ pay-for-performance sensitivity
as the dependent variable. Following Core and Guay (2002), we define PPS as the
dollar change in executives’ stock- and option holdings for a hypothetical one percent
change in firm value. In column 2, the dependent variable is the PPS-ratio, an
alternative measure of incentives (as used in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and
Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008)). It scales PPS by the sum of PPS, salary, and
bonus. The PPS-ratio measures the importance of incentive pay that is directly tied
19Controlling for R&D and cash constraints as predictors of option usage does not materially
affect our estimates.
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to the stock price relative to CEOs’ total compensation. It also implicitly controls
for changes in the level of CEO pay, because the denominator captures the bulk of
annual CEO pay.
We make the following three observations. First, we observe that PPS and the
PPS-ratio fall in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 by a statistically significant amount, but
not in other years: the adjustment begins immediately in the transition year and is
completed by the following year. The empirical evidence thus suggests that firms
adjust CEO incentives in response to SOX. Second, the economic magnitude of the
adjustment is significant. We find that log(PPS) falls by a combined 0.232 over 2002
and 2003, which translates into an average drop in PPS of about 20.7% (or about
$59,000 per 1% change in firm value at the median and $222,000 at the mean).20
Similarly, we estimate that the PPS-ratio falls by 5.0 percentage points around SOX,
or by about 18.7% from its average pre-SOX level. Third, the adjustment seems
permanent in the sense that it is not reversed in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. While
we estimate that log(PPS) increases in 2004 by 0.042 from the previous year, the
magnitude of the increase is not sufficient to offset the earlier decrease.
Note that our identification strategy assumes that incentives were optimal before
SOX and adjust to new optimal levels after SOX. Alternatively, one could argue
that pre-SOX incentives were excessive, and that the decrease in incentives merely
reflects a market correction. While we cannot completely rule out the possibility
that the decrease in incentives can be explained by this learning story, the timing
of the incentive changes coincide strongly with SOX and not with the revelation of
the accounting frauds that actually led to SOX. For example, according to a report
by the General Accounting Office ((2002)), the fraction of listed companies issuing
an accounting restatement steadily increased from 0.89% in 1998 to 2.47% in 2001,
which represents an annualized growth rate of over 29%. Note that the largest increase
occurred from 1998 to 1999, when the fraction of restating firms jumped from 1.02%
to 1.73%.
20We calculate the percentage change as exp(−0.232)−1 = 20.7%. We calculate the dollar change
by multiplying the percentage change with the mean and median values of PPS of the sample firms
before SOX.
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Incentive Levels vs. Flow
One potential drawback to our incentive measure PPS is that it may not only reflect
optimal contracting considerations, but also CEOs’ timing of option exercises and
stock sales. For example, if CEOs choose to unwind their holdings of exercisable
options following SOX, then we could mistakenly attribute the decrease in PPS to
shareholders’ preference for maximizing market values. We provide three arguments
against this alternative explanation. First, as is evident from Table 2.2, Panel A,
the option exercise ratio drops sharply in 2003. Fewer exercised options translate
into higher PPS. Second, we include the option exercise ratio as a control variable
in our regressions. As expected, its effect on PPS is negative. Third, we use the
equity grant ratio as an alternative incentive measure that is arguably less affected
by CEOs’ choices and market conditions. The equity grant ratio captures the fraction
of annual pay in the form of stock and option grants, which are more performance
sensitive than salary, bonus, and other pay. Contrary to PPS which measures the
stock of incentives, the equity ratio indicates the performance sensitivity of the flow
of pay. The results are presented in column (iii) and are consistent with the results
for PPS. The fall in the level of incentives is mirrored in the composition of the flow
of incentive pay.
Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX Period
While estimating year dummies sheds light on when the changes in CEO incentives
take hold, the year dummies are not well-suited for interacting with proxies for share-
holder benefits from overstatements, which we do in parts 2 and 3 of our empirical
analysis. Thus, for ease of interpretation and comparison of incentive levels between
the pre- and post-SOX periods, we re-estimate Eq. (2.4), but replace the year dummies
with one post-SOX dummy. When using the post-SOX dummy, we cluster standard
errors by firm-periods to address serial correlation concerns and to account for the
fact that SOX affected the firms simultaneously.21
21While the computationally more flexible, but more time-intensive two-way clustering procedures
recommended by Petersen (2009) (cluster2 ) and Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) (cgmreg) in-
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Fig. 2.1 offers a graphical representation of the change in CEO incentives around
SOX. It plots the kernel density estimates of average residual CEO incentives for
the pre- and post-SOX periods. We obtain residual CEO incentives from regressing
CEO incentives on its known economic determinants used in estimating q. (2.4), but
without time effects. For each firm, we then average the residuals over the pre- and
post-SOX years.
Table 2.4 displays the estimation results. For the first two columns, we define
fiscal years 2002 and later as the post-SOX period, because CEO incentives start
falling in fiscal year 2002. As a robustness check, we define all fiscal years beginning
on or after August 1, 2002 as post-SOX years, as SOX was signed into law on July
30, 2002. The change in the definition of post-SOX affects a large number of firm-
years. 840 observations of fiscal year 2002 and 61 observations of fiscal year 2003
are considered post-SOX in columns 1 and 2, but pre-SOX in columns 3 and 4. The
results, however, are very similar across the definitions of post-SOX. We estimate
that, on average, log(PPS) falls by 0.082–0.083 and the log(PPS-ratio) by 0.117–
0.128 from before to after SOX. The reason that the definition of post-SOX does not
significantly affect the results is that CEO incentive levels in 2002 lie in between those
of earlier and later years. Shifting fiscal year 2002 observations from the post- to the
pre-SOX period raises the averages in both periods, but leaves the difference largely
unaffected.
In untabulated robustness checks, we estimate variations of Eq. (2.4) for different
event windows (± 1, 2, or 3 years around SOX, including and excluding 2002). While
our estimates of the magnitude of the decrease in CEO incentives vary depending
on the size of the event window, the results are qualitatively unchanged. Since our
theory only makes directional predictions about CEO incentives, and not their mag-
nitude, the choice of the event window is largely inconsequential. Appendix 2.A.3
contains further robustness tests dealing with influential observations, methodology,
and measurement of CEO incentives, including a detailed discussion of bonus pay.
crease the standard errors somewhat, the coefficient of interest remains statistically highly significant
with a p-value of 0.1% or less.
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To summarize, we find CEO incentive levels decrease in response to SOX by an
economically large and statistically highly significant amount, which is inconsistent
with the hypothesis that shareholders discourage overstatements, but consistent with
the alternative view that shareholders benefit from overstatements.
2.4.2.2 CEO Incentives and Shareholder Benefits from Overstatements
We now take a completely independent approach to identify shareholder objec-
tives. In the previous section, we inferred shareholder objectives from the change in
CEO incentives in response to an increase in the cost of overstatements. Here we
proxy for unobservable shareholder objectives and test if they are reflected in CEO
incentives as predicted by the model. As stated in Hypothesis (2.2), we expect firms
whose shareholders benefit from overstatements to provide more incentives. To test
this prediction, we build on the following regression equation linking CEO incentives
and shareholder benefits:
incentivesit = ψ1 SBOit + ψ2 D(t ≥ 0)t + α0 +
k∑
j=1
αjXjit + υi + it , (2.5)
where ψ1 is the coefficient of interest and SBOit is the generic label for our proxies
for shareholder benefits from overstatements. As before, D(t ≥ 0)t is the post-
SOX dummy and Xjit includes control variables: market value of equity, stock price
volatility, market-to-book ratio, leverage, firms’ total shareholder returns, market
returns, CEO tenure, CEO turnover, and CEO option exercises.
Our two measures of shareholder benefits to proxy for shareholder objectives are
based on the motivations behind the recent contributions by Bolton et al. (2006) and
Shleifer (2004): (i) the Kaplan-Zingales measure of capital constraint (KZ-score); and
(ii) the turnover rate in the portfolios of institutional shareholders (IT-score).
The KZ-score (as estimated by Lamont, Polk and Saa´-Re´quejo (2001) and used, for
example, in Bergman and Jenter (2007) and Malmendier and Tate (2005)) captures
firms’ need to access external capital markets. Financially constrained firms benefit
from overstating performance, as it helps them reduce the cost of external financing.
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For example, Guthrie and Sokolowsky (2010), Rangan (1998), and Teoh, Welch and
Wong (1998a, 1998b) provide empirical evidence of earnings overstatements around
IPOs and SEOs, and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) document overstatements to avoid
debt-covenant violations. More recently, Linck et al. (2010) find that discretionary
accruals are significantly higher in financially constrained than unconstrained firms
prior to investment. Their evidence suggests that managers use earnings management
to ease financial constraints, gain access to external funds, and invest.22
The IT-score captures internal pressure from firms’ investors. Institutional share-
holders with higher portfolio turnover rates are more likely to value short-term per-
formance (see Carhart (1997) and Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) for applications).
Indeed, Bushee (2001) shows that transient institutional owners overweigh current
earnings in valuing firms; and Bushee (1998) finds that in the presence of transient
institutional investors managers are more likely to engage in real earnings manage-
ment to avoid to reverse an earnings decline. Also, there is mounting evidence that
institutional shareholders actively influence management. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and
Thomas (2008), Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998), and Becht, Franks, Mayer
and Rossi (2009), and provide detailed studies of shareholder activism for a sample
of US hedge funds, by TIAA-CREF in the US, and the Hermes Fund in the UK.
A difficulty in estimating Eq. (2.5) is that CEO incentives may reflect variation in
shareholder benefits either over time and/or across firms. The fixed effects estimator,
however, utilizes only within-firm variation and the between estimator uses only cross-
sectional variation. Applying the random effects estimator to Eq. (2.5) constrains the
within-effect to equal the between-effect. Yet, there is no reason to expect that the
22In robustness checks, we also use the Hadlock-Pierce-index (HP) and Whited-Wu-index (WW)
of financial constraints. However, in our research setting, the KZ-index is more desirable for two
reasons. First, the main difference between the KZ- and the WW-indexes is that the WW-index
includes firm size (as measured by total assets; size is also the major determinant of the HP-index)
as an indicator of financial constraint. However, firm size directly affects PPS: small firms are
more financially constrained according to HP and WW, but also offer lower PPS (e.g., because
the marginal returns of CEO effort are smaller). The size-PPS relationship is of lesser concern
in estimating Eq. (2.7), because the direct effect of firm size on PPS is canceled out through the
difference-in-difference approach. Second, the KZ-index is more highly correlated with actual debt
and equity issuances in our sample. We posit that it is this access to capital markets that provides
shareholders with benefits from overstatements.
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difference in CEO incentives between two firms reflecting a one unit difference in SBO
is equal to the change in CEO incentives within a firm for a one unit increase in SBO.
Furthermore, our SBO measures exhibit greater variation in across firms than within
firms.
To allow the between-firm effects to differ from the within-firm effects, we decom-
pose every right hand side variable from Eq. (2.5) into a firm-fixed component (the
average value for each firm — denoted by ∅) and the firm-change component (the
period-to-period fluctuations around the firm average — denoted by ∆), as explained
in Gould (2001):
incentivesit = ψ
∅
1 SBO
∅
i + ψ
∅
2 D(t ≥ 0)∅i +
k∑
j=1
α∅j X
∅
ji
+ ψ∆1 SBO
∆
it + ψ
∆
2 D(t ≥ 0)∆t +
k∑
j=1
α∆j X
∆
jit + υi + it . (2.6)
To account for the increase in the cost of overstatements from SOX, we allow the
effect of the shareholder benefit measures to vary from before to after SOX by in-
teracting them with pre- and post-SOX dummies. We estimate the regression using
the random-effects estimator. ∅-coefficients equal the coefficients that would be es-
timated using the between estimator; the ∆-coefficients equal the coefficients that
would be estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. D(t ≥ 0)∅i gets dropped from
the regression, because it does not vary between firms (due to our requirement of no
entry into and exit from the sample). Again, we estimate heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors and account for clustering at the firm-period level.
We run four versions of regression (2.6): two measures for CEO incentives (log(PPS)
and log(PPS-ratio)) times two measures of shareholder benefits. The results are dis-
played in Table 2.5. In all four cases, we obtain a positive and statistically significant
estimate of the effect of shareholder benefits on CEO incentives in the cross-section
before SOX. We also find that the cross-sectional link between shareholder benefits
and CEO incentives weakens after SOX. The p-value for ∆sox confirms our conjecture
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that ψ∅1 is indeed smaller after SOX than before SOX.
23
To compare the economic magnitudes across the different measures of shareholder
benefits from overstatements, we evaluate the percentage difference in expected CEO
incentives for moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the pooled cross-sectional
distribution of the SBO measures. The interquartile ranges (∆iqSBO) are 1.06 for
the KZ-score and 0.15 for the IT-score. The percentage change in CEO incentives is
then given by exp(ψ̂∅1 × ∆iqSBO). We obtain KZ- and IT-effects of 36% and 21%
on PPS, which translate into differences between $220,000–$382,000 per 1% increase
in firm value at the mean of pre-SOX PPS, and $58,000–$101,000 at the median of
pre-SOX PPS.
Our findings on the cross-sectional relationships between proxies for SBO and
PPS are consistent with those of contemporaneous work on executive compensation:
Wang (2008) finds that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities are higher in financially
constrained firms than in unconstrained firms; and Shin (2008) documents that short-
term institutional ownership is associated with higher option compensation.24
To summarize, we show that cross-sectional variation in shareholder benefits from
overstatements is reflected in cross-sectional variation in CEO incentives. We also
document that the cross-sectional link between shareholder benefits and CEO incen-
tives is stronger before SOX than after SOX. These findings suggest that shareholder
objectives vary cross-sectionally with shareholder benefits from overstatements.
23In contrast to the strong results in the cross-section, we find a weaker relationship between
within-firm variation in the KZ-score and CEO incentives, and no link for IT-score. The within-firm
variation comes from only 3 years in the pre-SOX period, and 4 years in the post-SOX period, but
not from across the periods (we do this in the next section). Therefore, this finding is not surprising,
given the limited number of observations per firm over time and the between- and within-variation
in the SBO-scores mentioned previously.
24Dikolli, Kulp and Sedatole (2009) also find that bonuses, which capture only a fraction of total
incentive pay, are more sensitive to stock returns than earnings and equity grants are larger when
transient institutional ownership is high. However, the authors interpret these findings as evidence
that CEO incentive contracts are designed to offset myopia.
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2.4.2.3 The Change in CEO Incentives around SOX: The Effect of Share-
holder Benefits from Overstatements
In the preceding section we show that our measures of shareholder benefits of
overstatements are consistent with the model’s prediction about the effect of share-
holder myopia λ in the cross-section. In this section we go one step further and test if,
within firms, incentives also fall by more around SOX in firms with high shareholder
benefits, as stated in Hypothesis (2.3). To that end, we run the regression
incentivesit = φ1 SBOit + φ2 D(t ≥ 0)t ×D(SBO|t < 0)i + φ3 D(t ≥ 0)t
+ α0 +
k∑
j=1
αjXjit + υi + it , (2.7)
where D(t ≥ 0)t is a dummy set to one for fiscal years 2002–2005 and D(SBO|t < 0)i
is a dummy that indicates high shareholder benefits from overstatements in the period
before SOX. In particular, for the time-varying KZ- and IT-scores, we average the
score over the three-year pre-SOX period for each firm. We consider the upper half of
the distribution to have high SBO (D(SBO|t < 0)i = 1). While separating the SBO
groups at the median is coarse, it is transparent and easily interpretable.25 Thus, φ2 is
the coefficient of interest. A negative estimate of φ2 would indicate that incentives fall
by more in firms with high shareholder benefits from overstatements before SOX.26
To control for the possibility that the within-firm change in incentives is driven by
the within-firm change in shareholder benefits from overstatements over time, we also
include the time-varying continuous measure of shareholder benefits in the regression.
Xjit contains the same standard determinants of CEO incentives as regression (2.4).
As before, υi are firm fixed effects. We estimate heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors, clustered by firm-period.
25The results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use continuous pre-SOX averages of the proxies
for shareholder benefits instead of their dummy versions, or consider only the top 15% of KZ-scores
as financially constrained.
26Here we allow the average within-firm response of CEO incentives to SOX to vary cross-
sectionally. The fixed effects estimator identifies φ2, because the time-invariant shareholder benefits
variable is interacted with the time-varying post-SOX dummy.
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The results are displayed in Table 2.6. The coefficients are directly comparable
across SBO measures for the same measure of incentives, because the interaction term
uses a dummy for SBO. Our estimates are remarkably similar across the different
specifications. Specifically, we find that log(PPS) falls by 0.121–0.164 more in firms
with high pre-SOX shareholder benefits than in firms with low pre-SOX shareholder
benefits. Translating these estimates into dollar figures yields an additional decrease
in PPS for high SBO firms between $122,000 and $162,000 at the mean level of
pre-SOX PPS, and between $32,000 and $43,000 at the median level of PPS. The
results for the PPS-ratio are similar. All interaction terms are significant at the 1%
confidence level or better.
It is worth noting that, when measuring CEO incentives with log(PPS), the co-
efficient for the post-SOX dummy loses its statistical significance and much of its
economic magnitude compared to the specifications in Table 2.4. This finding sug-
gests that the decrease in stock- and option-based incentives around SOX is fully
concentrated in firms with high benefits from overstatements prior to SOX: only firms
with high shareholder benefits from overstatements value market performance. When
measuring CEO incentives with the log(PPS-ratio), however, the post-SOX dummy
remains negative with sizable magnitude in all regressions. This finding suggests that
all firms — with and without benefits from overstatements — increase the relative
importance of salary and bonus pay around SOX.
The evidence in Table 2.6 is arguably stronger than the evidence presented in
Table 2.4. While significant changes in PPS coincide with SOX, the estimated SOX
effect potentially reflects other events or changes in market conditions. The results
in Table 2.6 implicitly control for such confounding effects, because we compare the
change in PPS around SOX between firms with high and low shareholder benefits
from overstatements. Through this difference-in-difference approach we are able to
rule out alternative explanations that affect the two groups equally. For example,
heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs about the extent of overstatements may have de-
creased with the revelation of more and more accounting scandals. Growing media
and social pressure on restraining skyrocketing CEO pay, especially in the form of
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stock options, may have also led to the change in the structure of CEO compensation.
2.4.2.4 Contemporaneous Changes in NYSE/Nasdaq Listing Require-
ments
Contemporaneous to SOX, NYSE and Nasdaq were in the process of revising
their listing requirements. The goal of these reforms was to improve the quality of
corporate governance by increasing the independence of corporate boards and their
committees. In particular, the new listing requirements on the NYSE and Nasdaq
require each board to have a majority of independent directors, as well as fully in-
dependent compensation and audit committees. The new NYSE and Nasdaq rules
became effective with a company’s first annual meeting occurring after January 15,
2004, but no later than October 31, 2004. For the majority of firms, the new require-
ments became binding for fiscal year 2003 reports.
We use board data provided by Riskmetrics to determine firms’ compliance sta-
tus. We match the Riskmetrics observation to the fiscal year into which the board
meeting date falls. We classify boards as compliant or non-compliant based on their
board independence in fiscal year 2002, the year prior to the rule change. Follow-
ing Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), we reclassify directors as independent when
their employment relationship terminated three or more years ago to reconcile the
differences in how Riskmetrics and the NYSE/Nasdaq listing standards define inde-
pendence. Of our 857 sample firms, we classify 138 as non-compliant, and lack board
data for 77.
The new listing requirements had a noticeable impact on board independence.
The change in board independence is evident in Table 2.2, Panel A. Firms that were
failing the new director independence standards in the year prior to those rules going
into effect, improved their governance drastically over the following years. In the non-
compliant firms, only 42% of directors were independent before the new rules, but
independence increased by 10 percentage points within one year and by 20 percentage
points by 2005. On the other hand, firms that already met the requirements show
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an increase of only 3 percentage points from 2002 to 2005. The fraction of compliant
boards in our sample jumps from 82% in 2002 to 93% in 2004.
We allow the effect of SOX on CEO incentives to differ between compliant and
non-compliant firms by estimating regression (2.4) separately for compliers and non-
compliers. In addition, we add various measures of board characteristics that might
either affect CEO pay and incentives (e.g., board ownership, tenure and age of di-
rectors) or vary systematically around SOX (e.g., board size, board independence,
and the number of directorships of board members) as control variables. Table 2.7
displays the results. CEO incentives decrease in compliant firms, which suggests that
even independent boards emphasize market values over fundamental values. Thus,
we should not expect independent boards to be effective monitors of overstatements.
The economic magnitude of the change in log(PPS) is three times larger for non-
compliers than compliers, but not for incentives measured as log(PPS-ratio). The dif-
ference between the SOX effects, however, is not statistically significant for log(PPS)
with a p-value of 29.9%.
Note that the estimate of the decrease in PPS around SOX for compliant firms
isolates the effect of shareholder myopia from changes in board independence. In
contrast, the estimate for non-compliant firms captures both myopia and changes in
board independence. Under the assumption that the effect of myopia is the same for
compliant and non-compliant firms, our estimates suggest that board independence
leads to an economically significant decrease in CEO incentives (at least if measured
as log(PPS)). There are at least two possible explanations for this finding. First, the
decrease in CEO incentives in non-compliant firms is consistent with the view that
oversight and incentive pay are substitutes (Holmstro¨m 1979). The large decrease
could thus reflect not just the change in the cost of overstatement, but also the im-
provement in the quality of corporate governance. Second, as suggested by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001), non-independent boards may not have been setting or en-
forcing optimal incentive contracts. Therefore, the large decrease in CEO incentives
could also be attributable to a regime shift from managerial skimming to optimal con-
tracting. That compliant and non-compliant boards differ in the allocation of power
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between managers and shareholder becomes evident when one compares board own-
ership. The mean pre-SOX ownership of compliant boards is only 6.4%, but 20.0% in
non-compliant firms. Ownership by independent directors, however, is much smaller
in magnitude and about equal at 1.1% in compliant firms and 1.2% in non-compliant
firms.
Our model does not contain a parameter for board independence and thus does not
offer predictions about the effect of independence (and its interaction with SBO) on
CEO incentives. In light of the alternative views on the role of board independence,
we simply replicate the empirical tests of Hypotheses (2.2) and (2.3) for the subsample
of firms in compliance with the new board independence requirement in fiscal year
2002 and control for the various board characteristics mentioned previously. The
results remain qualitatively, and in most cases even quantitatively, unchanged. We
conclude that our findings are not attributable to the contemporaneous changes in
board characteristics.
2.5 Conclusion
Recent corporate governance reforms and proposals have put great emphasis on
improving board independence and shareholder empowerment. The view behind these
reforms is that shareholder voice is an important building block to improving corpo-
rate decision making and the quality of financial reporting. In contrast, opponents
cite stockholder power — and their demand for increasingly higher returns — as a
major reason for firms’ focus on short-term performance. However, empirical evidence
on shareholder preferences for overstatements is scant. By inferring shareholder ob-
jectives from observed changes in pay-for-performance sensitivities around SOX, we
are able to differentiate between these two opposing views.27
27We do not speak to the efficiency of overstatements. On the one hand, earnings overstatements
can distort investment decisions. If firms appear more profitable than they are, managers invest
in insufficiently profitable projects to mimic investment and employment of truly profitable firms
(as documented in Kedia and Philippon (2009), for example). On the other hand, Shleifer and
Vishny (1990) argue that short-term arbitrage being cheaper than long-term arbitrage leads to
firms focusing on short-term assets to avoid prolonged underpricing. That is, firms may avoid
long-term investments with positive net present values, because of fear of underpricing. Therefore,
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Our two approaches — inferring shareholder objectives and proxying for share-
holder objectives — yield results that are consistent with each other. We find that
firms of large public companies in the U.S. respond to the increase in the cost of earn-
ings overstatements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by reducing CEO
incentives. Using two proxies for shareholder benefits from overstatements (capital
constraints and portfolio turnover rates of institutional owners), we document a posi-
tive relationship between shareholder benefits and CEO incentives. We also find that
the decrease in CEO incentives is concentrated in firms whose shareholders benefit
from overstatements. These results indicate that CEO incentives reflect sharehold-
ers’ benefits and CEOs’ costs from overstatements. Our empirical evidence thus casts
doubt on overstatements being an unintended consequence of inducing productive
effort, at least prior to SOX.
After the wave of corporate scandals, much emphasis has been placed on board
independence to curb and prevent corporate fraud. Yet, our results hold even if we
restrict the sample to firms that were compliant with the board independence require-
ments instituted by the stock exchanges in 2003. Thus, shareholder myopia — and
not just lack of board independence — could have been responsible for performance
overstatements. We conclude that corporate boards as representatives of shareholders
face a conflict of interest in their role as monitors of overstatements, and thus cannot
be expected to effectively prevent overstatements.
contracts that encourage CEOs to avoid underpricing by inflating earnings could in fact alleviate
underinvestment in long-term assets.
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Figure 2.1: Residual CEO Incentives before and after SOX
This figure captures the change in CEO incentives around SOX. It plots the kernel density estimates
of average residual CEO incentives for the pre- and post-SOX periods. We obtain residual CEO
incentives from regressing CEO incentives on its known economic determinants used in estimating
Eq. (2.4), but without time effects. For each firm, we then average the residuals over the pre- and
post-SOX years.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics on CEO and Firm Characteristics
Our sample covers large publicly traded firms with fiscal years 1999–2005. We require annual data on
CEO incentives (from Execucomp) and firm characteristics (from Compustat). To avoid entry and
exit effects, we only keep firms with CEO incentive data for all seven years of the sample. However,
our results are qualitatively unchanged if we relax this restriction. Table 2.2, Panel A, displays the
means of all variables (winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles) for each fiscal year. We consider
fiscal years 1999–2001 as pre-SOX and fiscal years 2003–2005 as post-SOX. It is a priori unclear how
fiscal year 2002 is affected by SOX, so we treat it as a transition year. Panel B provides further
summary statistics for the pooled cross-section.
Panel A: Means by Fiscal Year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
PPS ($ thsd.) 1178 1223 976 752 921 984 969
PPS-ratio 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.24
equity-ratio 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.41 0.42 0.42
market value ($ mill.) 8688 9518 8125 6707 8098 8732 8960
return volatility 0.40 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.39
market-to-book ratio 2.38 2.22 1.95 1.63 1.88 1.90 1.87
leverage 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22
return on assets 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04
shareholder return 0.24 0.19 0.06 -0.12 0.41 0.17 0.07
market return 0.22 -0.09 -0.15 -0.22 0.27 0.10 0.05
CEO tenure 8.49 8.35 8.01 8.13 8.08 8.46 8.16
option exercise ratio 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.17
CEO turnover 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13
KZ-score 0.98 0.97 0.79 0.62 0.69 0.62 0.57
IT-score 0.61 0.61 0.50 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.51
compliant boards 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.88 0.93 0.95
board independence - compliers 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78
board independence - noncompliers 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.52 0.60 0.62
board size 9.94 9.72 9.54 9.58 9.53 9.58 9.51
board ownership (indep.) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
board tenure 9.73 9.72 9.67 9.73 9.84 9.82 9.89
board age 59.02 59.02 58.94 59.22 59.57 59.88 60.13
board busyness 1.76 1.69 1.67 1.60 1.59 1.57 1.54
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Panel B: Summary Statistics for the Pooled Cross-Section
25th %ile 50th %ile 75th %ile mean st dev # obs
PPS ($ thsd.) 102 294 790 1001 2417 6153
PPS-ratio 0.09 0.18 0.34 0.26 0.24 6153
equity-ratio 0.19 0.46 0.67 0.43 0.29 6106
market value ($ mill.) 650 1786 6209 8404 20920 6152
return volatility 0.30 0.39 0.55 0.45 0.21 5913
market-to-book ratio 1.12 1.45 2.19 1.97 1.45 6150
leverage 0.08 0.23 0.35 0.24 0.18 6137
return on assets 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09 6152
shareholder return -0.16 0.07 0.32 0.15 0.54 6131
market return -0.14 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.18 6146
CEO tenure 3.00 6.00 11.00 8.24 7.37 5891
option exercise ratio 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.15 0.26 6152
CEO turnover 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.32 6054
KZ-score 0.16 0.65 1.22 0.74 1.03 5721
IT-score 0.43 0.50 0.58 0.52 0.13 6153
board independence 0.60 0.73 0.82 0.70 0.16 5509
board size 8.00 9.00 11.00 9.63 2.68 5509
board ownership (indep.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 5509
board tenure 7.13 9.29 11.88 9.77 3.74 5509
board age 57.14 59.63 61.88 59.40 3.76 5509
board busyness 1.20 1.50 1.93 1.63 0.54 5509
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Table 2.3: The Change in Incentives Around SOX — Year Dummies
In this table, we document that CEO incentives decrease around SOX, which was signed into law
on 7/25/2002. We define 2002 as the transition year, as SOX falls into fiscal year 2002 for most
companies. Fiscal years 1999–2001 are considered pre-SOX and fiscal years 2003–2005 are considered
post-SOX. The year dummies are defined to capture the marginal effect of each year on the level of
incentives and incentive pay (i.e., each year dummy captures the change from the previous year).
Our measures of the level of CEO incentives are the dollar change in CEOs’ stock and option holdings
from a hypothetical 1% increase in firm value (PPS) in column (i); and the fraction of income derived
from PPS relative to the sum of PPS, salary, and bonus (PPS-ratio) in column (ii). As a robustness
check, we also look at the fraction of stock and option grants of total pay (equity-ratio) in column
(iii), which captures the flow of incentives. Two-sided p-values — based on heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level — are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant
differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels.
log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio) equity-ratio
2000 (pre-SOX) 0.114*** 0.048 0.034*
(0.009) (0.246) (0.082)
2001 (pre-SOX) 0.031 0.089*** 0.046***
(0.228) (0.000) (0.000)
2002 (transition year) -0.044** -0.110*** -0.046***
(0.049) (0.000) (0.000)
2003 (post-SOX) -0.188*** -0.097* -0.053**
(0.001) (0.075) (0.046)
2004 (post-SOX) 0.042 -0.033 -0.001
(0.100) (0.166) (0.926)
2005 (post-SOX) 0.013 -0.016 -0.009
(0.645) (0.513) (0.395)
market value (log) 0.901*** 0.465*** 0.063***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
return volatility (log) 0.183* 0.109 -0.021
(0.074) (0.242) (0.441)
market-to-book ratio (log) 0.232** 0.298*** 0.027
(0.039) (0.000) (0.250)
leverage -0.120 -0.065 0.010
(0.347) (0.589) (0.829)
return on assets (log) 0.097 -0.307* -0.073
(0.536) (0.050) (0.173)
shareholder return (log) 0.188*** 0.058*** -0.049***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000)
market return (log) 0.282*** 0.224** 0.050
(0.010) (0.030) (0.329)
CEO tenure (log) 0.441*** 0.276*** -0.054***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
option exercise ratio -0.174*** -0.132*** 0.029**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.038)
CEO turnover (dummy) 0.073* 0.076** 0.017
(0.069) (0.041) (0.257)
# of observations 5,549 5,549 5,511
# of firms 857 857 856
within-R2 0.540 0.325 0.069
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Table 2.4: The Change in Incentives Around SOX — Post-SOX Dummy
In this table, we simplify our regressions from Table 2.3 by replacing the year dummies with a single
dummy variable to differentiate between pre- and post-SOX years. We use this specification for ease
of interpretation of our subsequent results. In the first two columns, we define fiscal years 2002 and
later to be post-SOX. We choose to count fiscal year 2002 toward post-SOX, because the downward
adjustment in CEO incentives becomes evident in fiscal year 2002, as shown in Table 2.3. In columns
3 and 4, we document that our finding is robust to an alternative definition of the post-SOX period.
There, the post-SOX period includes all fiscal years that begin on or after 8/1/2002 (i.e., the first
month after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law on 7/25/2002). Two-sided p-values — based
on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm-period level — are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels.
fiscal year ≥ 2002 fiscal year begins ≥ 8/1/2002
log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio) log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio)
post-SOX (dummy) -0.082*** -0.117*** -0.083*** -0.128***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
market value (log) 0.901*** 0.464*** 0.905*** 0.473***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
return volatility (log) 0.217*** 0.209*** 0.194*** 0.175***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
market-to-book ratio (log) 0.234*** 0.289*** 0.247*** 0.301***
(0.007) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
leverage -0.121 -0.063 -0.105 -0.045
(0.247) (0.529) (0.314) (0.649)
return on assets (log) 0.091 -0.360*** 0.092 -0.361***
(0.493) (0.008) (0.488) (0.007)
shareholder return (log) 0.188*** 0.065*** 0.188*** 0.067***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
market return (log) -0.065* 0.010 0.023 0.152***
(0.059) (0.757) (0.635) (0.001)
CEO tenure (log) 0.441*** 0.276*** 0.441*** 0.276***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
option exercise ratio -0.175*** -0.134*** -0.175*** -0.134***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO turnover (dummy) 0.073* 0.071** 0.078** 0.078**
(0.051) (0.038) (0.030) (0.019)
# of observations 5,549 5,549 5,549 5,549
# of firms 857 857 857 857
within-R2 0.539 0.321 0.538 0.319
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Table 2.5: The Link between CEO Incentives and Shareholder Benefits from Over-
statements
Our model predicts that greater shareholder benefits from overstatements lead to higher CEO incen-
tives. This table presents empirical evidence linking shareholder benefits to incentives. We use two
continuous proxies of shareholder benefits: (i) the Kaplan-Zingales measure of capital constraint;
and (ii) the portfolio turnover rate of firms’ institutional owners. We employ generalized random
effects regressions to allow the between-firm effect of each right hand side variable to differ from its
within-firm effect. The regressions include all the previous control variables, including the post-SOX
dummy. Two-sided p-values — based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the
firm-period level — are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the
1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels. p-values for ∆sox provide the confidence level for rejecting the
null hypothesis that the link between shareholder benefits from overstatements and CEO incentives
is stronger after SOX than before SOX.
SBO measure KZ capital constraints institutional investor horizon
log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio) log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio)
Between Effects: Utilizing Variation Between Firms
SBO-score × pre-SOX 0.288*** 0.236*** 1.248** 0.931**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.027)
SBO-score × post-SOX 0.239*** 0.188*** 0.288 0.097
(0.002) (0.000) (0.580) (0.804)
p-value for ∆sox 0.037 0.007 0.000 0.000
Within Effects: Utilizing Variation Within Firms Over Time
SBO-score × pre-SOX 0.066*** 0.008 -0.003 -0.200
(0.004) (0.689) (0.983) (0.132)
SBO-score × post-SOX 0.045* 0.029 0.080 -0.134
(0.091) (0.242) (0.596) (0.368)
p-value for ∆sox 0.251 0.762 0.665 0.632
# of observations 5,217 5,217 5,549 5,549
# of firms 813 813 857 857
overall-R2 0.645 0.443 0.641 0.428
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Table 2.6: The Change in Incentives around SOX: The Effect of Shareholder Benefits
from Overstatements
In this table we test the model’s prediction that around SOX incentives will fall by more in firms with
higher benefits from overstatements before SOX. post-SOX equals one for fiscal years 2002–2005,
and zero otherwise. pre-SOX SBO-dummy equals one if the mean value of the KZ/IT-scores over
the pre-SOX period falls in the upper half of the distribution, and zero otherwise. We also control
for the variation in the KZ/IT-scores over time, as well as all other previous controls. Two-sided
p-values — based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm-period level —
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
confidence levels.
SBO measure KZ capital constraints institutional investor horizon
log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio) log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio)
post-SOX -0.121*** -0.079*** -0.164*** -0.100***
× pre-SOX SBO-dummy (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
SBO-score 0.049*** 0.013 -0.064 -0.217**
(0.008) (0.433) (0.497) (0.026)
post-SOX (dummy) -0.019 -0.081*** -0.010 -0.089***
(0.414) (0.000) (0.679) (0.000)
market value (log) 0.882*** 0.451*** 0.905*** 0.464***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
return volatility (log) 0.252*** 0.228*** 0.206*** 0.202***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
market-to-book ratio (log) 0.202** 0.292*** 0.218** 0.297***
(0.023) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000)
leverage -0.297** -0.062 -0.100 -0.036
(0.015) (0.601) (0.339) (0.720)
return on assets (log) 0.133 -0.345** 0.090 -0.358***
(0.329) (0.011) (0.501) (0.009)
shareholder return (log) 0.182*** 0.064*** 0.186*** 0.068***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
market return (log) -0.054 0.014 -0.055 0.030
(0.131) (0.698) (0.115) (0.376)
CEO tenure (log) 0.452*** 0.286*** 0.450*** 0.282***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
option exercise ratio -0.172*** -0.139*** -0.179*** -0.138***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO turnover (dummy) 0.083** 0.087** 0.072* 0.076**
(0.030) (0.015) (0.055) (0.027)
# of observations 5,096 5,096 5,431 5,431
# of firms 779 779 823 823
within-R2 0.546 0.327 0.549 0.329
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Table 2.7: The Change in Incentives Around SOX: Controlling for Changes in Board
Characteristics
This table replicates the tests reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4, except that we run the
regressions separately for firms whose boards of directors were compliant and non-compliant with
the new NYSE/NASDAQ listing requirements for board independence and control for various board
characteristics. We determine compliance status in fiscal year 2002, which for most firms is the
year preceding the announcement of the new governance standards. CEO incentives decreased even
in compliant firms, although by a smaller magnitude than in non-compliant firms, indicating that
our results are fully attributable to the contemporaneous changes in governance. Two-sided p-
values — based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm-period level —
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
confidence levels.
log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio)
compliant non-compliant compliant non-compliant
post-SOX (dummy) -0.047** -0.133 -0.108*** -0.099**
(0.015) (0.105) (0.000) (0.048)
market value (log) 0.936*** 0.817*** 0.516*** 0.185**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042)
return volatility (log) 0.124** 0.594** 0.211*** 0.255*
(0.029) (0.027) (0.000) (0.078)
market-to-book ratio (log) 0.233*** -0.098 0.262*** 0.307**
(0.000) (0.847) (0.000) (0.034)
leverage -0.080 -0.308 -0.086 -0.016
(0.526) (0.339) (0.485) (0.950)
return on assets (log) -0.046 0.475 -0.800*** -0.012
(0.806) (0.349) (0.000) (0.971)
shareholder return (log) 0.231*** 0.191* 0.061** 0.067
(0.000) (0.057) (0.013) (0.228)
market return (log) -0.057 -0.037 0.017 0.033
(0.108) (0.709) (0.644) (0.724)
CEO tenure (log) 0.406*** 0.674*** 0.263*** 0.363***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
option exercise ratio -0.185*** -0.294** -0.143*** -0.181*
(0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.090)
CEO turnover (dummy) 0.033 0.240* 0.052 0.081
(0.437) (0.059) (0.201) (0.415)
board size (log) -0.301*** 0.155 -0.236*** -0.234
(0.000) (0.515) (0.001) (0.162)
board independence 0.156 -0.161 0.098 -0.144
(0.161) (0.564) (0.347) (0.392)
board ownership (indep.) 0.326 -0.841 1.048 -0.248
(0.592) (0.210) (0.194) (0.657)
board tenure (log) 0.029 0.206 0.070 0.057
(0.681) (0.355) (0.317) (0.703)
board age (log) -1.203** 0.093 -0.773* 0.316
(0.012) (0.928) (0.099) (0.626)
board busyness -0.065 0.224 -0.051 0.128
(0.120) (0.133) (0.167) (0.174)
# of observations 4,056 802 4,056 802
# of firms 642 138 642 138
within-R2 0.565 0.421 0.311 0.314
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Table 2.8: The Link between CEO Incentives and Shareholder Benefits from Over-
statements: Controlling for Changes in Board Characteristics
This table replicates the tests reported in Table 2.5, except that we restrict the sample to firms
whose boards of directors were compliant with the new NYSE/NASDAQ listing requirements for
board independence and control for various board characteristics (as displayed in Table 2.7). This
restriction ensures that our results are not driven by the contemporaneous changes in governance.
The regressions include all the previous control variables, including the post-SOX dummy. Two-
sided p-values — based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm-period
level — are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% confidence levels. p-values for ∆sox provide the confidence level for rejecting the null
hypothesis that the link between shareholder benefits from overstatements and CEO incentives has
strengthened around SOX.
SBO measure KZ capital constraints institutional investor horizon
log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio) log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio)
Between Effects: Utilizing Variation Between Firms
SBO-score × pre-SOX 0.242*** 0.193*** 1.390** 1.172**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.018)
SBO-score × post-SOX 0.202*** 0.139*** 0.852 0.494
(0.002) (0.003) (0.189) (0.305)
p-value for ∆sox 0.076 0.012 0.022 0.002
Within Effects: Utilizing Variation Within Firms Over Time
SBO-score × pre-SOX 0.062** 0.024 0.080 -0.263*
(0.035) (0.362) (0.574) (0.084)
SBO-score × post-SOX 0.060* 0.033 0.175 0.043
(0.079) (0.317) (0.373) (0.820)
p-value for ∆sox 0.476 0.595 0.656 0.900
# of observations 3,777 3,777 4,056 4,056
# of firms 601 601 642 642
overall-R2 0.667 0.461 0.668 0.451
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Table 2.9: The Impact of Shareholder Benefits from Overstatements on the Change
in Incentives around SOX: Controlling for Changes in Board Characteristics
This table replicates the tests reported in Table 2.6, except that we restrict the sample to firms
whose boards of directors were compliant with the new NYSE/NASDAQ listing requirements for
board independence and control for various board characteristics (as displayed in Table 2.7). This
restriction ensures that our results are not driven by the contemporaneous changes in governance.
post-SOX equals one for fiscal years 2002 – 2005, and zero otherwise. pre-SOX KZ/IT-dummy
equals one if the mean value of the KZ/IT-scores over the pre-SOX period falls in the upper half
of the distribution, and zero otherwise. We also control for the variation in the KZ/IT-scores over
time, as well as all the previous control variables. Two-sided p-values — based on heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors clustered at the firm-period level — are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels.
SBO measure KZ capital constraints institutional investor horizon
log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio) log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio)
post-SOX -0.061* -0.063** -0.104*** -0.056*
× pre-SOX SBO-dummy (0.063) (0.037) (0.002) (0.068)
SBO-score 0.057** 0.025 0.030 -0.146
(0.017) (0.245) (0.794) (0.217)
post-SOX (dummy) -0.002 -0.073*** 0.001 -0.097***
(0.933) (0.001) (0.978) (0.000)
# of observations 3,710 3,710 3,988 3,988
# of firms 582 582 622 622
within-R2 0.568 0.314 0.572 0.317
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition (2.1)
From (2.5),
∂β∗
∂ρ
=
2η2
(
1− λη(1− θ)(1 + r(σ2a + σ2m)))(
1 + 2η2ρ
(
1 + r(σ2a + σ
2
m)
))2 ≥ 0 (2.A.1)
⇐⇒ λ ≤ 1
η(1− θ)(1 + r(σ2a + σ2m))
.
Since λ ≤ 1, ∂β∗
∂ρ
is always non-negative if 1
(1−θ)(1+r(σ2a+σ2m)) ≥ 1, that is, if θ ≥
ηr(σ2a+σ
2
m)−1
ηr(σ2a+σ
2
m)
.
If θ < ηr(σ
2
a+σ
2
m)−1
ηr(σ2a+σ
2
m)
, however, ∂β
∗
∂ρ
< 0 if and only if λ > 1
η(1−θ)(1+r(σ2a+σ2m)) .
Proof of Proposition (2.2)
(i) From (2.5), it is straightforward to show that
∂β∗
∂λ
=
1−θ
2ηρ
1 + 1
2η2ρ
+ r(σ2a + σ
2
m)
> 0. (2.A.2)
(ii) From (2.A.1),
∂2β∗
∂λ∂ρ
= − 2η
3(1− θ)(1 + r(σ2a + σ2m))(
1 + 2η2ρ
(
1 + r(σ2a + σ
2
m)
))2 < 0. (2.A.3)
2.A.2 Details on Calculating PPS
We construct the incentive measure following Core and Guay (2002). In particular,
we compute the dollar change in executives’ stock- and option holdings for a hypo-
thetical one percent change in firm value (we call this variable pay-for-performance
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sensitivity [PPS]). We separately calculate PPS for newly granted options, previously
granted exercisable and unexercisable options, and stock holdings. Measuring PPS
requires six inputs: the risk-free rate, stock price volatility, dividend yield, time to
maturity, stock price, and number of options granted or held. All variables except
for the risk-free rate can be obtained from Execucomp, either directly (e.g., dividend
yield and volatility, stock price) or indirectly (time-to-maturity, number of options
held).
Following the Execucomp convention in calculating option grant values, we win-
sorize volatility and dividend yields within each fiscal year. The largest and smallest
values are least likely to be good representations of expectations about their future
values. We replace missing values of the 3-year average dividend yield (bs yield) with
current dividend yields, missing values for volatility (bs volat) with the Execucomp
sample mean, and missing values for exercise price (expric) with either the market
price (mktpric) or the average of the fiscal-year-end closing price (prccf ) and the clos-
ing price discounted by total shareholder returns that year (trs1yr). We also observe
that firms who make only one grant to an executive within a fiscal year often only
report the total number of options granted (soptgrnt), but not the number of options
in that grant (numsecur). We estimate maturity to be the difference between exercise
date and grant date. Missing values are assumed to be 10 years. Some maturities are
computed to be 0 years, so we replace those with 1 year. We also value the options at
the end of the fiscal year, not at the time of the grant to make all values comparable
and current at fiscal year end. Finally, we weight the individual grants’ deltas by the
grant values to each executive within each year to compute PPS from new option
grants for each executive-firm-year.
Estimating the inputs for previous grants is harder. Information on the charac-
teristics of past option grants is not available. For example, the number and value of
unexercisable options are available, but we do not know the composition of the unex-
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ercisable options from previous grants. Similarly, for exercisable options, we do not
know which previously granted options were exercised by the executives and which
ones were kept in the portfolio. However, Core and Guay’s main contribution lies in
showing that imputing the missing characteristics yields a very close approximation to
hand-collected, full-information option portfolios. Unfortunately, the documentation
in Core and Guay does not allow us to replicate their imputation strategy directly. We
encounter a number of problems. For example, the reported value of (un)exercisable
options pertains only to in-the-money options, but the number of (un)exercisable
options also includes out-of-the-money options. Furthermore, adjusting the value
and number of unexercisable options for current year option grants imply that about
half of our observations would end up with negative values. We assume that the
reported number of unexercisable options held includes newly granted options, unless
the number of options granted exceeds the holdings. Similar to our approach for
newly granted options, we estimate the exercise price for previously granted options
by appropriately discounting the adjusted fiscal-year end stock price by total share-
holder returns (trs3yr). The maturity of unexercisable options is assumed to be one
year less than the maturity of any option grant in the previous year, or 9 years if
no options were granted in the previous year. The maturity of exercisable options is
assumed to be 3 years less than that of unexercisable options.
2.A.3 Robustness Checks
Representativeness of the Mean Effect
To ensure that our results are representative of the typical firm in the sample
instead of being driven by large changes in a few firms, we also estimate median
regressions. The results are presented in Table 2.A.1. We purge firm fixed effects by
demeaning all variables.28 The estimated median change in incentives from before
28First-differencing instead of demeaning does not materially affect the results.
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to after SOX is almost identical to the mean effect. We conclude that the change in
CEO incentives is pervasive and representative of the typical firm in our sample.
Bonus Pay
Our measures of CEO incentives emphasize CEOs’ wealth gains from stock and
option holdings. In practice, however, other forms of pay, such as bonuses, are also
tied to firm performance and can thus provide incentives for overstatements. Our
first measure of the level of CEO incentives — log(PPS) — completely ignores CEOs’
bonus compensation. Although our second measure of CEO incentives — log(PPS-
ratio) — includes bonuses, it assumes that bonuses provide CEOs with fewer in-
centives to overstate performance than stock- and option holdings. To rule out the
possibility that CEO incentives shifted from PPS to bonus pay around SOX with-
out affecting the link between total CEO pay and firm performance, we take an
alternative approach offered in the prior literature on CEO pay to estimate how the
performance-sensitivity of CEO pay has changed around SOX. We regress bonus pay
and total CEO pay on two measures of firm performance: return on assets and firm
stock returns. We also interact the performance measures with the post-SOX dummy
to allow for changes in the performance sensitivity of CEO pay:
payit = τ1 performanceit + τ2 D(t ≥ 0)t × performanceit + τ3 D(t ≥ 0)t
+ α0 +
k∑
j=1
αjXjit + υi + it , (2.A.4)
where D(t ≥ 0)t is a dummy set to one for fiscal years 2002–2005. The interaction
term captures whether the link between pay and performance has strengthened or
weakened from before to after SOX. Again, we estimate heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered at the firm-period level.
The results are displayed in Table 2.A.2. In column 1, we use bonus pay as the
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dependent variable. In column 2, we use total CEO pay as the dependent variable,
which includes the flow of compensation (such as salary, bonus, stock and option
grants), as well as changes in the value of CEOs’ stock and option holdings. We
use the dollar value of bonus and total pay (in $ mill.) instead of their logarithmic
values, because the dollar amounts are zero or negative in a non-negligible fraction of
observations. To alleviate the concern that outliers severely affect the magnitude of
our estimates, we winsorize the pay and performance measures at the top and bottom
percentile.
The result for bonus pay confirms that incentive pay has in fact shifted from stocks
and options toward bonus pay. We estimate that bonus pay has increased by $166,000
around SOX on average. Furthermore, bonus pay does increase with return on as-
sets (accounting performance) and with firm stock returns (market performance).
Most interestingly, however, is the finding that the accounting-performance sensitiv-
ity decreases around SOX, while the market-performance sensitivity of bonus pay
increases. This shift towards bonus pay and its increasing market-performance sensi-
tivity suggest that our earlier results based on log(PPS) overstate the true decrease
in incentives.
Turning to total pay, we find that it primarily responds to firms’ market perfor-
mance. The economic magnitude of its performance sensitivity swamps the wealth
effects from bonus pay.29 More importantly, the performance-sensitivity of total pay
decreases sharply around SOX by almost half. We conclude that the declining perfor-
mance sensitivity of stock and option holdings outweighs the increasing weight placed
on bonus pay and its increasing market-performance sensitivity.
29As CEO pay is highly skewed, estimated mean effects are not representative of the typical firm.
Using median regressions reduces the magnitude of the estimates by factors ranging from 2 to 4, but
the qualitative findings do not change.
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Table 2.A.1: The Change in Incentives Around SOX — Median Regression
In Tables 2.3 and 2.4, we report results from firm-fixed-effects regressions that estimate the mean
change in CEO incentives from before to after SOX. To ensure that our results are representative
of the typical firm in the sample (instead of being driven by large changes in a few firms), we also
estimate median regressions. We purge firm fixed effects by demeaning all variables. In columns 1
and 2, the post-SOX period includes fiscal years 2002 and later. In columns 3 and 4, the post-SOX
period includes all fiscal years that begin on or after 8/1/2002. Two-sided p-values are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels.
fiscal year ≥ 2002 fiscal year begins ≥ 8/1/2002
log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio) log(PPS) log(PPS-ratio)
post-SOX (dummy) -0.080*** -0.110*** -0.084*** -0.120***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
market value (log) 0.879*** 0.424*** 0.875*** 0.426***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
return volatility (log) 0.064** 0.155*** 0.028 0.110***
(0.034) (0.000) (0.420) (0.007)
market-to-book ratio (log) 0.293*** 0.270*** 0.319*** 0.297***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
leverage -0.032 -0.067 -0.044 -0.046
(0.605) (0.412) (0.529) (0.577)
return on assets (log) 0.124* -0.353*** 0.144* -0.345***
(0.098) (0.000) (0.091) (0.001)
shareholder return (log) 0.136*** 0.054*** 0.131*** 0.057***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
market return (log) -0.029 0.033 0.057 0.166***
(0.286) (0.365) (0.121) (0.000)
CEO tenure (log) 0.382*** 0.256*** 0.382*** 0.248***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
option exercise ratio -0.132*** -0.110*** -0.137*** -0.121***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO turnover (dummy) 0.007 0.030 0.020 0.041
(0.742) (0.248) (0.368) (0.123)
# of observations 5,549 5,549 5,549 5,549
# of firms 857 857 857 857
Pseudo-R2 0.389 0.189 0.388 0.187
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Table 2.A.2: The Changing Link between CEO Pay and Firm Performance
Our first measure of the level of CEO incentives — log(PPS) — has the potential drawback that it
does not include CEOs’ bonus compensation, which can also be tied to firm performance. Although
our second measure of CEO incentives — log(PPS-ratio) — does include bonuses, it assumes that
bonuses provide CEOs with fewer incentives to overstate performance than stock- and option hold-
ings. To rule out the possibility that CEO incentives shifted from PPS to bonus pay around SOX
without affecting the link between total CEO pay and firm performance, we take an alternative
approach offered in the prior literature on CEO pay. To this end, we regress CEO pay (in $ mill.)
on two measures of firm performance: return on assets and firm stock returns. We also interact the
performance measures with the post-SOX dummy to allow for changes in the performance sensitiv-
ity of CEO pay. In column 1, we only consider bonuses. In column 2, we consider total CEO pay,
which includes both the flow of compensation (e.g., stock and option grants, salary, and bonus) as
well as changes in the value of CEOs’ stock- and option holdings. Two-sided p-values — based on
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm-period level — are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels.
Bonus Pay Total Pay
post-SOX (dummy) 0.166*** 0.119
(0.000) (0.937)
market value (log) 0.338*** 2.785
(0.000) (0.402)
return volatility (log) -0.232*** -15.829***
(0.003) (0.001)
market-to-book ratio (log) -0.262*** 23.970***
(0.000) (0.000)
leverage -0.060 25.601**
(0.606) (0.013)
return on assets (log) 1.035*** -27.218
(0.000) (0.280)
return on assets (log) × post-SOX -0.504** -4.136
(0.015) (0.853)
shareholder return (log) 0.133*** 67.780***
(0.000) (0.000)
shareholder return (log) × post-SOX 0.135*** -31.631***
(0.005) (0.000)
market return (log) -0.072 21.243***
(0.445) (0.007)
market return (log) × post-SOX -0.027 -4.330
(0.819) (0.646)
CEO tenure (log) 0.030 4.360***
(0.294) (0.001)
option exercise ratio 0.055 -0.628
(0.194) (0.810)
CEO turnover (dummy) -0.031 3.576*
(0.489) (0.081)
# of observations 5,549 5,361
# of firms 857 857
within-R2 0.104 0.229
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CHAPTER 3
Obesity, Health Costs, and Credit Risk
3.1 Motivation
While most of the costs of obesity are borne by the obese through the impact on
their personal health, a significant amount accrues to the public (Bhattacharya and
Sood (2011)). Due to the growing prevalence of obesity in the population, obesity is
increasingly being considered as a factor in economic interchange.
For example, businesses use obesity as the basis for differential treatment of cus-
tomers and employees. Airlines and movie theaters require large people to purchase
two seats; the obese tend to earn lower wages; and legal cases provide anecdotal
evidence of consideration of body weight in hiring and promotion decisions. In the
majority of cases, the justification for differential treatment is that obesity imposes
higher costs. When a large person takes up two seats, airlines and movie theaters
cannot sell the extra seat to another customer. Even when a large person fits into one
seat, airlines incur higher fuel costs and landing fees. When obese employees suffer
more injuries or illnesses than their non-obese coworkers, employers experience a pro-
ductivity loss and incur higher costs for their health plans. To offset the higher cost
of serving or employing the obese, businesses have incentives to charge higher prices,
offer lower wages, or avoid hiring obese workers (e.g., Kirkland (2008), Bhattacharya
and Bundorf (2009), and Lundborg, Nystedt and Rooth (2009)).1
1The weight gain in the U.S. population during the 1990s cost the airlines an estimated 350
million gallons of additional jet fuel in 2000 (Dannenberg, Burton and Jackson (2004)). A Duke
University Medical Center analysis found that obese workers filed twice the number of workers’
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With public attitude toward obesity ranging from viewing it as a stigmatized
difference to being a character flaw, U.S. law and public policy have struggled with
how to respond to the statistical discrimination against the obese in the markets.
Sometimes obesity is viewed as an aﬄiction, and sometimes as a personal choice.
In 2002, the IRS recognized obesity as a medical condition, allowing tax deductions
for certain medical expenses. Yet, in 2005, the House of Representatives passed the
Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act to protect the fast food industry
from legal liability (although the bill did not pass the Senate vote). In 2006, changes
to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) paved the way
for group health plans to charge lower premiums to the non-obese. In response,
the State Employees’ Insurance Board of Alabama, for example, approved a policy
under which obese employees will have to pay an additional $25 per month in health
insurance beginning in 2011 if they do not make sufficient progress toward lowering
their BMI. There has also been renewed interest in levying a tax on fatty foods and
sugary drinks.
Given the increasing relevance of obesity for public and business policies, and the
controversy surrounding them, it is worth investigating the stakes. The purpose of
our research is to shed light on the magnitude and nature of the relationship between
obesity and relevant economic outcomes, specifically credit risk. Obesity is primarily
the result of excessive caloric intake (Cutler, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003)). It is a
known health risk factor and carries a social stigma. Its presence, despite being
preventable, thus provides a potentially informative signal from individuals’ past
choices about their preferences or future choices. Based on these premises, we first
explore whether obesity does in fact have predictive power for consumer delinquencies
compensation claims, had seven times higher medical costs from those claims and lost 13 times more
days of work from work injury or work illness than did nonobese workers (Østbye, Dement and
Krause (2007)). According to Thompson, Edelsberg, Kinsey and Oster (1998), already in 1994 the
cost of obesity to U.S. businesses amounted to $2.4 billion for paid sick leave, $2.6 billion for life
and disability insurance, and $7.7 billion for health insurance. See Hammond and Levine (2010) for
a recent and thorough review of the economic consequences of obesity.
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and bankruptcies. Second, we investigate the channels through which obesity affects
credit risk.2
Our empirical analysis utilizes 2004 and 2008 survey data from the 1979 cohort
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which is a nationally rep-
resentative sample of the U.S. population born between 1957 and 1964. We estimate
that the obese have a 3.8 percentage point higher likelihood of becoming delinquent
over the following four years (this constitutes a 20.5% increase relative to the sample
delinquency rate of 18.5%), after controlling for credit risk relevant factors that are
observable to lenders and permissable under federal regulations, such as respondents’
income and net wealth, debt capacity, credit histories, and income instability.3 The
magnitude is comparable to 62%, 83%, and 58% of the impact of unemployment
spells, marriage dissolutions, and disability shocks conditional on those trigger events
occurring. Taking into account the frequency with which they occur, the total inci-
dence of obesity on delinquencies is on par with that of unemployment spells, triple
the effect of marriage dissolutions, and twice as important as disability shocks.
We conduct numerous robustness tests of our main result in terms of measurement
and estimation, and consider several alternative interpretations. We show that delin-
quencies are indicators of serious financial distress, as opposed to forgotten bills while
on vacation. Our result holds for alternative measures of financial distress (bankrupt-
cies and maxing out credit cards). We also address the possibility that obesity simply
proxies for omitted variables that are credit-risk-relevant and available to lenders. In
a subsample of respondents who have applied for credit, we show that obesity is con-
ditionally uncorrelated with lenders’ credit decisions, but has strong predictive power
2In light of the substantial medical expenditures attributable to obesity, we are interested in
the relationship between obesity and personal financial outcomes. Also, the high rate of personal
bankruptcies has drawn much attention from academics, policy makers, and the public. The rate
has more than quadrupled between 1980 and 2005, culminating in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). While BAPCPA resulted in a steep drop-off in
personal bankruptcies, the bankruptcy rate has again reached its pre-2005 level.
3Delinquency is defined as having completely missed a payment or been at least 2 months late in
paying any bills in the previous 5 years.
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for subsequent delinquencies. We conjecture that obesity does not proxy for credit
relevant information that is used by lenders, but is unobservable to us. Furthermore,
the result is not driven by observable attributes that are prohibited under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), such as ethnicity, gender, and marital status. It
also does not reflect credit risk factors or signals that are unobservable to lenders, such
as cognitive abilities (as measured by the AFQT score), one’s youth BMI, or parental
influence on respondents’ preferences or decision making quality (controlled for by
including sibling fixed effects). Conditional on observable and permissible credit risk
factors, these variables are uncorrelated with obesity.
The obesity effect is present in different time periods (e.g., before the financial
crisis) and is robust to more flexible specifications of the credit risk model. Semipara-
metric estimates show that the delinquency rate rises almost monotonically over most
of the BMI range (although we do not have sufficient observations in the underweight
category). Propensity scoring is highly effective at making the obese and non-obese
comparable along observable characteristics, reveals common support over almost the
entire range of the propensity score, and yields estimates similar to the credit risk
benchmark.
Next, we explore cross-sectional heterogeneity in the ability of obesity to predict
delinquencies. It is particularly informative when obesity is least likely, e.g., among
high income earners, the wealthy, and those with low credit risk. These findings
are consistent with (i) obesity being more informative when it has not yet lead to
financial distress in the past; (ii) obesity being more informative when it reflects
individuals’ choices rather than their economic environment or financial situations;
and (iii) obesity having higher predictive power among individuals with higher human
capital and correspondingly greater incentives to invest in health, e.g., in the form of
medical expenditures.
Finally, we investigate two plausible mechanisms through which obesity affects
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delinquencies. First, we find that the obesity effect is at least partially mediated
through health. Including measures of physical well-being reduces the obesity effect
by about 30%.4 Second, we find no support for the idea that the obesity effect re-
flects individuals’ time or risk preferences. Conditional on economic factors, plausible
preference parameters such as impatience and myopia are weakly related to BMI or
obesity. While measures of time-preferences help predict delinquency, their inclu-
sion does not absorb any of the obesity effect. With much of the obesity effect on
delinquencies left unexplained, we also cannot rule out that obesity proxies for other
unobserved socioeconomic factors.
Our paper proceeds with a review of some related literature in Section 3.2, fol-
lowed by a description of the methodology (Section 3.3) and the data (Section 3.4).
Section 3.5 shows that obesity predicts delinquencies after controlling for observable
and permissible credit risk factors, as well as prohibited or to lenders unobservable
characteristics. We assesses the economic magnitude of our finding in Section 3.6,
and investigate cross-sectional heterogeneity in the predictive power of obesity in Sec-
tion 3.7. Section 3.8 analyzes the potential channels through which obesity impacts
delinquencies. Section 3.9 concludes. All robustness tests and further discussions of
potential methodological issues have been relegated to the Appendix.
3.2 Related Literature
While our paper adds a new dimension in evaluating the costs of obesity, it specif-
ically contributes to the rapidly growing literature on household finance and the
determinants of credit risk.
In an attempt to rein in risky lending, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
of the UK proposed in October 2009 “to require all lenders to assess the level of
a consumer’s expenditure in determining the affordability of a mortgage product”
4Unfortunately, NLSY data does not permit us to cleanly identify health shocks, or to link those
to increased expenditures or loss of income.
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(Judge 2009). It was suggested that such an affordability test would assess borrowers’
spending on shoes, clothes, childcare, alcohol, and smoking. However, differentiating
between needs and wants in borrowers’ spending is difficult, and such spending mea-
sures are easily manipulable by the borrowers and costly to verify for the lenders.5
Nevertheless, the proposal raises an intriguing question: What additional predictors
of loan defaults are not currently priced, but could be incorporated into loans?
Current credit risk models — such as the one behind the FICO score — primarily
focus on credit capacity (i.e., income and wealth relative to debt or credit limits)
to assess borrowers’ ability and willingness to repay, as well as borrowers’ payment
histories to identify different risk types. One area in which the current models fall
short is the assessment of future changes in borrowers’ ability to repay. Illiquidity
is the key driver of defaults, and often stems from the loss of employment, medical
expenditures, or marital dissolutions.6,7
Only recently have academics begun to shift their attention towards predicting
such trigger events or identifying the relatively risky borrowers. For example, self-
employed individuals are more likely to experience a drop in income than employees
of large corporations. Workers in the construction industry have riskier jobs than
those working for utility companies, and tenured professors have more stable income
perspectives than untenured professors. Drewianka (2010) investigates such system-
5We do recognize that misaligned incentives play a critical role in risky lending practices (e.g.,
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2010)). This paper, however, is about the information available to
lenders, regardless of whether they utilize it.
6With the recent fall in real estate values, negative equity has also become a driver of defaults.
7Keys (2010) investigates the consequences of these trigger events on households’ credit market
outcomes. He finds strong support for for job displacement causing long-lasting repercussions. His
results for marital dissolutions and health shocks are somewhat more tenuous. While bankruptcy
filings are higher in the years after a divorce, the bankruptcy rate begins to rise in the year prior
to the divorce. He interprets this finding as money problems influencing the probability of getting
divorced, but his findings are equally consistent with partners experiencing cash flow shocks in
anticipation of the divorce (e.g., separate housing, legal costs, etc.). Keys also notes that the effect
of health shocks is imprecisely estimated, mostly because they are noisily proxied for with the onset
of disability that lasts at least two consecutive surveys. While he finds a significant increase in the
bankruptcy rate from before to after the onset of disability, those individuals who become disabled
also have higher bankruptcy rates 3 to 4 years prior to the disability.
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atic variation in income instability across workers, and its determinants could then
be incorporated into credit risk models to assess future income risk. Guvenen and
Smith (2010) point to large cross-sectional variation in income growth. They are able
to elicit individuals’ private information about future income prospects from their
consumption choices. Using credit card account data from a Mexican retail chain,
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) is able to predict future default losses from consumers’ pur-
chases. Specifically, she finds that people who spend more on luxuries cause higher
losses, which is consistent with the view that consumer spending reveals information
about the borrowers’ time preferences or self-control problems.8,9
These recent advances complement a rapidly growing literature on the effect of
individuals’ preferences and decision making processes on financial outcomes. For
example, Agarwal and Mazumder (2010) show that households with lower cognitive
abilities are more likely to make costly mistakes in financial decisions. Lusardi and
Tufano (2009) find that individuals with low financial literacy amass excessive debt.
Gatherwood (2011) links financial literacy and impatience to higher delinquency rates.
While these studies validate theories of preferences and decision making, and even
offer new insights into how to improve the quality of financial decision making, the
underlying traits of intelligence, financial literacy, impatience, or self-control problems
are not directly observable. As such, they are of limited use in assessing future credit
risk.10
8Anecdotal evidence suggests that lenders do take expected earnings changes into consideration.
A recent article in the New York Times tells the story of a woman who was denied credit after
the lender received an automated response from her email account that she would be on maternity
leave (Bernard (2010)). While it is prohibited to discriminate against pregnant women or base loan
decisions on the number of children in the household, the lender was legally allowed to take the
expected loss of income during maternity leave into account when making the loan decision. This
story did have a happy ending, as the woman’s employer continued to pay her. See Duhigg (2009)
for an account of how a credit card company already utilizes its knowledge of consumers’ purchases.
9We are aware of only one provider of credit scores that factor in income stability (ScoreLogix,
founded in 2003).
10Our study also adds to the recent work on the relationship between obesity or health and wealth.
Zagorsky (2004) documents that weight gain negatively impacts wealth. Poterba, Venti and Wise
(2010) find a large correlation between poor health and asset accumulation for retirement. Mu¨nster,
Ru¨ger, Ochsmann, Letzel and Toschke (2009) find that obesity is more prevalent among the over-
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3.3 Methodology
The goal of this paper is to assess whether obesity captures credit risk relevant
information that is otherwise unobservable to or nonverifiable by the lender at the
time of extending the loan. We do not argue for a causal relationship between obesity
and future delinquencies — for our purposes, it suffices to show that the correlation
between obesity and future delinquencies is not captured by information typically
found on credit applications.
The basic idea is that a borrower’s financial liquidity is represented by a latent
random variable
Y ∗ = X ′β + ε, (3.1)
where ε ∼ N(0, σ2) and X captures financial resources and obligations (e.g., income,
wealth, and debt). If liquidity falls below zero, the borrower becomes delinquent, an
observable event we denote as Y . That is,
Y = 1{Y ∗<0} =

1 if Y ∗ < 0⇔ ε < −X ′β,
0 otherwise.
(3.2)
This yields the familiar probit model
Pr(Y = 1 | X) = 1− Φ(X ′β). (3.3)
In estimating this basic credit risk model we regress future delinquencies (Yt+1)
on a number of variables intended to capture the credit risk relevant information set
indebted, suggesting a link from financial distress to weight gain. However, while finding a link
from debt to deteriorating physical and mental health, Keese and Schmitz (2010) find no impact of
over-indebtedness on obesity.
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available to lenders (Xt).
11,12 Those credit risk relevant variables are called character-
istics, one of which is obesity. We seek to understand the association between obesity
and future delinquency.
As is standard in credit risk modeling, we adopt a flexible specification for all char-
acteristics by creating a number of attributes for each characteristic. Each attribute
is a dummy indicating whether an observation falls into a particular range of the un-
derlying characteristic. Jointly, the attributes cover the range of each characteristic.
Admittedly, there is no perfect way to determine the optimal number and spacing of
attributes. Some credit risk modelers reduce the arbitrariness by iteratively parsing
the characteristic to maximize a pre-specified objective function (e.g., maximizing
adjusted R2) subject to pre-specified constraints (e.g., monotonicity requirements).
This process is not entirely non-arbitrary. For example, it still depends on the order
in which characteristics are parsed and how the parsing proceeds. Should the modeler
split each characteristic into 2 splices, then 3 splices (i.e., thus move the boundaries
of the attributes with each round of parsing)? Or should the modeler keep previous
parsings and continue parsing each subgroup?
The obvious constraint to the number of attributes is the size of the sample avail-
able to the credit risk modeler. We determine attributes rather arbitrarily (although
we check whether our main result is robust to various alternative specifications).
For example, from a continuously measured characteristic we create six attributes —
five attributes corresponding to the quintiles of the characteristic and an additional
attribute for missing responses.13
11The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides an excellent overview about
credit risk scoring in its Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability
and Affordability of Credit (BGFRS 2007). This section draws heavily on that document.
12We estimate probit models. Probit, logit, and linear probability model results do not materially
differ from each other.
13Dropping observations with missing data on controls reduces the sample by about one third and
yields a larger estimate of the obesity effect.
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DiNardo, Garlick and Stange (2010) criticize the underlying monotonicity assump-
tion behind the obesity-outcome relationship and the parsimonious specifications of
control variables typically employed in academic research on obesity for failing to
capture important non-linearities and heterogeneity. Our research design mitigates
these concerns through the creation of attributes, which yield a flexible specification
for the controls. While we keep our main analysis simple by comparing outcomes
between the obese and non-obese, we also carefully examine the effect of weight on
delinquency over the entire range of BMIs in Section 3.A.1.3.
ECOA makes it unlawful for lenders to discriminate against credit applicants with
protected personal or demographic characteristics. The prohibition is far reaching,
from discouraging applications to differential loan pricing. Under the Federal Reserves
Regulation B, which implements ECOA, protected characteristics include race, eth-
nicity, gender, marital status, religion and to a limited extent age. Furthermore,
Regulation FF does not allow lenders to use medical information in credit eligibility
or pricing decisions. Therefore, our baseline credit risk model excludes the prohibited
characteristics, but we later investigate if obesity is simply a proxy for the prohibited
characteristics.
3.4 The Data
Ideally, our analysis would link individual loan performance to borrowers’ obesity,
while controlling for information that is available to the lender at the time the loan
contract is signed. Unfortunately, the ideal data is currently not available; it would
require the cooperation of a lender in collecting borrowers’ weight and height without
influencing the loan decision and tracking loan performance over several years.
We use individuals’ survey responses from the 1979 youth cohort of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which is administered by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The NLSY79 is a nationally representative survey that began in
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1979, covering 12,686 individuals born between 1957 and 1964. We primarily utilize
data from the 2004–2008 biennial interviews, which still cover about 60% of the
original sample.14
Designed to follow life-time experiences of a representative cross-sectional sam-
ple of the population, the focus of the NLSY79 has been on labor market outcomes.
As such, this data set has been used extensively in labor economics, but rarely in
financial economics. The 2004 and 2008 interviews, however, include questions on re-
spondents’ loan delinquency status. Both surveys ask respondents about having been
delinquent on any debt payment over the last five years, as well as prior bankruptcies
and credit card usage.15 Combined with detailed data on respondents’ income, wealth,
debt, employment status, education, family background, the NLSY79 allows us to use
borrowers’ 2004 obesity status to predict 2008 delinquencies, while controlling for nu-
merous factors that affect both. In addition, survey questions on respondents’ health
status, as well as risk and time preferences allow us to examine various mechanisms
that potentially link obesity to delinquency.16
So why do we not predict bankruptcies rather than delinquencies? In light of the
relative infrequency of bankruptcies, our sample of 6,995 observations is too small to
yield sufficient statistical power. To put this in perspective, typical credit risk models
contain hundreds of characteristics and are estimated over millions of observations.17
Turning to delinquencies improves the statistical power, because they occur more fre-
14The annualized attrition rate in the NLSY79, adjusted for the discontinuation of the two subsam-
ples, is only 1%. The drop in participation is primarily driven by the discontinuation of the military
subsample (1,079 participants) after the 1984 interview and the discontinuation of the subsample of
economically disadvantaged, nonblack/non-Hispanic respondents (1,643 participants) after the 1990
interview. The loss of these two subsamples does not affect the representativeness of the survey of
this age cohort in the U.S. population, because those two subgroups were intentionally oversampled.
15The exact question is: “In the last 5 years, have you completely missed a payment or been at
least 2 months late in paying any of your bills?”
16The usual disclaimer about surveys applies to our research as well. The answers to the interview
questions are self-reported. As such, they may reflect biases (e.g., underreporting of one’s weight)
or mistakes (e.g., a misunderstanding of the interview question). In addition, answers to questions
that gauge respondents’ risk and time preferences reflect beliefs, not actual economic choices.
17There are 7,661 respondents in the 2004 survey, 7,156 of which have information on future
delinquency. Missing BMI eliminates another 161 respondents.
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quently than defaults as people catch up with their late payments. One immediate
concern then is whether delinquencies capture serious financial distress or whether
delinquencies are inconsequential late water bills, perhaps because someone had for-
gotten to make a payment while on vacation or after having ones credit card replaced.
To this end, we tabulate delinquencies vs. bankruptcies in Table 3.1. In the 2008 sur-
vey, 9.2% of delinquent respondents declared bankruptcy between 2004 and 2008. In
the 2004 survey, 11.8% of delinquent respondents filed for bankruptcy between 2000
and 2004. For comparison, the bankruptcy rates among the non-delinquent respon-
dents were 2.7% in 2008 and 2.5% in 2004. That is, delinquency almost quadruples
bankruptcy risk, which indicates that delinquencies are an indicator of serious finan-
cial distress.18
NLSY data allow us to construct an estimate of each respondent’s body mass index
(BMI) as the ratio of respondents’ self-reported weight (converted to kilograms) and
height (converted to meters) squared. Height is reported in years 1981, 1982, 1985,
2006, and 2008. We use the average of the observations from 1985, 2006, and 2008 as
our measure of adult height to reduce measurement error (we discard the observations
from 1981 and 1982, because respondents may not yet have reached their adult heights
at that time). Weight is reported more frequently (in 1981, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988–90,
and 1992–2008 interviews), because it fluctuates more over time. To calculate BMI
in 2004, we use the weight reported in the 2004 survey. Following the convention
set forth by the World Health Organization (WHO), we classify a respondent as
obese if his/her BMI is 30 or greater. We also use the more narrow classification
into categories of underweight (BMI < 18.5), normal weight (18.5 ≤ BMI < 25),
overweight (25 ≤ BMI < 30), class I obese (30 ≤ BMI < 35), and class II/III obese
(BMI ≥ 35). Fig. 3.1 displays the distribution of BMI in the U.S. population in their
18In undisclosed results, we find that delinquencies are also associated with a high probability of
declining wealth. Also see Section 3.A.1.1 for robustness tests in which we utilize bankruptcies and
maxed out credit cards.
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early 40s and its classification. 32% of the cohort are of normal weight, 39% are
overweight, and 28% are classified as obese.19,20
The NLSY79 data are obtained from a complex survey design. As such, the
participants do not represent a random sample of the population (e.g., they are geo-
graphically clustered to minimize interviewers’ travel times between participants and
are subject to self-selection, because only those respondents who chose to complete
the initial interview became NLSY79 cohort members). In all of our analyses, we use
the sample weights provided in the NLSY (which also adjust for non-interviews) to
obtain estimates that are representative of the U.S. population born between 1957
and 1964.21,22
3.5 Obesity Is a Delinquency Risk Factor
Fig. 3.2 shows that the incidence of delinquency rises steadily across the weight
categories. Relative to the population of normal weight who have a delinquency rate
of 14.5%, the overweight have a 3 percentage point higher incidence of delinquency.
The difference in delinquency rates relative to respondents of normal weight is 8
percentage points for the obese (class I) and 14 percentage points for the severely
obese (classes II/III). In light of evidence that being underweight also constitutes
a health risk factor, it is somewhat surprising to find that the underweight have
19Information on BMI in 2004 is missing for 2% of the cohort. Our results are virtually unchanged
if we use those respondents’ BMI from earlier or later years.
20One drawback to the NLSY data is that delinquencies occur at the household level, but BMI is
available only for the respondent. However, Abrevaya and Tang (2010) find that a spouse’s BMI is
the most significant predictor of BMI after controlling for individual socioeconomic and behavioral
characteristics. Using MEPS data (specifically, longitudinal panel 9 covering years 2004 and 2005),
we also find that conditional on observing a non-obese respondent of the same age as the NLSY
cohort, the probability of another household member being obese is 28%. Conditional on observing
an obese respondent, the probability is 53%.
21As access to the detailed geographical information on respondents’ residence is restricted, we
cluster standard errors by the intersection of geographic region and whether the respondent lives
in an urban or rural location, SMSA, or city to approximate the use of stratification and sampling
units in the survey design.
22Appendix 3.A.2 contains a discussion of measurement error in our key variables.
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the lowest delinquency rate of all (but less than 1% of the population falls into this
category, which makes it a very imprecise estimate).23,24
As is evident from Table 3.2, however, the observable characteristics of the obese
represent a systematically higher credit risk than those of the non-obese. The obese
have lower income and wealth, and are more highly leveraged. Their credit histories
are substantially worse: they are more likely to have been delinquent or bankrupt in
the past, or to have been denied additional credit.25 The obese are also less educated.
We also find that obesity is more prevalent among Hispanics and Blacks and that
it is negatively correlated with respondents’ age-adjusted AFQT-score ranking (used
in prior literature as a measure of general ability). The only mitigating factors are
that the obese tend to have more stable incomes (measured as the ratio of average
total net family income over years 1996 to 2004 over its standard deviation) and are
less likely self-employed. The biggest concern we face is to differentiate the effect of
obesity from the effect of other risk factors.26
In the following section, we provide evidence that obesity has an effect on delin-
quencies above and beyond that captured by other measures of credit risk, and that
the obesity effect is not driven by any of the prohibited characteristics (such as eth-
nicity or gender) or borrower attributes that are not observable to the lender (e.g.,
cognitive ability and common family background). Column 1 of Table 3.3 provides
our starting point. Without any control variables, the marginal effect of obesity on
delinquency risk is 8.1 percentage points, with a standard error of 1.3 percentage
23The results are almost identical if we restrict the sample to the 5,301 respondents who were
indebted in 2004, through mortgages, home loans, car loans, student loans, credit card debt, or
debt owed to other businesses, people or institutions (such as doctors, lawyers, and hospitals).
Delinquency need not be restricted to borrowers, because even respondents without debt in 2004
can borrow subsequently.
24Fig. 3.A.1 in the Appendix provides the corresponding graph for bankruptcies.
25We use the individual credit history components in the regressions, but combine them into a
single adverse credit history dummy variable for this table.
26Unemployment identifies unemployment spells since the last interview (it does not mean cur-
rently unemployed). As it pertains to a longer time period, the number is larger than the unem-
ployment rate in 2004.
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points. Note that the delinquency rate in the population is 18.5%, so the potential
contribution of obesity is large in magnitude.
3.5.1 Permissible and Observable Credit Risk Factors
More Than Income, Wealth, and Debt
Column 2 of Table 3.3 shows the impact of including various controls — taken
from the 2004 survey — for income, wealth, and debt on the obesity effect.27 Income,
wealth, and debt are primary credit risk factors and have been linked to obesity
in numerous prior studies. For example, Lundborg et al. (2009) document an 18%
earnings penalty for obesity among 450,000 Swedish men; Zagorsky (2004) finds that
Americans with BMIs in the normal range have about twice the net worth of the
obese; and Mu¨nster et al. (2009) show that obesity is more prevalent among the
over-indebted in Germany.
As expected, being in a higher income or wealth quintile is associated with a lower
risk of delinquency (see Table 3.A.1). Also, delinquencies tend to rise with the debt-
to-asset ratio. However, we find that the debt-to-income ratio is not related to future
delinquencies, which is consistent with the results of Foote, Gerardi, Goette and
Willen (2009). We acknowledge that the irrelevance of the debt-to-income ratio may
be driven by measurement error. However, neither using an estimate of the annual
debt payment in lieu of debt nor average reported household income to smooth out
temporal variation materially alters our finding. Even after controlling for wealth,
income, and debt ratios, the average marginal effect of obesity remains economically
27The appendix contains three additional tables (Tables 3.A.1, 3.A.2, and 3.A.3), in which we
sequentially introduce every control variable. The details provided there allow the interested reader
to assess the relative importance of the various credit risk factors and their relation to obesity. Here
we provide only a brief summary of the main findings.
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significant at 5.1 percentage points (with a p-value of 0.1%).28,29
More Than Credit History
Credit histories play a crucial role in assessing credit risk, because they — at least
partially — reveal information about borrowers’ types that is otherwise unobservable.
Of course, not all prior derogatory accounts are the borrowers’ fault; they can happen
to the best risk types due to bad luck, e.g., the closing of a major local employer or
the health repercussions from a car accident. However, to the extent that borrowers
are of inherently different risk types, bad types will on average have worse credit
histories than good types.
If, as we posit, obesity is related to credit risk, we would expect obesity and future
delinquencies to be correlated with the incidence of prior bankruptcies and delinquen-
cies. And since the 2004 and 2008 interviews ask respondents about bankruptcies and
delinquencies, we can either control for or condition on such past derogatories when
predicting 2008 delinquency status. In addition, in 2004 the NLSY asked participants
whether they had applied for a loan in the last 5 years or since the last bankruptcy;
and whether the application was denied or approved. An application for a loan in-
dicates a borrowers’ need or desire to borrow (e.g., due to liquidity constraints or
for consumption smoothing). More importantly, credit denials also reflect lenders’
assessments of the applicants’ credit risk.
As expected, we find that credit risk is serially correlated, i.e., prior delinquencies
and bankruptcies positively predict future delinquencies (see Table 3.A.2). This find-
28Using average income instead of 2004 income to reduce measurement error further strengthens
the obesity effect.
29The estimate of the obesity effect on delinquencies is highly robust to increasing the flexibility
of the specification (why quintiles?); the marginal effect is 0.050 when we create deciles instead of
quintiles (see column 6 in Table 3.A.1) and 0.052 when we include dummies for each $5,000 increment
in income, $10,000 increment in wealth, and 5% increment in the debt-income and debt-asset ratios
(unreported; available from the authors upon request). In this last specification, we lose about 23%
of the sample, because certain attributes perfectly predict delinquency. Further tests indicate that
the obesity effect is also highly robust to polynomial specifications (as an alternative to the creation
of attributes) and various interactions between the income, wealth, and debt characteristics.
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ing is consistent with the view (i) that individual fixed effects are important credit
risk factors or (ii) that financial distress can have long-lasting repercussions (e.g.,
analogous to a poverty trap). On average, having been delinquent translates into a
26.0 percentage point higher likelihood of becoming delinquent again. The average
marginal effect of prior bankruptcy is lower, but economically still highly significant
at 7.3 percentage points. The fact that a household has applied for credit and was
accepted does not help predict future delinquencies, either positively or negatively.
However, delinquencies are estimated to be 16.3 percentage points higher when credit
was denied, and 11.0 percentage points higher for credit applications withheld because
of a low chance of approval.
The explanatory power of credit history and lenders’ information about future
credit risk is evident in column 3 of Table 3.3, which shows that adding these three
increases the Pseudo-R2 from 0.009 to 0.119. Despite the economic and statistical
significance of the proxies for credit history and the differential prevalence among the
obese and non-obese, their impact on the coefficient on obesity is relatively modest.
More Than Income Risk and Labor Market Indicators
As earnings from labor typically constitute the largest fraction of income, we
now turn to assessing the relationship of earnings risk with obesity and delinquency.
Credit applications routinely ask potential borrowers about their current employment
situation and how long they have been with the employer. The primary objective is to
verify borrowers’ claims about their current income and to ascertain that the borrower
can be expected to continue earning this income. Until recently, however, credit
risk models have not systematically attempted to assess cross-sectional differences in
applicants’ income instability.
Our most direct measure is the income instability coefficient (the ratio of 1996–
2004 average income over its standard deviation. We further select a number of
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variables based on the growing strand of literature in labor economics that investigates
cross-sectional heterogeneity in earnings instability. Drewianka (2010) provides a
recent and detailed study based on data from the PSID on this topic. He finds that
education, self-employment, and workers’ occupations and industries affect earnings
stability. Age and ethnicity matter as well, but regulations prohibit their use in
credit risk models.30 Therefore, we exclude them from our analysis in this section
(we will explore their impact on the obesity effect in Section 3.5.2). We further
add respondents’ tenure with their employer and whether they have experienced an
unemployment spell or been out of the labor force since the last the last interview in
2002.
We find that greater income instability is associated with a higher delinquency
rate (see Table 3.A.3). Respondents in the highest quintile are 6.3 percentage points
more likely to become delinquent than respondents in the lowest quintile. Greater
educational attainment translates into a lower delinquency rate, e.g., an advanced
degree by 2.8 percentage points. The greater earnings volatility associated with self-
employment manifests itself in a more than 6.5 percentage point increase in the ex-
pected delinquency rate. The marginal effects of tenure, unemployment, and labor
force participation are of economically smaller magnitudes and not statistically signif-
icant at conventional significance levels. More importantly, our estimate of the effect
of obesity on delinquency is relatively insensitive to controlling for labor market in-
dicators and income instability.
Benchmark Model
In column 5 of Table 3.3, we add all of the credit risk factors into the regression (for
a total of 96 attributes). This specification is our benchmark result. At 3.8 percentage
points, the average marginal effect of obesity on delinquency remains economically
30In contrast, Bostic (1997) fails to find racial differences in earnings volatility in an attempt to
explain racial differences in mortgage application denial rates.
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large (20.5% of the total delinquency rate) and sufficiently precisely estimated (a
standard error of only 1.2 percentage points). Obesity appears to contain credit-
risk-relevant information above and beyond income and wealth; debt-to-income and
debt-to-asset ratios; prior bankruptcies, delinquencies, and credit decisions; income
risk and labor market indicators. The caveat remains that we are missing some
important information that is available to lenders, like data on the number of credit
accounts, credit limits, and utilization. Those measures may also be correlated with
obesity, for the same reasons that we expect obesity to proxy for credit risk in the
first place.
Does Obesity Proxy for Omitted Credit Risk Factors?
We have included numerous regressors to ensure that obesity does not simply cap-
ture observable credit-risk-relevant information that is otherwise available to lenders.
Yet, the possibility remains that the NLSY lacks relevant information that is avail-
able to lenders, but not us (such as credit scores, borrowing capacity, and utilization).
This raises the question whether our results extend to those omitted variables as well.
We have already incorporated lenders’ information contained in credit decisions
on loan applications into our control variables. Here, we investigate its properties in
more detail. First, we test whether obesity also predicts credit denials. If obesity
does in fact predict denials after controlling for the other credit risk factors, then it
would likely be proxying for omitted variables — and cast serious doubt on our inter-
pretation of obesity risk. In a second step, one would then have to test whether the
informational overlap between obesity and denial is the same as the overlap between
obesity and delinquency.
Column 1 of Table 3.4 shows the results of the first test. The sample is restricted
to respondents who in the 2004 survey said they had applied for credit. The credit
decision (Denial) is now the dependent variable (equal to one if the loan application
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was rejected). We include the full set of observable and permissible credit risk factors
as controls, with the exception of the credit decision itself (obviously). The coefficient
on obesity is 2.5 percentage points, with a standard error of 2.0 percentage points
(with a p-value of over 20%). We cannot reject the hypothesis that obesity is not
reflected in credit decision.31
When we regress delinquency on obesity (and the controls), the coefficient on
obesity is large and significant (4.8 percentage points in column 2). Controlling for
the credit decision (column 3) and conditioning on no denying the credit application
(column 4) does not take away from the obesity effect on delinquency. The results
indicate that the credit decisions contain no informational overlap with obesity. In
other words, obesity appears to be unrelated to the additional credit-risk-relevant
information apparently utilized by lenders.
In addition, as noted by Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), the statistical fit of predictive
default regressions is typically modest. Gross and Souleles (2002), for example, ob-
tain Pseudo-R2s of about 14% in dynamic probit regressions predicting delinquency
and 13% predicting bankruptcies after controlling for account age, credit utilization,
internal and external credit scores, and local economic conditions (many of their vari-
ables were collected by the credit card issuers themselves). Vissing-Jorgensen obtains
Pseudo-R2s of about 10% in predicting loss rates with information on account age,
loan amounts, downpayments, interest rates, loan terms, credit limits, repayment
histories, credit scores, demographics, and store fixed effects. The statistical fit of
our model compares favorably to that of other credit risk models in the literature,
which suggests a limited potential role of additional covariates for explaining the
obesity-delinquency link that we document here.
These observations increase our confidence that obesity would survive the inclusion
of additional control variables that are not available in the NLSY.
31The marginal effect of obesity turns even negative if we control for its propensity score instead
of including the covariates separately.
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3.5.2 Personal Characteristics that Are Prohibited or Unobservable to
Lenders
One important concern about using obesity in assessing credit risk is that it merely
proxies for factors that are known to be correlated with credit risk, but are by law
prohibited from being used in credit decisions. For example, it is well-known that
obesity is more prevalent among Blacks and Hispanics (e.g., CDC (2009)), and their
default rates are higher (e.g., see Martin and Hill (2000) on car loan performance
and Pope and Sydnor (2008) for evidence from peer-to-peer lending). In columns
1–3 of Table 3.5, we individually introduce indicator variables for ethnicity, gender,
and marital status as control variables (in addition to all the controls used in the
benchmark regression).32 Even controlling for these prohibited characteristics does
not affect our estimate of the obesity coefficient in any meaningful way. Some of
the factors, however, are correlated with delinquency. Relative to Whites, Blacks are
more likely to be delinquent by 4.1 percentage points, suggesting that ethnicity prox-
ies for unobserved socioeconomic factors. We also find that women are more likely
to be delinquent than men, by about 2.6 percentage points. While those never mar-
ried, separated, divorced, or widowed are more likely to be delinquent than married
borrowers, the effect is relatively small in magnitude (1.3 and 1.4 percentage points)
and not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Lundborg et al. (2009) fully attribute the negative relationship between obesity
and earnings among 450,000 Swedish men to differences in cognitive and non-cognitive
skills and fitness between the obese and non-obese. They conclude that employers
utilize obesity to statistically discriminate against employees of lower expected pro-
ductivity. Furthermore, Agarwal and Mazumder (2010) document a strong associa-
tion between cognitive skills and the quality of household financial decision-making
32BMIs also tend to increase with age up until the mid 50s or early 60s (e.g., Baum and Ruhm
(2009), DiNardo et al. (2010)). Yet, the age profile does not play an important role in our study,
because the NLSY participants’ age range is limited (an interquartile range of only 5 years).
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among members of the U.S. military. In column 4 of Table 3.5, we control for early
educational attainment/innate ability as captured by respondents’ age-adjusted score
on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT). Delinquency risk does decrease with
higher AFQT scores. For example, those with AFQT scores in the top quintile are
3 percentage points less likely to be delinquent than those in the bottom quintile (p-
value of 2.6%). Despite that AFQT scores are higher for the non-obese than the obese,
including them in the regression does not affect the relationship between obesity and
delinquencies.
Persico, Postlewaite and Silverman (2004) show that the positive association be-
tween adult height and earnings can be fully traced back to youth height. Height
advantages during the teen years can affect self-esteem or social dominance which in
turn may translate into better economic outcomes during adulthood (e.g., through
participation in club sports) as argued by Persico et al. or simply proxy for better
cognitive ability as argued by Case and Paxson (2008). To test whether obesity risk
can be traced back to the teen years, we include attributes for youth BMI quintiles
in column 2 of Table 3.5.33 We find that the youth BMI attributes absorb none of
the conditional association between obesity and delinquency.
In column 5, we control for all prohibited or unobservable characteristics simul-
taneously. Taken together, the factors that are prohibited or not observable to the
lenders do not impact the correlation between obesity and delinquency.34
Finally, it is possible that parental influence manifests itself both in obesity and
in a higher probability of financial distress in adulthood. For example, Baum and
Ruhm (2009) show that socioeconomic status during childhood is strongly related to
adult BMIs. To see whether differences in early life conditions can explain the link
33We include youth BMI in the regression instead of obesity, because less than 5% of the respon-
dents in our sample were obese during their teen years. Using teen height also does not affect our
results.
34In unreported robustness tests, we also interact ethnicity, gender, and marital status. The results
are quantitatively similar.
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between obesity and delinquencies during adulthood, we restrict our sample to NLSY
siblings and include sibling fixed effects in the regression. The fixed effects absorb
variation in siblings’ shared environments while growing up together.35 The data
reveal substantial variation in obesity outcomes even among siblings. Of the 6,995
respondents, 3,453 have siblings in our sample. Respondents with siblings originate
from 1,499 unique households, 596 of which have at least one obese and one non-obese
respondent. The results are displayed in column 7 of Table 3.5. The marginal effect
of obesity on delinquencies remains large and significant (coefficient of 5.0 percentage
points, standard error of 2.4 percentage points).36
3.5.3 Description of Robustness Tests Available in the Appendix
We conduct numerous tests to assess the robustness and generalizability of our
benchmark result. For the interested reader, those results are reported in the Ap-
pendix. Here we only provide a synopsis.
In Section 3.A.1.1, we document robustness in three dimensions. First, our results
extend to alternative measures of financial distress, namely bankruptcies and maxing
out credit cards. Second, we show that credit risk tends to rise across the BMI
categories, i.e., the result is not driven by our simplification of comparing delinquency
rates between the obese and non-obese. Third, we obtain similar results utilizing the
survey waves from before the financial crisis.
In Section 3.A.1.2, we take a different approach to comparing the obese and non-
obese. We use the covariates from Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 to obtain a propensity score
of obesity, with which we make the two groups comparable along their observable
characteristics (see Fig. 3.A.3 for a depiction of the comparability of the obese and
35After identifying eligible households, all household members born between 1957 and 1964 were
asked to participate in the NLSY. About half of all NLSY respondents in our sample come from
households with multiple respondents. We implement the sibling regression as a linear probability
model with sibling fixed effects.
36There are some siblings with varying ethnicity. The obesity effect is insensitive to the inclusion
or exclusion of ethnicity in the regression.
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non-obese before and after propensity scoring). We find that propensity scoring
further strengthens our estimate of the effect of obesity on delinquency.
Finally, in Section 3.A.1.3, we estimate the relationship between BMI and delin-
quency semiparametrically (all covariates are collapsed into a propensity score, which
is treated parametrically). Fig. 3.A.4 plots the predicted probability of delinquency
for an average individual at any given level of BMI. We find that the delinquency risk
increases over most of the BMI range, but most drastically between BMIs of 30 and
37.
3.6 How Costly is the Obesity Effect on Delinquencies?
3.6.1 Comparing Obesity Risk to Trigger Events
Income or expenditure shocks that interfere with debt payments are called trigger
events. The three key trigger events are job displacements, marriage dissolutions (due
to separation, divorce, or death of a spouse), and health shocks. One way to assess
the economic magnitude of obesity risk is to compare it to the marginal effects of
known trigger events. Unlike obesity, a state variable, these trigger events represent
shocks to respondents’ economic and financial well-being.37
Table 3.6 presents the results. Each regression controls for the full set of credit
risk characteristics used in the benchmark regression (column 5 in Table 3.3). Based
on the estimates shown in column 4, those who become unemployed between 2004
and 2008 are 6.1 percentage points more likely to become delinquent than those
who do not experience unemployment. Similarly, those whose marriages dissolve
are 4.6 percentage points more likely to become delinquent. Disability increases the
probability of delinquency by 6.5 percentage points. At face value, the relative impact
37We identify health shocks as the onset of job limitations in 2006 or 2008, i.e., we count only
those cases in which the respondent did not have health limitations in 2004. To identify disability
shocks, researchers typically use the stricter definition of the onset of a job limitation that lasts at
least two consecutive survey waves. Our results are quantitatively similar if we employ the stricter
definition.
104
of obesity on delinquency is 62% of the unemployment effect, 83% of the marriage
loss effect, and 58% of the disability shock.
However, as indicated in column 4, obesity occurs more frequently in the pop-
ulation than the other three trigger events. In 2004, 27.7% of the population born
between 1957 and 1964 was obese, but only 7.4% saw their marriage dissolve over
the subsequent four years. After adjusting for the relevance of each credit risk in the
population, the incidence of obesity on delinquencies (= 0.038 × 0.277 = 1.05%) is
almost on par with that of unemployment (1.08%), triple the magnitude of the impact
of marriage dissolutions (0.34%), and double the impact of disability (0.49%).38
3.6.2 Back-of-the-envelope Calculation of an Obesity Risk Premium
By how much would the obesity risk affect interest rates if it were priced? To
answer this question, let us consider the following example, which features represen-
tative inputs as of 2004. Assume that lenders are risk-neutral, expect a rate of return
of 6%, and incur losses of 20% in the event of a default. Let the probability of a
default across all outstanding consumer loans be 5% and the amount of consumer
debt owed by the obese be proportional to their prevalence in the population (30%).
First, we calculate the conditional probabilities of default for obese and non-obese
borrowers by equating the default probabilities, weighted by their prevalence in the
population, to the unconditional default rate:
0.3× Pr(D|O) + 0.7× Pr(D|O) = 5%. (3.4)
38That is, we calculate the contribution of each trigger event to the overall delinquency rate in
the population. Denote delinquency as D, obesity as O, and non-obesity as O. Then Pr(D) =
Pr(D|O) Pr(O)+Pr(D|O) Pr(O) = Pr(D|O) Pr(O)+Pr(D|O)(1−Pr(O)) = Pr(D|O)+[Pr(D|O)−
Pr(D|O)]Pr(O). Multiplying the estimated marginal effect of obesity Pr(D|O) − Pr(D|O) by its
prevalence Pr(O) yields the difference between the observed delinquency rate in the population and
the rate that would prevail if all respondents were non-obese.
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Assuming that the obese are 20% more likely to default than the non-obese (this is our
best estimate based on their relative delinquency rates as predicted from the model
in column 5 of Table 3.3), we find that Pr(D|O) = 4.72% and Pr(D|O) = 5.66%.
Second, for the lenders to earn an expected return of 6%, their required returns
on loans that do not default (Ro for the obese and Ro for the non-obese) must offset
the loss they incur on defaults:
(1− 4.72%)×Ro + 4.72%× (−20%) = 6% (3.5)
(1− 5.66%)×Ro + 5.66%× (−20%) = 6%. (3.6)
Solving for R yields Ro = 7.29% and Ro = 7.56%, or an obesity risk premium of
7.56%− 7.29% = 0.27%.
While our data do not allow us to estimate the effect of obesity on delinquency
for individual loan types, the following example illustrates the financial impact of a
quarter point increase in the interest rate for a typical mortgage in 2004. On a 30-
year fixed rate mortgage of $200,000 with a base rate of 6%, the risk premium would
increase the monthly payments from $1,199 to $1,235 (or $432 annually). This amount
is more than double the average difference in out-of-pocket medical expenditures
between the obese and non-obese.
3.7 Cross-sectional Variation in the Informativeness of Obesity
How does the predictive power of observed obesity vary cross-sectionally? The
answer to this question is of interest for many reasons, including substantiating our
interpretation of the result, assessing its robustness across subsamples, and finetuning
our understanding of when conditioning on obesity is most valuable.
At first glance, if obesity proxies for omitted socioeconomic factors that are related
to delinquency (perhaps a lingering concern to some readers), then we would expect
106
it to be most informative in the economic environment that gives rise to both obesity
and delinquency (e.g., among those with low income and wealth).
On the other hand, there are several plausible reasons to expect obesity to be
particularly informative when it is least likely. First, if obesity is indeed informative
about the future as we posit in the preceding sections, then the information must
also be revealed over time. In other words, higher risk translates into more frequent
bad realizations over time, revealing itself to the lenders. Therefore, we expect the
predictive power of obesity for future delinquencies to be lower for borrowers with
poor credit histories. Second, obesity is more prevalent among individuals with lower
incomes and wealth, which are correlated with the value of human capital and indi-
viduals’ willingness to invest in it, e.g., in the form of health. Third, we expect obesity
to be a more informative signal when it reflects borrowers’ choices rather than their
economic circumstances (e.g., budget constraints limit the choice set).
We explore the cross-sectional variation across a number of variables that capture
the explanations above: the obesity propensity score, a credit risk score, race, and
gender (see Table 3.7); and income, wealth, credit history, and debt types (secured
vs. unsecured) (see Table 3.A.6 in the Appendix).
For more information on the obesity propensity score, see Section 3.A.1.2. The
credit risk score comes from regressing 2004 delinquencies on 2000 covariates without
an obesity indicator. The estimated coefficients are then multiplied by the 2004 values
of the covariates to obtain a forward-looking assessment of credit risk (with the caveat
that this credit risk score does not contain information on credit applications or past
delinquencies, as those are not available in the 2000 survey). From both scores, we
create quintile attributes and interact them with obesity. Additional information on
the range of the scores and the prevalence of obesity within each quintile is provided
in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6.
As shown in columns 1 and 4 of Panel A, obesity has the highest marginal effect
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on delinquency when obesity is least prevalent and when credit risk is lowest, and
the obesity effect is statistically different from zero only in the lowest two quintiles
for both scores. The magnitude of the heterogeneity is quite large: the difference in
marginal effects between the top and bottom quintiles is 8.0 − 1.8 = 6.2 percentage
points for the obesity propensity score and 8.7− 3.3 = 5.4 percentage points for the
credit risk score. The relative magnitude — compared to the average delinquency
rate in each quintile — even larger. For example, the 2008 delinquency rate in the
bottom quintile of the obesity propensity score is just 9.4%, whereas it is 31.7% in the
top quintile. Also, as shown in the Appendix, the obesity effect is strongest among
the top 40% of the income distribution and the top 20% of the wealth distribution.
Among respondents without prior bankruptcies, delinquencies, and credit denials, the
obese are 4.5 percentage points more likely to become delinquent. Among those with
damaged credit history, the marginal effect of obesity is only 2.7 percentage points
(not statistically different from zero).39
It is also of interest whether the obesity effect holds across various demographic
groups. Controlling for gender and ethnicity in Table 3.5 only ensures that the obesity
effect is not driven by differences in obesity and delinquency across gender and race.
Here we investigate whether the intensity of the obesity effect varies across these
demographic groups. To this end, we stratify the sample and run separate regressions
for each subpopulation. The results are shown in Panel B. The obesity effect is evident
among Hispanic and White and female and male respondents, but not among Blacks.
One potential reason for not finding an obesity effect among Blacks include greater
measurement error in BMI (Burkhauser and Cawley (2008)).
39To account for the uncertainty in estimated — rather than observed — propensity scores, we
obtain bootstrapped estimates of the standard errors on the obesity coefficients shown in column 1
of Tables 3.7 and 3.A.5. Based on 100 replications, they are almost identical to those reported.
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3.8 What Are the Mechanisms Through Which Obesity Affects Delin-
quencies?
3.8.1 Health Costs
Previous Evidence
The first plausible explanation for a link between obesity and delinquency is that
the obese tend to incur higher health-related costs than the non-obese, and these cash
flow shocks impede borrowers’ ability to meet their debt obligations. Being a leading
health risk factor, obesity is associated with increased risks of heart disease, diabetes,
cancer, breathing problems, arthritis, depression, premature death, and many other
health consequences.40
Finkelstein, Trogdon, Cohen and Dietz (2009) estimate that medical per-adult-
capita spending is $1,429 (or 41.5%) higher for the obese than non-obese. In an
earlier study, Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn and Wang (2003) found that about 14% of total
medical spending attributable to obesity came out-of-pocket. Assuming that the
out-of-pocket contribution has not changed between 1998 and 2006, the additional
out-of-pocket medical spending due to obesity amounts to approximately $200 per
adult capita. However, the incidence of medical spending is highly skewed, with a
large fraction of the population incurring zero medical expenditures in a given year.
We expect that the difference in average medical expenditures between the obese and
non-obese also translates into a differential probability of experiencing a significant
cash-flow shock relative to income or wealth.
Health-related costs do not only come in the form of higher out-of-pocket medical
expenditures. Obesity-related health issues can jeopardize job security and affect
loan delinquencies through the loss of income. Numerous studies have shown that
40Further information available at 〈http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity〉. See
DiNardo et al. (2010) for a contrarian view.
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the obese miss more days at work due to illness or injury, or that their productivity is
lower because they do go to work ill or injured.41 For example, Tucker and Friedman
(1998) find in a sample of over 10,000 employees in the U.S. that the obese are 74%
more likely to experience high levels of absenteeism than their normal weight weight
coworkers. We conjecture that a wage-growth penalty or higher likelihood of job
separation for the obese resulting from poorer job performance would adversely affect
their ability to meet their debt obligations in the future.42
Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren and Woolhandler (2009)’s findings attest to the im-
portance of health for financial outcomes. In 2007, they surveyed a random sample
of bankruptcy filers in the U.S. about the causes of their financial difficulties. They
find that income shortfalls or medical bills due to illness contributed to 62.1% of all
bankruptcies. Most of the debtors were well-educated and middle class. The average
out-of-pocket medical expense of the bankrupt was $18,000. Common diagnoses in-
cluded multiple sclerosis, diabetes, injuries, stroke, mental illnesses, and heart disease,
all of which are more prevalent and cause more complications among the obese.
Results
Ideally, we would like to observe health shocks or medical expenditures incurred
by the households. We could then test whether the additional delinquencies among
the obese are due to the realization of such adverse events. Unfortunately, the NLSY
does not contain good information on health shocks.43 Our approach to assess the
extent to which the effect of obesity on delinquencies is potentially channeled through
41See Hammond and Levine (2010) and Wolf (2002) for a more detailed and comprehensive review
of the evidence.
42There is also evidence of a wage-penalty for the obese (e.g., see Cawley (2004) and Han, Norton
and Stearns (2009)). While lower wages decrease a borrower’s potential to absorb spending shocks,
the lower wages are observed at the time the loans are made. Therefore, we would not expect obesity
to provide additional information about future delinquency risk after controlling for income.
43The only available measure is based on job limitations, which we have already discussed in Sec-
tion 3.6. After controlling for credit risk factors, obesity weakly predicts the onset of job limitations
in 2006 and 2008 (obesity is a stronger predictor of existing job limitations). Predicted probabilities
of new job limitations have no effect on delinquencies.
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health costs follows Persico et al. (2004). Paraphrasing them, to the extent that
health outcomes reflect individual choices, a decrease in the coefficient on obesity
would suggest that part of the effect of obesity on delinquency is channeled through
health. We introduce several health outcome measures to the benchmark credit risk
model and test whether the obesity-delinquency effect is sensitive to the inclusion of
the health measures.
Our primary measure of health is a self-reported assessment of the respondents’
health after they turn 40 years old. In 2004, respondents’ ages range from 39 to 48.
That is, we have data on most respondents’ health status, although for some it is
somewhat dated.44 Table 3.8, column 1, shows the results. Including respondents’
self-assessed health reduces the marginal effect of obesity on the delinquency rate by
an economically meaningful amount, from 3.8 percentage points in the benchmark
model to 2.6 percentage points, or by -31.6% (the difference in the obesity effect
with and without controlling for health is statistically significant at a p-value of less
than 0.1%). In other words, about one third of the obesity effect on delinquencies
appears to be channeled through poor health. The NLSY further provides physical
component summary scores, which summarize NLSY participants’ responses to 12
questions on their physical health (the scores are highly correlated with self-assessed
health). Unreported results show that being in the bottom quintile of physical health
is associated with a significantly higher incidence of delinquencies when compared
to the credit risk of borrowers in the upper 80% of the distribution. The inclusion
of physical health scores also lowers the marginal effect of obesity to 3.0 percentage
points (a decrease of 21.1%).45
44In unreported specifications, we attempt to account for this potential problem by controlling for
the number of years since the health assessment. We also conduct the analysis with the pre-financial
crisis data, for which we lack some other controls. The impact of controlling for self-reported health
on the marginal effect of obesity remains quantitatively similar.
45The NLSY data also contain a long list of illnesses and mental health scores. Including indicator
variables for the various health conditions yields results similar to those of the physical component
score; while mental health affects credit risk, it does not impact the obesity effect.
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We conclude that the effect of obesity on delinquencies is at least partially medi-
ated through health outcomes. Since the onset of job limitations does not appear to
explain the effect of obesity on delinquency, we conjecture that the obesity effect is
primarily channeled through higher expenditures rather than income shocks and/or
that the obesity effect reflects longer-term conditions rather than temporary shocks.
The nature of the relationship between health outcomes, obesity, and delinquencies
raises further issues. If one subscribes to the view that weight is a choice variable,
then conditioning loan decisions on obesity would force the obese to internalize the
costs of their caloric intake choices. On the other hand, if one believes that weight
is not a choice variable, then obesity would merely proxy for health outcomes. In
this case, conditioning loan decisions on obesity would penalize borrowers for non-
preventable poor health outcomes. The matter is further complicated by the role
of external factors that affect whether weight is a choice variable (e.g., community
characteristics and budget constraints can effectively eliminate choices).
3.8.2 Time Preferences
Previous Evidence
The second plausible explanation for a link between obesity and delinquency is
that obesity reflects time- or risk-preferences. Because obesity is the result of excess
caloric intake over an extended period of time, it can contain valuable information
about individuals’ underlying preferences or characteristics underlying their choices.
Courtemanche and McAlvanah (2011) provide an in-depth assessment of the link
between time preferences and BMI. Using NLSY79 data, they find that both ratio-
nal intertemporal tradeoffs and time inconsistency play a role in weight gain. Other
studies provide similar findings. For example, Ikeda, Kang and Ohtake (2010) also
document a positive association between BMI and impatience and hyperbolic dis-
counting in a survey of Japanese adults; Scharff (2009) shows that obese dieters
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display behavior consistent with hyperbolic discounting in the Continuing Survey of
Food Intakes by Individuals; and in calibrating a model of caloric intake, Buttet and
Dolar (2010) also find that commitment problems play an important role in weight
gain.46,47
Results
We are aware of three measures of impatience obtained from NLSY data. DellaV-
igna and Paserman (2005) use factor analysis to construct an aggregate measure of
impatience from seven behaviors that indicate impatience.48 Cadena and Keys (2010)
identify impatience from NLSY interviewers’ assessments of the respondent as impa-
tient or restless in any of the first five surveys.49 These two studies link impatience
measures from respondents’ early surveys to subsequent labor market outcomes (job
search and formation of human capital). Courtemanche and McAlvanah (2011), on
the other hand, obtain estimates about respondents’ underlying time preferences pa-
rameters from survey questions about the time value of money and show that these
measures of impatience are reflected in respondents’ BMIs after controlling for a wide
range of economic and demographic factors.
Our primary measure is based on Courtemanche and McAlvanah, because it is
most strongly related to BMI/obesity.50 In 2006, NLSY participants were asked the
46For further references as well as evidence on the time-stability of intertemporal preferences of
individuals, see citations in Courtemanche and McAlvanah (2011).
47In the 2002 Swiss Health Survey, Stutzer (2006) documents that obesity decreases well-being only
for those respondents who report limited self-control and concludes that obesity reflects sub-optimal
choices. His interpretation is supported by the observation that individuals spend considerable
resources trying to lower or maintain their weight. According to Cummings (2003), annual spending
on diet products by U.S. consumers alone is estimated to be $40 to $100 billion (or about $200 to
$500 per adult capita).
48The indicators are labeled NLSY assessment of impatience, having a bank account, use of
contraceptives, insurance, health habits (smoking and drinking), and vocational clubs in high school.
49It is not clear to us why Cadena and Keys did not incorporate the other indicators from DellaV-
igna and Paserman. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no comparison between the various
impatience measures.
50We present results only for the ex-post best measure, and even it fails to absorb any of the
obesity effect on delinquency. However, we implement and test all of the previously used measures,
variants thereof, as well as our own measures of impatience based on the hypothetical time- and
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following question:
“Suppose you have won a prize of $1,000, which you can claim immedi-
ately. However, you can choose to wait one month to claim the prize.
If you do wait, you will receive more than $1,000. What is the smallest
amount of money in addition to the $1,000 you would have to receive
one month from now to convince you to wait rather than claim the prize
now?”
The question was then repeated using a one year wait time. As Courtemanche and
McAlvanah explain in detail, the implicit annualized discount factors should be equal
for time-consistent individuals. Yet, most respondents reveal a greater discount fac-
tor for the one-year delay than for the one-month delay, which is consistent with
present-biased preferences. Assuming that individuals discount payoffs τ periods in
the future by βδτ , the authors back out estimates of β and δ for each respondent. δ
reflects long-run impatience and β captures myopia (lower value correspond to higher
discounting and more impatience). We winsorize the β and δ estimates at the top
and bottom percentile. Our sample moments closely match those of Courtemanche
and McAlvanah.51 We convert the estimates of β and δ from discount factors into dis-
count rates to match the interpretation of the other measures of impatience (where
higher values correspond to more impatience) and because the discount rates are
more strongly related to BMI/obesity. The β- and δ-discount rates have means and
standard deviations of 0.517 and 0.956 and interquartile ranges of 0.678 and 0.920.52
Table 3.8 presents the results for the impatience channel. In columns 2 and 3, we
regress obesity on the β- andδ-discount rates (first without controls, then with con-
trols). Similar to Courtemanche and McAlvanah, excess weight reflects both greater
risk-preference questions in the 2006 survey. Almost all measures predict delinquency, but few are
positively correlated with obesity (DellaVigna and Paserman’s and Cadena and Keys’ impatience
measures are even negatively correlated with obesity after controlling for credit risk factors). The
results are available from the authors upon request.
51In our sample, the relationship between β and δ and BMI is weaker.
52A potential objection to using information from these 2006 survey questions is reverse causality.
Respondents in financial distress are more likely to place greater value on receiving money sooner
rather than later. However, the results from alternative impatience measures that pre-date our
sample by 20 years yield qualitatively similar estimates without impacting the marginal effect of
obesity.
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short-term and long-term impatience. The magnitude of the effects is quite mod-
est — the time preference parameters explain only 0.3% of the variation in obesity,
and moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the discount rate distributions
increases the likelihood of being obese by only 2 and 3 percentage points.53 The
majority of the myopia effect on obesity is absorbed by the credit risk factors.
Since about 8.5% of our sample does not have information on discount rates, we
re-estimate the benchmark credit risk model for this subsample (column 4). The
marginal effect of obesity on delinquency is 4.2 percentage points, moderately higher
than for the full sample. Including the β- and δ-discount rates only trivially lowers
the obesity effect. Based on the many failed attempts to have measures of impatience
absorb some of the obesity effect, we conclude that obesity does not proxy for time-
preferences. Interestingly, impatience itself is predictive of delinquencies, above and
beyond what is revealed through other economic outcomes.
3.9 Conclusion
3.9.1 Summary of Findings
We estimate that loan delinquency rates among the obese are 20% higher than
among the non-obese after controlling for differences in income and wealth; debt-to-
income and debt-to-asset ratios; prior bankruptcies, delinquencies, and credit deci-
sions; income risk and labor market indicators. The results are not driven by race,
gender, marital status, age, human capital, or youth experiences. We document that
despite its power to predict delinquencies, obesity does not help explain credit de-
cisions. This observations suggests that obesity does not merely proxy for omitted
credit-risk-relevant variables. Our finding is robust to alternative measures of finan-
cial distress and holds in other time periods. Delinquency risk increases over most
53Also, the relationship appears to be non-monotonic, but ultimately none of our further attempts
of estimating the BMI/obesity-impatience relationship yielded significant impact on the effect of
obesity on delinquency.
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of the BMI range, but especially between BMIs of 30 and 37. The economic signifi-
cance of obesity for delinquencies is comparable to that of job displacements, and it
is particularly informative among households with low credit risk. We identify poor
health as a channel through which obesity is linked to delinquencies. Our findings
are consistent with the view that obesity-linked medical expenses or loss of income
impede borrowers’ ability to meet their financial obligations. However, we find no
support for the view that the obesity effect captures borrowers’ time preferences.
3.9.2 Discussion
While our findings are intriguing, they must be interpreted with care. Our results
are indicative of cross-subsidization in the credit market. Average risk pricing in
the credit market amounts to a wealth transfer from the non-obese to the obese.
However, we cannot speak to the role of obesity in the allocative efficiency of the
credit market. Also, our study is mute about whether BMIs would drop in response
to an increase in the cost of being obese born by the obese (e.g., due to actuarial
pricing of credit risk). At best, the cross-subsidization constitutes an unintended
redistribution of wealth, and possibly an inefficiency in the allocation of capital and
personal investment in health. As such, our results should inform the discussions on
the desirability of providing legal or regulatory protection to the obese.
We would like to emphasize that we do not claim causality from excess weight to
credit risk. Beside the obvious academic distinction, there are important implications
for how to think about obesity. Our study does not provide justification for any diet
regimens, diet drugs, or surgical weight loss. It is compatible with a number of studies
and books that argue that it is not fatness per se, but the obsession with or the
underlying factors leading to it, that are harmful (e.g., see Gaesser (1996), Campos
(2004), and Oliver (2005)). Also, we do not advocate taste-based discrimination.
We do not argue that the obese should pay more for their loans because of their
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appearance per se, but per se, but point to their higher credit risk on economic
grounds.
Regulations in Credit, Labor, and Insurance Markets
In the context of credit markets, U.S. federal regulations restrict the use of med-
ical information in the provision of credit. At this point, however, it is not clear
whether obesity would be considered a medical condition under Regulation FF. Even
without explicit legal restrictions on the actuarialization of obesity, it often conflicts
with the protection of other protected groups under antidiscrimination law. For ex-
ample, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits lenders to discriminate
against credit applicants with protected personal or demographic characteristics. The
prohibition is far reaching, from discouraging applications to differential loan pricing.
Under the Federal Reserve’s Regulation B, which implements ECOA, protected char-
acteristics include race, ethnicity, gender, marital status, religion and to a limited
extent age. For credit score models to comply with antidiscrimination rules, the
characteristics included in the model must have sufficient business rationale, yet not
disproportionately affect protected populations.54
Insurance markets have a longer history of dealing with the issue of obesity, and
due to their actuarial nature provide a good comparison for credit markets. While
most states prohibit race-based discrimination for medical insurance underwriting,
none restricts the use of weight. However, when insurance is offered as an employment
benefit, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act mandates equal treatment of all employ-
ees. This creates incentives for companies to avoid hiring employees with high health
risks. However, rules do change, as evidenced by the changes to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 2006, which opened the door to dif-
ferential pricing between the obese and non-obese in employers’ group health plans.
54While our results are not driven by the disproportionate prevalence of obesity among Blacks,
the use of obesity in credit modeling may still have a disparate impact on minorities.
117
Based on the increasing use of weight in the insurance market and its similarities
with the credit market, it appears likely that its use would also be permitted in credit
markets.
Obesity vs. Race
The conditional correlation between obesity and delinquency that we document
here mirrors the relationship between race and delinquency (e.g., as seen in Table
3.5, Martin and Hill (2000), and Charles, Hurst and Stephens (2008)). In both cases,
the empirical results establish statistical stereotypes that are based on the logic of
actuarial personhood (Kirkland (2008)). The predictions do not apply to any specific
person in the population, but to a hypothetic average member of a group.
As Kirkland puts it, the question then is “Whose personhood is subject to actuar-
ialism in the law and whose gets protected from it?” Despite the similarity between
race and obesity in predicting credit risk, they are treated differently under U.S. law.
To argue that fatness is like race one would have to establish that it
“has been subject to invidious discrimination, that it is an immutable
trait [. . . ], that it causes isolation and exclusion of a group of people from
public life and opportunity (as segregation practices did), and that fat
people as a group are marked by their fatness in a way that is tempting
for government to use to subordinate them [. . . ] As long as being fat is
like being a smoker, it will never be like being black” Kirkland (2008).
In addition, antidiscrimination law struggles with how to treat actuarial personhood
of obesity due to the absence of a moral underpinning in the classification of people
into risk attributes (i.e., discrimination is based on presumably true facts, not on
distaste for obesity).
3.9.3 Open Questions
We establish a robust relationship between obesity and credit risk using NLSY
data, but limited data quality and availability put a cap on the confidence we can place
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on the generalizability of this finding. Follow-up research could conduct an out-of-
sample evaluation of our empirical model using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics
(PSID) or similar international data. One could also combine detailed loan level data
from LPS Applied Analytics with obesity prevalence estimates at the county or ZIP
code level based on survey responses from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS) of the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Further-
more, it would be interesting to expand on whether obesity is being priced (which
would suggest that obesity merely captures other observable characteristics).
While our results point to health shocks as the main channel from obesity to delin-
quency risk, they are far from conclusive. Yet, the distinction between the channels
— revelation of borrower behavior vs. future health shocks — is very important. On
the one hand, if obesity is informative about the inherent type of the borrower, then
an increase in the overall rate of obesity in the population would have no effect on
total defaults. On the other hand, if obesity is informative about future cash flow
risk, then its rising prevalence should coincide with a rise in credit defaults over time.
Fig. 3.3 depicts the comovement between obesity prevalence and personal bankruptcy
rates and is, at first glance, consistent with our interpretation that the obesity effect
is at least partially mediated through health shocks.55 Also note that the bankruptcy
rate for businesses, which are not directly affected by the rise in obesity, trends
downward over the available sample period. It would be interesting to quantify the
extent to which the rise in defaults and bankruptcies over the last decades can be
attributed to obesity. However, a detailed examination of the long-term time trends
are beyond the scope of this paper, and would need to account for various contem-
poraneous changes in the U.S. economy over that time period, especially the increase
in household indebtedness.
55The sharp decline in personal bankruptcy rates in 2005 coincides with the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).
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Given that body weight provides information that is relevant for economic out-
comes in the labor and credit markets, it is of great interest to explore its significance
in other settings. Note that obesity or weight gain need not be negative indicators in
all settings, and the outcomes need not reflect the same channels to which we have
appealed here. Negative stress could cause weight gain or loss as people respond
differently (in which case it is the magnitude of the change in BMI that would be
relevant), and obesity may signal the amount of effort devoted to and focus on a task
rather than oneself. We recognize the difficulty of establishing causality in this line
of inquiry, but — in light of its importance — hope that future research will take on
this challenge.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution and Categorization of BMI
We compute the body mass index (BMI) from NLSY respondents’ self-reported height and weights. As our measure
of adult height, we use the average of the heights reported in 1985, 2006, and 2008. The classification of BMIs into
under/normal/overweight and obese categories reflects 2004 WHO standards. Data source: NLSY79.
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Figure 3.2: Delinquency Rates Across BMI Categories
This graph displays the delinquency rate across the BMI categories (brackets denote the 95% confidence interval).
Delinquency is defined as having completely missed a payment or having been late by at least 2 months on any bill
over the last 5 years. Data source: NLSY79.
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Figure 3.3: National Obesity and Bankruptcy Filing Trends
This graph plots long-term trends in the prevalence of obesity among adults and bankruptcy rates in the U.S. Obesity
prevalence is based on NHES/NHANES estimates available through the World Health Organization’s Global Database
on Body Mass Index. We calculate personal bankruptcy rates as the number of bankruptcies per 1,000 households
and business bankruptcy rates as the number of bankruptcies per 1,000 employers. The drop in personal bankruptcy
filings in 2005 coincides with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).
Data sources: WHO, ABI, US Census, SBA.
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Table 3.1: Delinquencies Are an Indicator of Serious Financial Distress
What do delinquencies measure: financial distress or forgotten bills? This table shows that bankruptcy risk is about
four times as high when households are delinquent than when they are not. In other words, delinquencies are an
indicator of serious financial distress.
Bankruptcy rate
Survey year 2004 2008
(1) (2)
Non-delinquent 2.51 2.67
Delinquent 11.78 9.17
Population average 4.20 3.87
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics, By Obesity
This table captures that the obese and non-obese systematically differ in their observable credit-risk relevant, so-
cioeconomic, and demographic characteristics. The top and bottom 1 percent of debt-to-income and debt-to-asset
ratios have been winsorized. Poor credit history encompasses prior bankruptcy filings, delinquencies, and rejected
applications for credit. *** denote statistically significant differences in means between the obese and non-obese at
the 1% significance level. Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
Non-obese Obese
mean st dev obs mean st dev obs ∆
Measures of credit risk as of 2008
Delinquent 0.162 0.369 4,803 0.244 0.429 2,192 ***
Bankrupt 0.032 0.177 4,794 0.054 0.228 2,189 ***
Maxed out credit card 0.082 0.274 4,752 0.127 0.333 2,169 ***
Credit-risk relevant characteristics as of 2004
Income 87,975 86,138 4,197 65,651 53,070 1,932 ***
Wealth 305,000 546,000 4,695 170,000 337,000 2,148 ***
Debt/income ratio 1.519 2.106 4,075 1.406 2.057 1,896
Debt/asset ratio 0.481 1.072 4,417 0.651 1.491 2,025 ***
Poor credit history 0.291 0.454 4,761 0.407 0.491 2,182 ***
Income instability 0.395 0.330 4,555 0.364 0.303 2,094 ***
> High school educ 0.318 0.466 4,752 0.205 0.404 2,168 ***
Self-employed 0.104 0.306 4,803 0.076 0.266 2,192 ***
Job tenure 7.743 6.854 4,149 7.939 6.953 1,856
Unemployed 0.128 0.335 4,546 0.127 0.333 2,056
Out of labor force 0.274 0.446 4,591 0.270 0.444 2,091
Prohibited/unavailable characteristics as of 2004
White 0.821 0.383 4,803 0.721 0.449 2,192 ***
Male 0.513 0.500 4,803 0.514 0.500 2,192
AFQT ranking 0.605 0.275 4,606 0.542 0.287 2,113 ***
Age 43.301 2.337 4,803 43.381 2.255 2,192
124
Table 3.3: Marginal Effect of Obesity on Delinquency After Controlling for Credit-
Risk-Relevant Variables that Are Observable and Permissible
The table displays marginal effects of obesity on subsequent delinquency, estimated from credit risk probit models.
All explanatory variables are from the 2004 survey. For a flexible specification, we create quintile attributes from
continuous characteristics. The bottom quintiles are the omitted categories, so the displayed marginal effects are to
be interpreted relative to the omitted category. Tables 3.A.1, 3.A.2, and 3.A.3 provide estimated marginal effects of
the control variables and show how the marginal effect of obesity changes as we add characteristics one at a time.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by residence typology (region and urban/rural), and accounting
for the complex survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% significance levels. Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
No Income Credit Income All
controls & assets history risk controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Obese 0.081*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.074*** 0.038***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Income no yes no no yes
Wealth no yes no no yes
Debt/income no yes no no yes
Debt/assets no yes no no yes
Delinquent no no yes no yes
Bankrupt no no yes no yes
Recent credit decision no no yes no yes
Income instability no no no yes yes
Education no no no yes yes
Job tenure no no no yes yes
Self-employed no no no yes yes
Unemployed no no no yes yes
Out of labor force no no no yes yes
Industry dummies no no no yes yes
Occupation dummies no no no yes yes
# of observations 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995
Pseudo-R2 0.009 0.075 0.119 0.054 0.162
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Table 3.4: Obesity Does Not Enter Credit Decisions, But Predicts Delinquencies
In this table we investigate whether obesity captures information that is available to lenders, but unobservable to
us (the researchers). To this end, we constrain the sample to those respondents who in 2004 said that they had
applied for credit. On this subsample, we regress the binary variable Denied (equals one if credit was denied) on all
of the observable and permissible covariates of Table 3.3 column 5 (excluding the credit application indicator). The
estimated marginal effect of obesity on the credit decision is displayed in column 1. Then we regress Delinquent on
obesity and the controls included in column 1. Column 2 provides the baseline estimate for the effect of obesity on
delinquency without controlling for lenders’ information. We add Denied as a control in column 3, and we condition
on credit not having been denied in column 4. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by residence
typology (region and urban/rural), and accounting for the complex survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Observations are weighted using
NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
Dependent var: Credit denied Delinquent
Baseline Control Condition
for Denied on Denied=0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Obese 0.025 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.048***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Denied 0.087***
(0.016)
Benchmark controls yes yes yes yes
# of obs 3,007 3,007 3,007 2,241
Pseudo-R2 0.259 0.191 0.200 0.163
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Table 3.5: Obesity Is Not Just a Proxy for Race, Gender, Marital Status, Cognitive
Ability, or Parental Influence
The table displays marginal effects of obesity on subsequent delinquency, estimated from credit risk probit models.
In columns 1–5, we successively introduce new control variables that are potentially correlated with obesity and
credit risk, but are either prohibited by ECOA (ethnicity, gender, and marital status) or are unobservable to the
lender (cognitive abilities, as measured by the age-adjusted AFQT-score, and youth BMI in 1981). The explanatory
variables are from the 2004 survey (except for the AFQT-score and youth BMI). The excluded base categories are
Whites, males, the married, and the bottom quintiles of ability and youth BMI. In column 6, we combine all of
the new controls. In column 7, we estimate a linear probability model (OLS) with sibling fixed effects (the sample
being restricted to respondents with siblings in the NLSY; there are some siblings with varying ethnicity). Every
specification also includes the full set of attributes from Table 3.3, column 5 (coefficients not reported to save space).
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by residence typology (region and urban/rural), and accounting
for the complex survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% significance levels. Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
Ethni- Gender Marital Cognit Youth All Sibling
city status ability BMI controls FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Obese 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.050*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.024)
Hispanic 0.025 0.025 -0.096
(0.017) (0.019) (0.164)
Black 0.041*** 0.039*** -0.336*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.184)
Female 0.026* 0.027* 0.020
(0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
Never married 0.013 0.009 -0.006
(0.016) (0.015) (0.021)
Separated, divorced, 0.014 0.012 -0.009
widowed (0.011) (0.011) (0.026)
AFQT Q2 -0.012 -0.004 0.000
(0.016) (0.016) (0.036)
AFQT Q3 -0.008 0.004 0.018
(0.014) (0.015) (0.033)
AFQT Q4 -0.025 -0.010 -0.009
(0.021) (0.022) (0.035)
AFQT Q5 -0.030** -0.010 0.029
(0.013) (0.016) (0.049)
Youth BMI Q2 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.043
(0.011) (0.011) (0.028)
Youth BMI Q3 0.006 0.010 -0.028*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Youth BMI Q4 0.005 0.011 -0.010
(0.016) (0.018) (0.029)
Youth BMI Q5 0.020 0.027 -0.026
(0.016) (0.017) (0.030)
Benchmark controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995 3,453
Pseudo-R2 0.164 0.163 0.162 0.163 0.164 0.168 0.154
127
Table 3.6: Comparing Obesity Risk to the Impact of Trigger Events on Delinquencies
The table displays the marginal effects of obesity and various trigger events on subsequent delinquency rates. In
all specifications (columns 1–4), we include the set of controls used in column 5 of Table 3.3. Unemployment,
Marital dissolution, and Disability represent negative shocks to the household. They come from the 2006 and 2008
surveys. Unemployment and Marital dissolution equal one if a respondent experiences the conditions between 2004
and 2008, and zero otherwise. Disability only equals one if respondents are not disabled in 2004 and claim disability
in the 2006 or 2008 surveys. Column 4 displays the relative frequency of occurrence of obesity, unemployment, and
marital dissolutions in the population for which the NLSY is representative. Heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors, clustered by residence typology (region and urban/rural), and accounting for the complex survey design, are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels.
Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
Estimates Occurrence rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Obese 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 27.7%
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Unemployment 0.065*** 0.061*** 17.7%
(0.016) (0.016)
Marital dissolution 0.052*** 0.046** 7.4%
(0.020) (0.021)
Disability 0.073*** 0.065*** 7.5%
(0.021) (0.021)
Benchmark controls yes yes yes yes
# of observations 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995
Pseudo-R2 0.167 0.164 0.165 0.171
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Table 3.7: Cross-sectional Heterogeneity in the Informativeness of Obesity
The table displays estimates of the marginal effect of obesity on delinquency across the quintile attributes of the obesity
propensity score and the credit risk score (Panel A), and across race and gender (Panel B). The obesity propensity
score are the predicted values obtained from regressing obesity on all the attributes in Table 3.3. The credit risk score
is the predicted delinquency risk (combining estimated coefficients from the regression of 2004 delinquencies on 2000
covariates [excluding obesity] with 2004 covariates). Note that for the credit risk score, data on credit applications
and prior delinquencies are not available in 2000, which restricts the credit history controls to just prior bankruptcies.
In all specifications, quintile attributes of the obesity propensity score are included. Range w/in Q provides the
minimum and maximum value of the interacted variable within that particular quintile. % obese shows the fraction
of the population in each quintile that is obese. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by residence
typology (region and urban/rural), and accounting for the complex survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Observations are weighted using
NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
Panel A: Interactions with Credit Risk Factors
Average marginal effect of obesity over the quintiles of . . .
Obesity propensity score Credit risk score
marginal range % obese marginal range % obese
effect w/in Q w/in Q effect w/in Q w/in Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Obese
× Q1 0.080** 0.010–0.174 12.9 0.087** 0.130–0.191 19.7
(0.036) (0.038)
× Q2 0.060** 0.174–0.242 21.4 0.062*** 0.192–0.240 30.0
(0.026) (0.021)
× Q3 0.046 0.242–0.299 25.8 0.025 0.241–0.246 32.7
(0.029) (0.017)
× Q4 0.033 0.299–0.370 34.0 0.018 0.246–0.285 28.4
(0.036) (0.023)
× Q5 0.018 0.370–0.732 44.2 0.033 0.285–0.453 27.5
(0.028) (0.036)
BM controls yes yes
# of obs 6,995 6,995
Pseudo-R2 0.046 0.076
Panel B: Effect of Obesity by Race and Gender
Race Gender
Hispanic Black White Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Obese 0.048* 0.006 0.043** 0.034*** 0.049**
(0.027) (0.014) (0.018) (0.010) (0.019)
BM controls yes yes yes yes yes
# of obs 1,326 2,142 3,527 3,394 3,601
Pseudo-R2 0.026 0.019 0.048 0.030 0.058
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Table 3.8: Channels of the Obesity Effect: Health and Impatience
This table shows the results on the channels through which obesity affects delinquency. Column 1 displays marginal
effects of obesity and self-reported health status on the probability of becoming delinquent in 2008 (we also control
for all variables included in column 5 of Table 3.3). Self-reported health status and physical health scores come
from the surveys around which the respondents turn 40 years old. The omitted category is Excellent health. The
remaining columns investigate the impatience channel. Specifically, columns 2 and 3 show the average marginal effects
of individuals’ β- and δ-discount rates on the probability of being obese (column 2 does not include the controls from
the benchmark model). β- and δ-discount rates are obtained from respondents’ answers to NLSY survey questions
about time preferences. Column 5 displays the results from the benchmark credit risk model augmented by the β-
and δ-discount rates (and column 4 serves as a comparison for the obesity effect in the smaller sample due to missing
observations for the discount rates). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by residence typology (region
and urban/rural), and accounting for the complex survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant
differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling
weights.
Health Impatience
Dependent variable: Delinquent Obese Obese Delinquent Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Obese 0.026** 0.042*** 0.041***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Very good health 0.029**
(0.012)
Good health 0.081***
(0.015)
Fair health 0.075***
(0.024)
Poor health 0.111***
(0.042)
β-discount rate 0.022*** 0.009 0.010**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
δ-discount rate 0.011*** 0.008** 0.006***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Benchmark controls yes no yes yes yes
# of observations 6,995 6,403 6,403 6,403 6,403
Pseudo-R2 0.170 0.003 0.064 0.167 0.169
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Robustness Tests
3.A.1.1 Weight Categories, The Financial Crisis, and Other Measures of
Financial Distress
In this section, we consider robustness test in several dimensions. First, delin-
quency is not the only indicator of financial distress in the NLSY. Respondents also
declare when they have filed for bankruptcy in the 2004 and 2008 interviews and
how many maxed-out credit cards they have in 2008. Finding a similar association
between excess weight and other measures of financial distress would further validate
our interpretation. Second, it would be interesting and informative to know how
delinquency risk varies across the range of BMI. Third, our sample period partially
overlaps with the financial crisis. To assess the temporal robustness of our main
result, we use 2000 survey data to predict delinquencies reported in 2004.
Results are displayed in Table 3.A.4. In panel A, we use year 2004 covariates to
predict 2008 outcomes, and in panel B we use year 2000 covariates to predict 2004
outcomes. Being obese is associated with a 0.9 percentage point greater incidence
of bankruptcy and 2.8 percentage point greater incidence of reaching a credit card
limit. While statistically insignificant, the 0.9 percentage point impact of obesity on
bankruptcies in 2008 is economically large (0.9 percentage points relative to the 3.87%
incidence rate amounts to a 23% higher bankruptcy rate). Also, with the exception
of the thinly populated underweight category, we find that financial distress risk
increases for the most part across the BMI classifications.
One potential drawback to predicting 2008 financial distress is the interference
of the financial crisis that began in August 2007. Note that the delinquency rate in
our sample rises only modestly from 18.17% in 2004 to 18.49% in 2008, suggesting
that delinquencies reported in the 2008 interview do not yet fully reflect the changing
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economic environment. The 2008 NLSY interviews were conducted between January
2008 and April 2009, with 65% of the observations taken by the end of the first
quarter in 2008, and 82% by the end of the second quarter. As is evident from Fig.
3.A.2, national delinquency rates for consumer loans and mortgages began rising in
2006, albeit at a very slow pace. Growth in mortgage delinquencies accelerated in
mid 2007, but growth in consumer loan delinquencies and the unemployment rate
accelerated only in mid 2008. The NLSY79 data shows a similar pattern. Respon-
dents who answered the survey in the first quarter of 2008 have lower incidences of
delinquency and unemployment than respondents who answered the survey later, but
the magnitude of the difference is relatively small.
The caveat to using surveys prior to 2004 to predict financial distress in 2004 is
the lack of detailed information on assets and debts (e.g., no information on credit
card or student loans) and no information on credit histories. Some of our control
variables will be measured differently (e.g., debt-to-income and debt-to-asset ratios)
or be excluded from the 2000 credit risk model (e.g., credit history). Therefore, the
estimated marginal effects of the various BMI categories on delinquencies are not
directly comparable between the 2000 and 2004 credit risk models. Nevertheless, the
results in panel B are qualitatively similar to those in panel A. We conjecture that
the link between obesity and financial distress that we document in the cross-section
is stable over time and not driven by the financial crisis.
3.A.1.2 Estimates from Propensity Scoring
The purpose of adding the many factors to our credit risk model was to account for
differences between the obese and non-obese, so that we do not mistakenly attribute
delinquencies to obesity. An alternative way to achieve this goal is to use propensity
scoring. The propensity score is the predicted probability that a respondent is obese
based on his/her observed characteristics, which we obtain from a probit regression
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of obesity on the full set of credit risk attributes. The weights emphasize the compar-
ison of obese and non-obese that are similar in their observable characteristics (see
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) for an early application and Nichols ((2007),
(2008)) for details on the implementation).56
Fig. 3.A.3 displays the distribution of propensity scores for the obese and non-
obese before and after reweighting. The upper panel utilizes the observable and
permissible characteristics (see Table 3.3) for propensity scoring; the lower panel also
includes the factors that are prohibited or unobservable to the lender (see Table 3.5).
The left hand panels indicate that the the credit risk factors are strongly correlated
with obesity. The right hand panels indicate that the distributions overlap almost
perfectly over the entire range of propensity scores after we reweight the observations,
which suggests that we have sufficient variation in obesity across the spectrum of
observable credit risk factors.
In Table 3.A.5 we display the estimates from regressing delinquency on obesity
after propensity scoring. We implement propensity scoring in two ways: including
the score as a control variable in the regression (columns 1 and 3) and using the score
to reweigh the observations (giving more weight to the more typical observations;
columns 2 and 4). Restricting the regressions to the common support is superfluous,
as the common support covers almost the entire range of the propensity scores. We
find that the likelihood of delinquency among the obese is about 4.0 percentage points
higher than among the non-obese, with a standard error of about 1.4 percentage
points. This estimate based on propensity scoring is very close to the benchmark
estimate of 3.8 percentage points.
56Propensity score methods are often considered a valid approach to causal inference, albeit less
convincing than experiments, regression discontinuity designs, or instrumental variables. Neverthe-
less, we caution against the causal interpretation of our results, both due to data constraints and
our use of obesity as a proxy for or signal of credit risk. A causal interpretation of the results is not
necessary for the objective of our paper; we merely attempt to establish that obesity is incrementally
informative about the likelihood of the repayment of debt.
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3.A.1.3 Non-monotonic Effects of BMI on Delinquency: Evidence from
Semiparametric Estimation
Gronniger (2006) argues that variation in BMI within a broad category need not
have a monotonic effect on outcomes like mortality. As such, the optimal level of
BMI may not belong to the BMI category with the best average outcome. To gain a
better understanding of the relationship between BMI and delinquency across the full
range of BMIs, we estimate the relationship between BMI and delinquency semipara-
metrically. Fig. 3.A.4 plots the predicted probability of delinquency for an average
individual at any given level of BMI. All covariates other than BMI are collapsed into
a propensity score, which is treated parametrically. We find that the delinquency risk
increases over most of the BMI spectrum and most drastically between BMIs of 30
and 37. The evidence suggests that our main result is not qualitatively sensitive to
the definition or classification of obesity.
3.A.2 Measurement Error
Our primary variables of interest, obesity and delinquency, rely on survey data
and are potentially mismeasured. The following discussion is largely based on Bound,
Brown and Mathiowetz (2001). Due to the nature of our data, the measurement error
cannot be of the classical form: (i) BMI is the ratio of weight squared and height,
which implies that classical measurement error in the inputs would no longer be
classical for BMI; (ii) obesity and delinquency are binary variables, and therefore
measurement error must be mean reverting. We will therefore focus our discussion of
measurement error on the potential consequences of misclassification of obesity and
delinquency.
Whereas classical measurement error in continuous dependent variables does not
bias the coefficient estimates, misclassification error in the dependent variable causes
the estimates to be biased in probit models. Assuming that delinquency is the only
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mismeasured variable, the marginal effect of obesity on the observed delinquency rate
will differ from the marginal effect of obesity on the true delinquency rate by a factor
of 1 − τ01 − τ10, where τ01 is the probability of unreported delinquencies conditional
on actually being delinquent (false negatives) and τ10 captures false positives (Haus-
man, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998)). We can obtain a rough estimate of the
misclassification probability by comparing the bankruptcy rate reported by NLSY
respondents to the national bankruptcy rate based on court filings. Measured over
years 2004 to 2008, the bankruptcy rate among NLSY respondents is 26% lower than
the national rate. Assuming that classification error stems from underreporting only,
the marginal effect of obesity on the observed delinquency rate is 74% of the marginal
effect on the true delinquency rate.57
Turning to misclassification in obesity, let us assume that the measurement er-
ror is non-differential (i.e., conditional on true obesity, the error is independent of
delinquency). Based on Aigner (1973), Bound et al. (2001) show that the bias factor
is
1− pi01pi
pi01pi + (1− pi10)(1− pi) −
pi10(1− pi)
pi10(1− pi) + (1− pi01)pi , (3.A.1)
where pi is the true prevalence of obesity, pi01 is the probability of false negatives,
and pi10 is the probability of false positives. The estimated coefficient on obesity will
be biased towards zero, but — for sufficiently high degrees of misclassification —
can lead to a sign reversal on the estimated coefficient (i.e., the factor would turn
negative).
To quantify the potential downward bias in the obesity estimate, we obtain esti-
mates of the various probabilities from Grabner (2009), who compares the extent of
bias between self-reported and measured height and weight and the effect on BMI and
57Additional bias may arise from inconsistent estimation of the coefficients. Implementing
the solution proposed by Hausman et al. (1998) — explicitly allowing for misclassification in
the likelihood function — yields an estimate of the marginal effect of obesity on delinquency
that is about 35% higher than the benchmark estimate. The Stata routine is available at
〈http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/economics/faculty/ja8294?tab=139〉.
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obesity across various data sets. Survey respondents tend to overstate their height
and underreport their weight, leading primarily to false negatives in the obesity clas-
sification. According to Grabner’s Fig. 1.2.a, average measured BMI in NHANES is
about 1.5 units higher than average self-reported BMI in NHIS and BRFSS. Adding
the difference to each respondent’s reported BMI in NLSY raises the prevalence of
obesity in our sample from 27.7% to 37.3%. With pi01 = 9.6/37.3 as the misclas-
sification rate and pi = 37.3% as the true obesity prevalence, we obtain from eq.
(3.A.1) a factor of 0.87. That is, the amount of misclassification inherent in obesity
suggests that our estimate of the obesity effect is downward biased by about 13%.
Alternatively, Grabner’s Fig. 1.2.b suggests a true obesity rate of about 35% (based
on measured NHANES data), and a misclassification rate of 28.6% (underreporting
of obesity by 10 percentage points in NHIS/BRFSS data). These assumptions also
yield an estimated downward bias of 13%.58,59,60
Looking at measurement error in obesity and delinquency independently suggests
that the true relationship between the variables is stronger than what we capture
in the benchmark specification. However, in theory systematic joint misreporting of
weight, height, and delinquency could induce a positive correlation between obesity
and delinquency. Suppose that in the true state of the world the obese and non-
obese are equally likely to be delinquent. Yet, individuals who are self-conscious and
58The heading to Fig. 1.2.b states that it depicts class I obesity rates, but in private correspondence
Grabner has confirmed that it reflects the overall obesity rate.
59A second concern is that BMI does not distinguish between fat and muscle mass or bone struc-
ture, which leads to substantial measurement error. Utilizing results from Burkhauser and Cawley
(2008), we estimate bias factors of 0.5 (based on classification errors and prevalence without the
treshold adjustment) and 0.4 (with the threshold adjustment).
60Sometimes, researchers attempt to correct for misreporting bias with regression-based adjust-
ments, calibrated on the difference between reported and measured height and weight data from
NHANES. While BMI and obesity prevalence estimates are affected substantially, the relationship
between BMI or obesity and various outcomes appears to be insensitive to the self-reporting bias.
For example, Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002) and Zagorsky (2005) report that adjustments to BMIs
calculated from NLSY data do not substantively alter their results. More recently, Grabner (2009)
concludes that self-reported BMIs from other datasets (such as BRFSS and NHIS) are valid sources
for BMI trends and associations despite their bias, but cautions against adjusting self-reported data
based on NHANES calibrated corrections due to significant differences in self-reports across the data
sets.
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insecure are more likely to understate BMI and delinquency, as both are perceived
negatively in society. Thus, compared to the true state of the world, misreporting
would lead to more non-obese respondents and a lower delinquency rate among them
in the data. However, correlated misclassification cannot match the magnitude of our
benchmark estimate under reasonable assumptions.
Finally, we acknowledge the possibility that using classically mismeasured values
in place of true values in control variables (e.g., income and wealth) only partially
controls for the confounding effects of the correctly measured variables on the estimate
of the effect of obesity on delinquency (Bound et al. (2001)).
In conclusion, there are several reasons to believe that the estimated effect of
obesity on delinquency is biased downward, and a few reasons for why the effect might
be biased upward. Taken together, it is difficult to assess the relative magnitudes of
the potential biases inherent in the data, but there is no indication that the obesity
effect is fully attributable to measurement error.
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3.A.3 Additional Figures
Figure 3.A.1: Bankruptcy Rates Across BMI Categories
This graph displays the bankruptcy rate across the BMI categories (brackets denote the 95% confidence interval).
Bankruptcy refers to bankruptcies declared between 2004 and 2008. Data source: NLSY79.
138
Figure 3.A.2: Economic Environment Before and During the Sample Period
To gauge the impact of the financial crisis on the delinquency rate reported in the 2008 NLSY interview, we plot the
unemployment rate and the residential real estate loan and consumer loan delinquency rates over time. The 2008
NLSY interviews were conducted between January 2008 and April 2009, with 65% of the observations taken by the
end of Q1 2008, and 82% by Q2. Data sources: BLS and Federal Reserve Bank.
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Figure 3.A.3: Comparability of Obesity Propensity Scores Before and After Reweight-
ing
Numerous observable predictors of obesity are also known credit risk factors. These graphs illustrate the comparability
of obese and non-obese respondents. The figures on the left display the kernel density estimates of the probability
density functions of unadjusted propensity scores (i.e., predicted probabilities that individuals are obese) for the
obese and non-obese. The figures on the right display propensity-score-reweighted densities (i.e., giving more weight
to observations that are representative of the population average). The upper panel is based on the permissible and
observable characteristics (Table 3.3, column 5). The lower panel also includes the additional covariates from Table
3.5 (e.g., race and gender). Data source: NLSY79.
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Figure 3.A.4: Average Rate of Delinquency Across BMIs — Local Linear Estimates
The plot represents the predicted probability of delinquency for an average individual at a given BMI according
to semiparametric regression results (kernel bandwidth = 2, pilot bandwidth = 3). All covariates other than BMI
(including all typical observable credit risk factors, but excluding those prohibited from inclusion in credit risk models)
were collapsed into a propensity score, which was then treated parametrically. Data source: NLSY79.
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3.A.4 Additional Tables
Table 3.A.1: Marginal Effect of Obesity on Delinquency After Controlling for Income,
Wealth, and Debt Capacity
The table displays marginal effects of obesity on delinquency, estimated from credit risk probit models. All explanatory
variables are from the 2004 survey; the dependent variable Delinquent comes from the 2008 survey. In columns 1–4, we
individually introduce the income, wealth, debt characteristics as control variables. To achieve a flexible specification,
each characteristic is represented by 6 attributes (5 attributes for the quintiles of the distribution and one attribute for
missing responses). The first quintile represents the base category; estimates for the missing category are suppressed for
brevity. In column 5 we control for all attributes simultaneously. In column 6, we increase the number of attributes by
creating deciles. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by residence typology (region and urban/rural),
and accounting for the complex survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from
zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
Quintile attributes Deciles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Obese 0.066*** 0.057*** 0.082*** 0.070*** 0.051*** 0.050***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Income Q2 -0.068*** -0.055***
(0.021) (0.020)
Income Q3 -0.110*** -0.064***
(0.019) (0.021)
Income Q4 -0.150*** -0.083***
(0.011) (0.017)
Income Q5 -0.204*** -0.117***
(0.022) (0.021)
Wealth Q2 -0.070*** -0.073***
(0.024) (0.025)
Wealth Q3 -0.176*** -0.158***
(0.018) (0.023)
Wealth Q4 -0.196*** -0.165***
(0.017) (0.022)
Wealth Q5 -0.241*** -0.198***
(0.019) (0.028)
Debt/income Q2 0.024 0.040
(0.020) (0.027)
Debt/income Q3 -0.019 0.037
(0.017) (0.028)
Debt/income Q4 -0.021 0.034
(0.017) (0.029)
Debt/income Q5 0.027 0.043*
(0.026) (0.025)
Debt/assets Q2 -0.027 0.037
(0.021) (0.023)
Debt/assets Q3 -0.022 0.039**
(0.014) (0.018)
Debt/assets Q4 0.010 0.043*
(0.018) (0.025)
Debt/assets Q5 0.148*** 0.073***
(0.017) (0.022)
# of observations 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995
Pseudo-R2 0.039 0.0615 0.012 0.036 0.075 0.083
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Table 3.A.2: Marginal Effect of Obesity on Delinquency After Controlling for Credit
History (and Income, Wealth, and Debt Capacity)
The table displays marginal effects from credit risk probit models, delinquency reported in 2008 being the dependent
variable. All explanatory variables are from the 2004 survey. In all specifications, we include the set of controls
used in column 5 of Table 3.A.1, but suppress their average marginal effects to save space. For the credit attributes,
the omitted category is Did not apply for credit. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by residence
typology (region and urban/rural), and accounting for the complex survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Observations are weighted using
NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Obese 0.037*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.035**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Delinquent 0.260*** 0.232***
(0.014) (0.013)
Bankrupt 0.073** 0.006
(0.031) (0.024)
Credit approved -0.014 -0.012
(0.011) (0.012)
Credit denied 0.163*** 0.091***
(0.020) (0.019)
Credit expected 0.110*** 0.043***
to be denied (0.022) (0.016)
Controls from Table 3.A.1 yes yes yes yes
# of observations 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995
Pseudo-R2 0.137 0.077 0.096 0.144
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Table 3.A.3: Marginal Effect of Obesity on Delinquency After Controlling for Em-
ployment Factors (and Income, Wealth, Debt Capacity, and Credit History)
The table displays marginal effects from credit risk probit models, delinquency reported in 2008 being the dependent
variable. All explanatory variables are from the 2004 survey, with the exception of Income instability coefficient
(based on survey years 1996–2004). In all specifications, we include the set of controls used in column 4 of Table
3.A.2. The omitted category for education attainment is Did not complete high school. Industry and occupation
dummies are based on 4-digit Census codes and follow the classification in the NLSY codebook. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors, clustered by residence typology (region and urban/rural), and accounting for the complex
survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance levels. Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Obese 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.035** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
Income instability Q2 0.022* 0.017
(0.012) (0.012)
Income instability Q3 0.014 0.008
(0.014) (0.014)
Income instability Q4 0.038* 0.030
(0.020) (0.019)
Income instability Q5 0.063*** 0.048***
(0.018) (0.017)
High school degree -0.013 -0.010
(0.017) (0.016)
Some college -0.008 -0.010
(0.017) (0.020)
College degree -0.028 -0.033
(0.021) (0.025)
Advanced degree -0.028** -0.040***
(0.013) (0.013)
1yr < job tenure ≤ 2yr 0.016 0.015
(0.017) (0.018)
2yr < job tenure ≤ 3yr 0.015 0.018
(0.022) (0.026)
3yr < job tenure -0.009 0.000
(0.010) (0.013)
Self-employed 0.065*** 0.040
(0.021) (0.027)
Unemployed 0.027 0.028
(0.019) (0.019)
Out of labor force 0.015 0.001
(0.010) (0.012)
Industry dummies yes no no no no yes
Occupation dummies yes no no no no yes
Controls from Table 3.A.1 yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls from Table 3.A.2 yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995
Pseudo-R2 0.156 0.148 0.146 0.146 0.149 0.162
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Table 3.A.4: Marginal Effects of Excess Weight on Financial Distress
The table displays marginal effects of obesity on subsequent financial distress, estimated from credit risk probit
models. The dependent variables are dummies indicating delinquency (columns 1 and 4), bankruptcy (columns 2 and
5), or maxing out a credit card (columns 3 and 6). In all specifications of Panel A, we include the set of controls
used in column 5 of Table 3.3. In Panel A, the measures of financial distress are obtained from the 2008 survey
and the explanatory variables from the 2004 survey. In Panel B, the financial distress measures are taken from the
2004 survey, and the explanatory variables from 2000. Note that the regressions in Panel B control for fewer credit
history variables, as they are not available in the 2000 survey (we only have information on prior bankruptcies).
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by residence typology (region and urban/rural), and accounting
for the complex survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% significance levels. Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
Panel A: 2004 Obesity → 2008 Financial Distress
Coarse Obesity Classification Finer Classification of BMI
Delinquent Bankrupt Maxed out Delinquent Bankrupt Maxed out
(n=1,482) (n=275) (n=784) (n=1,482) (n=275) (n=784)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Obese 0.038*** 0.009 0.028**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.014)
Underweight -0.064** 0.036 0.016
(0.029) (0.043) (0.040)
Overweight 0.028* 0.000 0.018**
(0.017) (0.005) (0.007)
Obese I 0.040*** 0.013 0.032*
(0.015) (0.008) (0.017)
Obese II/III 0.075*** 0.004 0.052**
(0.016) (0.008) (0.021)
BM controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of obs 6,995 6,787 6,853 6,995 6,787 6,853
Pseudo-R2 0.162 0.193 0.093 0.165 0.194 0.095
Panel B: 2000 Obesity → 2004 Financial Distress
Coarse Obesity Classification Finer Classification of BMI
Delinquent Bankrupt Delinquent Bankrupt
(n=1,440) (n=315) (n=1,440) (n=315)
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Obese 0.062*** 0.019***
(0.009) (0.006)
Underweight 0.066 0.025
(0.054) (0.018)
Overweight -0.005 0.004
(0.007) (0.006)
Obese I 0.055*** 0.022***
(0.018) (0.006)
Obese II/III 0.071*** 0.018*
(0.020) (0.010)
BM controls yes yes yes yes
# of obs 6,958 7,019 6,958 7,019
Pseudo-R2 0.081 0.171 0.082 0.172
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Table 3.A.5: Marginal Effect of Obesity on Delinquency After Propensity Scoring
The table displays estimates of the marginal effect of obesity on delinquency after propensity scoring. In columns 1
and 3 we include the propensity scores as a control in the regression of 2008 delinquencies on 2004 obesity. In columns
2 and 4 we use the propensity scores to reweigh the observations. In either case, restricting the sample to the common
support has no impact on the obesity coefficient. Note that R2 is much lower than in the comparable specifications in
column 5 of Table 3.3 and column 6 of Table 3.5, because the propensity score discards the information contained in
those covariates that explains variation in delinquencies, but is not correlated with obesity. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors, clustered by residence typology (region and urban/rural), and accounting for the complex survey
design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
levels. Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
Score estimated from covariates in Score estimated from covariates in
Table 3.3, column 5 Table 3.5, column 6
control reweigh control reweigh
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Obese 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.032**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
BM controls yes yes yes yes
Other controls no no yes yes
# of obs 6,995 6,995 6,995 6,995
Pseudo-R2 0.045 0.002 0.017 0.001
Observed prob 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.185
Predicted prob 0.185 0.188 0.185 0.190
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Table 3.A.6: Additional Evidence on Cross-sectional Heterogeneity in the Informa-
tiveness of Obesity
The table displays estimates of the marginal effect of obesity on delinquency across income and wealth quintiles (Panel
A) and conditional on credit history and across holdings of secured and unsecured debt (Panel B). All specifications
control include quintile attributes of the obesity propensity score. We run separate regressions for good and poor
credit histories. Poor credit history encompasses any of the adverse histories (delinquency, bankruptcy, or credit
denial) as well as the cases in which respondents expected to be denied. For debt types, we interact obesity with
debt type. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered by residence typology (region and urban/rural), and
accounting for the complex survey design, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences from zero
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Observations are weighted using NLSY 2004 sampling weights.
Panel A: Interactions with Income and Wealth
Average marginal effect of obesity over the quintiles of . . .
Income Wealth
marginal range w/in % obese marginal range w/in % obese
effect Q ($ thsd.) w/in Q effect Q ($ thsd.) w/in Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Obese
× Q1 0.041 0–29 34.0 0.035 -926–8 34.7
(0.029) (0.026)
× Q2 0.044 29–53 29.2 0.016 9–67 32.2
(0.028) (0.022)
× Q3 -0.005 53–76 32.1 0.032** 67–167 31.1
(0.028) (0.016)
× Q4 0.073*** 76–111 25.0 -0.009 167–354 24.1
(0.026) (0.027)
× Q5 0.118*** 111–443 18.0 0.182*** 354–2720 16.8
(0.037) (0.053)
BM controls yes yes
# of obs 6,995 6,995
Pseudo-R2 0.060 0.078
Panel B: Effect of Obesity by Credit History and Debt Type
Credit history Debt type
Good Poor
(1) (2) (3)
Obese 0.045*** 0.027
(0.013) (0.030)
Obese
× no debt 0.033
(19.9%) (0.027)
× secured debt only 0.035**
(52.9%) (0.014)
× unsecured debt only -0.013
(7.1%) (0.049)
× sec & unsec debt 0.075***
(20.1%) (0.025)
BM controls yes yes yes
# of observations 4,675 2,264 6,995
Pseudo-R2 0.016 0.008 0.069
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